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ABSTRACT
THE STATE, THE NONCITIZEN, AND
THE CHALLENGE OF BILATERAL LEGITIMACY
IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA
SEPTEMBER 2005
ALICIA MARIE RAMPULLA, B.A., EMMANUEL COLLEGE
M.A., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John Brigham
The dissertation sets out a theory to explain the ways in which three liberal-
democratic, immigrant-accepting nations maintained state authority in the face of
increasing cultural diversity. The challenge of bilateral legitimacy involves state attempts
to engender support for itself, as well as assessments regarding which noncitizens have
legitimate claims to join the polity. Those deemed unable (certain people of color,
especially those lacking financial and educational resources) or unwilling (those refusing
to relinquish allegiance to their ancestral homelands) to embrace state legitimacy are
considered illegitimate or unwelcome guests in the polity. In order to reinforce the unity
of the members of each community, and, consequently, the authority of the state that
governs them, a shared sense of culture, of social mores and traditions, is encouraged. In
the American, Australian, and Canadian cases, the shared identity that is the crux of
national unity is Anglo-Saxonism.
Major domestic and international events in the 1960s through the 1980s led to an
influx of non-Anglo immigrants and refugees to these nations. Since overtly racist
policies were no longer feasible (due to social movements within their borders and
throughout the globe), the states utilized metaphoric models and designed immigration
and refugee policies to mitigate threats allegedly posed by increases in cultural diversity.
Though the three nations erased much of the overt discrimination in the texts of their
national policies by the mid-1960s/early 1970s, implicit bias allowed for inegalitarian
implementation. The states perceived themselves, and their national futures, to be at risk
if Anglo-Saxon values and traditions were diluted. Anglo-Saxon dominance was tied
directly to the vitality of the nation.
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CHAPTER I
THE THEORY OF BILATERAL LEGITIMACY
Chapter One sets out a theory to explain the ways in which the state in liberal-
democratic, immigrant-accepting nations maintains its legitimacy in the face of
inci easing cultural diversity. Utilizing a constitutive approach to law and an interpretivist
conception of the state, the theory captures the complex symbolic relationship between
government and noncitizens, and contributes to the growing tradition ofNew Historical
Institutionalism (specifically the call to focus on the stories of peoplehood that structure
and define political landscapes.) 1
The belief that Anglo-Saxon traditions and values constitute the foundation for
successful democratic institutions functions as a lens through which issues of
immigration, refugee policy, and diversity are handled in the United States, Canada and
Australia. State rhetoric regarding citizenship serves to both exclude those it deems
unworthy of the privileges that accompany it (typically non-Anglos) and include those it
deems to be valuable members of the nation (typically Anglos). 2 Consequently, central
to the “political projects of people-making” 3 is an attempt to maintain the dominance of
Anglo-Saxon values and traditions, which ultimately reinforces the (Anglo-Saxon) state's
ability to govern. In fact, the states perceive themselves, and their nation’s futures, at risk
if Anglo-Saxon values and traditions become diluted. Citizenship claims from non-
citizens who fit into certain legally-defined categories and who share Anglo-Saxon values
are assumed to be more legitimate than those who do not. Non-Anglo-Saxon noncitizens
(especially those who arrive with little or no financial resources) constitute the ultimate
challenge to the state: the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. The state must compel
noncitizens to believe in the system’s legitimacy and to diffuse the negative impacts their
(illegitimate or near-illegitimate) presence is assumed to exert upon the economic welfare
and social cohesiveness of the state. In order to be accorded legitimacy, noncitizens must
convince the state that they do not pose a threat to the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture by
demonstrating allegiance to the state and adopting Anglo-Saxon cultural values.
Introduction
Imagine that you are traveling to a foreign country. Upon your arrival, you are told that
you are not only unwelcome but also “unacceptable.” Your identity, though supported by
1
Rogers M. Smith, Stories ofPeoplehood: The Politics and Morals ofPolitical Membership (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
2
For an example of a discussion of this issue by a Critical Race Theorist, see Ian F. Haney Lopez, White By
Law : The Legal Construction ofRace (New York: New York University Press, 1996). For examples of
such work by Queer Theorists, see Wendy Brown, States ofInjury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity’
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Carl Stychin, “Dis-Integrating Sexuality: Citizenship,
Space, And The European Union” (Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association, Chicago, Illinois, May 27-30.)
3
Smith, Stories ofPeoplehood, 43.
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your physical presence, a personal history, and documentation that testify to the validity
of the way in which you identify yourself, is disregarded. You are recognized as a human
being by the bureaucratic officials in charge of policing the visiting nation’s borders, but
are simultaneously regarded as an illegitimate visitor, an intruder. Your new status,
which is entirely out of your control, defines you, though it is not based on anything that
makes you an individual. Instead, politics have changed during your trip so that your
nation of origin is no longer recognized as a sovereign political entity by the visiting
nation’s government, effectively erasing the legal significance of the documentation that
justifies your physical presence. Consequently, you are both visible and invisible. You
are visible in both a tangible and a legal sense: you have a physical presence but your
status as an intruder renders you as an entity targeted for removal. Therefore, your
illegitimacy makes you visible, but only in a negative sense: it derives from the desire on
the part of state officials to make you physically disappear. At the same time, the fact
that your status consumes your identity while you exist within the visiting nation’s
borders renders invisible all of the qualities that make you an individual, that make you
unique. Moreover, the reason for your visit and your justification for remaining become
irrelevant. Your nation has been rendered illegitimate, so, as an extension of that
political entity, you are illegitimate, too.
This is the premise of Steven Spielberg’s film, The Terminal. Viktor Navorski,
played by Tom Hanks, is a citizen of an Eastern European nation that is taken over by a
military coup while he is in transit to New York’s J.F.K. airport. United States’ custom
officials inform him that his visa and passport are no longer valid because the U.S.
government does not recognize his homeland, the fictional Krakhozia, as a sovereign
2
nation. An aspiring Field Director, Frank Dixon (Stanley Tucci), displays frustration at
the situation, given the fact that it does not fit comfortably into any bureaucratic
prescriptive. To make matters worse, Navorski initially fails to grasp the significance of
his predicament because he knows enough English only to tour the city and bureaucratic
officials put little effort into finding an interpreter for him. Navorski must remain in the
airport because, as Dixon apathetically explains, to people like him (to intruders, to
illegitimate visitors), “America is closed.” The film follows Navorski through his trials
and tribulations as he spends nine months in the airport waiting for his nation of origin to
regain its diplomatic authority, which would reinstate the validity of his travel documents
and enable him to explore American soil as a welcome (and legitimate) visitor .4
The use of The Terminal to introduce the theory of bilateral legitimacy is for
illustrative purposes only. The film does not tell a common story or paint an accurate
picture of the experience of noncitizens (illegal or otherwise) and/or those who come to
the United States seeking political asylum. However, many of the film’s themes reflect
the American, Australian, and Canadian cultural paradigms regarding the authority of the
national government to determine who does, and who does not, deserve to join the polity.
Also brought to light is the complexity of how legitimacy functions on both a macro- and
a micro-level in liberal-democratic societies. The state must possess legitimacy in order
to govern effectively, and noncitizens must be recognized by the state as legitimate in
order to be full participants in the polity. Members of racial or ethnic minority groups
face additional obstacles to successfully demonstrating their legitimacy because they are
assumed to reject the dominant cultural values necessary to accepting the democratic
4
Gervasi, Sacha and Jeff Nathanson, The Terminal, Produced by Jason Hoffs, Directed by Steven
Spielberg, 128 min, Dreamwork Pictures, 2004.
3
state as a legitimate governor. Metaphors and images that characterize rhetoric on
immigrants and refugees are present in the film. The nation is referred to as a house or
home with vulnerable entrances and exits or “borders.” It is bounded, limited. The state,
usually reduced to its bureaucratic entities, is regarded by dominant society as
responsible for policing those vulnerable areas from undesirable forces. Groups of
people seeking entry (noncitizens) are believed to constitute “floods,” “booms,” or
“invasions,” essentially energy that disregards rules and limitations. In this sense, the
house (or the nation) is fundamentally static, and is threatened by uncontrollable forces
(“floods” of noncitizens who carry illegitimate requests.) The currents that drive
noncitizens’ attempts at inclusion consume the individuality of these visitors. They
constitute one whole as opposed to complicated sets of distinct human beings with unique
histories and futures. These forces drive multi-dimensionality onto what is believed to be
a safe, static plane.
Viktor Navorski initially fails to comprehend the boundaries within which he
finds himself. His lack of knowledge of the English language and an overall
unfamiliarity with the United States political system illustrate the widespread assumption
that floods of would-be visitors threaten the boundaries that preserve our nation’s safety.
Noncitizens are assumed to disrespect liberal-democratic law, especially when specific
policies prevent them from taking up legal residence in the United States. Dixon
exemplifies this perspective. For example, he assumes that Navorski will leave the
airport and attempt to disappear (choose invisibility) within the fluid boundaries of New
York City. It is at that point that authorization for deportation (the most effective way of
making him invisible) would become justified because Navorski would have broken
4
national law. However, customs officials and airport employees are stunned when
Navorski obeys the law as he understands it, which is to wait for authorization to leave
the boundaries of the airport.
For noncitizens who possess a basic respect for liberal-democratic law, there is
still a popular assumption that they will become violators; particularly when doing so is
advantageous. In one scene, Dixon attempts to assist Navorski in applying for political
asylum in order to legitimize his presence. He coaxes Navorski into constructing a case
of “credible fear,” a claim recognized by courts as valid for remaining in the U.S. Viktor
fails to provide the “right” answers to Dixon’s questions. This scene suggests that
noncitizens may fail to navigate the system even when the tools are explained, especially
when those tools are offered by immigration officials using unclear culturally-coded
discursive practices. Dixon’s body language and his use of verbal innuendos make it
clear to the audience that Dixon is seeking an affirmative answer to his questions, even if
they are less than truthful. Navorski simply answers the questions honestly. Though we
are never sure whether or not Navorski catches on to the culturally-loaded discourse, we
are confident that Navorski has adopted a respect for the boundaries of the system
because he chooses, on multiple occasions, not to leave the airport (even when Dixon
arranges for the exit doors to be unarmed.) As the movie progresses, the audience is
encouraged to dislike Dixon as embodying the least compassionate features of our
system, which stands in contrast to Navorski’s sympathetic persona. Navorski, the
vulnerable outsider, becomes the law-abider, the type of resident believed to enhance our
society. At the same time, Dixon is cold and calculating and is willing to try to bend the
policies surrounding political asylum in order to render a bureaucratic glitch (and the
5
person embodying it) invisible. Dixon, the legitimate bureaucratic official entrusted with
preventing the invasion or “flood” of those with illegitimate claims for residency,
becomes wholly unsympathetic. By the completion of the film, legitimacy has taken on
an extra-legal property: it is the willingness to obey the law, to abide by the limits and
boundaries of the legal system, and not merely the status of one's nation of origin nor the
paperwork documenting one’s identity. Navorski ultimately earns legitimacy through the
court of public opinion.
A respect for liberal-democratic law and a dedication to abide by its policies at all
costs (in Navorski’s case, being forced to subsist on meals consisting of crackers and
condiments and to sleep on a bed created out of airport chairs) is central to foreigners’
assimilation to the new nation. Adoption of the socio-political and cultural tenets of a
society is believed to be crucial to the diffusion of the potential danger to the system
caused by newcomers. Acceptance of the system necessarily implies a refusal to
challenge it. Though the nation is assumed to be one-dimensional, the process of
becoming part of it is not regarded as linear. As the film depicts, assimilation is most
worthy of celebration when the best features of the system are championed by those most
disadvantaged by it. If those who benefit the least from the rules and regulatory
procedures embrace them, then the worth of the system is reinforced. Navorski'
s
willingness to abide by the Byzantine rules of American law, rules that were explained to
him without the help of a translator or a legal advocate, compels virtually all of the
airport employees (including recent immigrants and minorities) to rejoice in the
legitimacy of the system. In this sense, noncitizens become a compass for defining the
boundaries of the system (regarding who does and who does not “belong ’) and
6
celebrating its success. Assimilation of new residents is perceived to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the political system because it renders the uncontrollable forces
controllable, or at least manageable. Diffusion of new residents’ characteristics that
compel them to challenge the rules and regulations of the U.S. occurs. The flood
gradually becomes a body that is less likely to drown the polity and its government.
But, why does Navorski develop a respect for a system that renders him
“unacceptable”? The movie suggests that he possesses an innate sense, a respect for the
purpose and intent behind the system. This is the most important characteristic of a
legitimate member of the polity, at least from the perspective of the liberal-democratic
state. In other words, Navorski “c[a]me to have [a] sense of political affiliation and
allegiance” or of “belonging” despite his unacceptable or illegitimate status. Thus, in the
world of Spielberg’s The Terminal
,
the state was overwhelmingly successful at its
“process of people-making.”5 Of course, outside of Hollywood movie sets, the process is
more complex. Surprisingly, despite the importance of this process to the understanding
of human society, political scientists have spent too little time studying it. According to
Rogers Smith,
Political scientists . . . have paid far more attention to questions of state structures
and issues of the distribution of resources and power than they have to issues of
how, in general, political memberships and identities come to exist and become
institutionalized, and how they are then sustained or transformed . 6
Fostering allegiance among potential citizens, especially those viewed as least suitable to
assimilation because of their racial or ethnic backgrounds, is one of the most difficult
tasks the state allegedly faces.
5
Smith, Stories ofPeoplehood, 15, 32.
6
Ibid., 11-12.
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The Challenge of Bilateral Legitimacy
The state’s need for both citizens and noncitizens to pledge allegiance ^coupled
with the requirement that residents function successfully within the socioeconomic
system - is an intriguing phenomenon that I have called the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy. The multifaceted human and extra-human components that constitute the
state coalesce in ways that seek for its maintenance, including policy decisions that
preserve the status quo. Unexpected events and phenomena outside of the state’s control
are perceived to be threats. The more difficult to control is the threat, the greater is the
potential hazard. Liberal-democratic states act from the assumption that non-Anglo
noncitizens threaten the stability of social life and the security of the economic
marketplace. Whether or not perceived threats, such as the influx of newcomers with
cultural and language traditions that differ from the nation’s dominant culture, actually
jeopardize the state’s ability to govern is controversial . 7 Regardless, the state’s vitality is
doubly challenged: both by the perceived threat and by the degree to which citizens can
be assured of the state’s ability to mitigate that threat.
National identities are cultivated in part via control over the boundaries that
separate communities. In order to reinforce the unity of the members of each community,
and, consequently, the authority of the state that governs them, a shared sense of culture,
of social mores and traditions, is encouraged. This “shared identity” runs “deeper than a
Q e 9
transient intersection of interests.” In the American, Australian, and Canadian cases, the
shared identity that is the crux of national unity is fundamentally Anglo-Saxon. Diversity
of tradition, language, etc., “challenge strong senses of political identity and the
7 Though this is a subject worthy of study, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
x
William James Booth, “Foreigners: Insiders, Outsiders and the Ethics of Membership,” The
Review ofPolitics, vol. 59, no.2 (Spring 1997): 281.
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definition of the community as a we-group united by history, values and culture .”9 Thus,
diversity is perceived to threaten the very heart of the polity and the authority of the state
that both embodies it and governs over it. Anglo-Saxon values are at the core of the ties
that bind members of the community, the state’s identity, and consequently, national
identity. It is in the state s interest and, arguably, the nation’s, to compel unification
through assimilation of non-Anglos. Those deemed unable (certain people of color,
especially those lacking financial and educational resources) or unwilling (those refusing
to relinquish allegiance to their ancestral homelands by preserving non-Anglo traditions
outside of the private sphere) to assimilate are deemed illegitimate and unwelcome
visitors to the polity.
Social scientists and others have recognized that certain groups (based on racial,
ethnic, and gender identities) have been denied the privileges of citizenship by these
nations. However, scholars have not explored the dynamic ways in which such systems
have sought actively to maintain legitimacy by shaping their political cultures 10 in ways
that diffuse the conflict caused by promising liberty and equality to their citizens on the
one hand, and denying ethnic and racial groups full membership privileges on the other.
9
Ibid., p. 288.
10
The concept of political culture has been explored at length. For the comparative politics
approach, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba’s classic The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963) or
Robert Putnam, Robert Leonard, and Rafaella Y. Nanettfs MakingDemocracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.) For an excellent
critique of this literature, see Lisa Wedeen’s “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political
Science,” American Political Science Review, vol.96, no.4, (December 2002.) My work utilizes a
definition advanced by Eileen McDonagh and others in the New Historical Institutionalism (NHI)
school: the basic political attitudes, belief systems, or ideological perspectives of a nation, which
are affirmed by a political system. Eileen McDonagh, “Political Citizenship and
Democratization: The Gender Paradox,” American Political Science Review, vol.96, no. 3,
(September 2002.) I also agree with Wedeen’s argument that advances in technology and global
movement have decreased the uniqueness and firm delineations between/among cultures.
9
My theory responds to Rogers Smith’s call for political scientists to refocus our
efforts on the more human (as opposed to structural) side of political reality by studying
the complex relationship between the state and non-Anglo noncitizens. Smith explains
that, though the extent to which members are compelled to prioritize their national
affiliation over other memberships varies among political societies, modem political
regimes like the United States demand “strong and wide” political allegiance." Political
officials are some of the “architects” of “forms of peoplehood” who “seek to create
stable structures of power enabling them to accomplish their varied ends.” 12 One of the
most important “ends” is, of course, maintaining the state’s ability to exert control over
its people - which is best accomplished in a stable environment. In that sense, the state
must promulgate morals and values that compel citizens and noncitizens to support the
legitimacy of the system of government. Two means are typically utilized to “constitute
institutions of membership and exclusion that structure and distribute power and
resources in unequal ways.” One involves “coercive force,” a realm to which political
scientists have devoted much time and energy. The other incorporates “persuasive
stories” about the nation’s history, contemporary politics, external or internal threats, etc.
that shape the “formations of political identities.” 13 Though many of the tools used in the
implementation of immigration and refugee policies, along with the institutionalization of
measures to manage diversity, fall into the category of coercive force, the discourse
surrounding their enactment reveals and shapes the persuasive stories that are at the core
of each nation’s political culture. Since the creation of peoplehood is essentially a social
as opposed to a biological or natural process, political scientists must analyze the
' 1
Smith, Stories ofPeoplehood, 21, 22.
12
Ibid., 37.
13
Ibid., 43.
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historical and political forces and “constrained, asymmetrical” relationships between
“actual and would-be leaders of political communities .” 14 The state, along with its action
and inaction, is often the protagonist in these stories.
My theory also reflects a recently rejuvenated focus in Comparative Politics: the
emphasis on the state (or the study of state-society relations).
15
The central assumption
of this approach is that the state is a “key regulator of interest group activity, of political
parties, and of the policy-making process ." 16 The state in a constitutional society (a
society in which the rule of law prevails) is a key actor in terms of the way in which
nations develop because the state creates “procedural guarantees and restraints .” 17
Similarly, the expansion of the state in Canada and other Western nations has “important
implications for the capacity of the state to sustain its own authority.” 18 Though there is
no authoritative theory of the state, I utilized the conceptions advanced by sociolegal
scholars, Queer Theorists, and Critical Race Theorists. In Bringing the State Back In,
Theda Skocpol contends that historical analysis is a necessary part of state-focused
research in order to illuminate the ways that state institutions are created or adapted to
social change .
1
1
Operating from a modified Marxist approach (in which the state is
conceived of as an entity characterized by complexity and not simply a tool of the
14
Ibid., 32.
15
For example, see Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter Evans et al.
Bringing The State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
16 Howard Wiarda, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes (California:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993); 77.
17
Daniel P. Franklin and Michael J. Baun, eds, Political Culture and Constitutionalism: A
Comparative Approach, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); 1, 5.
18
Keith Banting, State and Society: Canada in Comparative Perspective (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1986); 1.
19
Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,”
Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, eds., Bringing The State Back In, 1 1.
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conceived oi as an entity characterized by complexity and not simply a tool of the
dominant class), Skocpol argues that, in order to assess the state’s strength, we must
consider its autonomy. States are compelled to act autonomously in order to maintain
domestic order. In this situation, the state may simply ignore, or be forced to ignore, the
demands ot the dominant or other classes in society. Much research recognizes the fact
that the influence of the state coexists with other social forces in its influence over social
lite. 1 he state is often considered to be one group in society competing for social control.
It must attain legitimacy in order to maintain sufficient social control. 20 As Rogers Smith
has pointed out, the state often seeks to obtain the primary allegiance of its citizens
among competing groups.
My theory incorporates a broad conception of the state that involves “a set of
institutions, a condensation of social relations, a national, corporate identity, and
monopolist of legitimate public violence.”21 In other words, the state is the “political
dimension of the entire order - individuals as citizens and taxpayers, electoral campaigns
and processes, public officials, [and] lawmaking institutions.”22 Despite the complexity
of its functioning, the state effectively shapes public discourse in order to promulgate
values that support the system’s legitimacy to govern. National leaders of that discourse
possess “certain conceptions of their possible identities, interests, and ideals and not
others.” They are not fully constrained by these conceptions, but they are heavily
20
Joel Migdal, “A Model of State-Society Relations,” Howard Wiarda, ed., New Directions in
Comparative Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
21
Davina Cooper, “An Engaged State: Sexuality, Governance, and the Potential for Change,”
Joseph Bristow and Angelia R. Wilson, eds., Activating Theory: Lesbian , Gay , and Bisexual
Politics (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1993).
22
William E. Connolly, Identity / Difference : Democratic Negotiations Oj Political Paradox
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 206-207.
12
successful democratic institutions functions as a lens through which issues of
immigration, refugee policy, and cultural diversity are handled. The characteristics of the
ideal citizen are consequently racialized. State rhetoric regarding citizenship serves to
both exclude those it deems unworthy of the privileges that accompany it (typically
nonAnglos) and includes those it deems to be valuable members of the nation (typically
Anglos ).
24
Consequently, central to the “political projects of people-making”25 is an
attempt to maintain the dominance of Anglo-Saxomsm, which ultimately reinforces the
(Anglo-Saxon) state’s ability to govern. White skin color and fluency in English are
considered to be the most accurate indicators of Anglo-Saxon values.
The theory of bilateral legitimacy builds upon postpositivist perspectives
regarding the nonstructural influence of the state. William Connolly examines the
intricate link between individuals’ perceptions of themselves as free citizens in a
democratic system and their belief in state authority to achieve common societal
objectives. In other words, “one’s self-identification as a free individual is bound up with
a common belief in the capacity of the state to promote publicly defined purposes .”26
The state, defined as “the political dimension of the entire order”27 and the representative
of collective identity, is influenced significantly by the identity politics of its citizens. It
attempts to bolster its authority by constructing policies that capitalize upon the loyalty
24
For an example of a discussion of this issue by a Critical Race Theorist, see Ian F. Haney
Lopez, White By Law: The Legal Construction ofRace (New York: New York University Press,
1996). For examples of such work by Queer Theorists, see Wendy Brown, States ofInjury:
Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Carl
Stychin, “Dis-Integrating Sexuality: Citizenship, Space, And The European Union,” Paper
presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago, Illinois,
May 27-30.
25
Smith, Stories ofPeoplehood, 43.
26
Connolly, Identity/Difference, 198.
27
Ibid., 206.
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that is engendered among its citizens when “internal or external threats to collective
identity emerge. Since national unity demands “repression of difference,”29 the state
classifies people into groups, codifies such classifications into law, and then treats people
differently in accordance with those classifications. The power to define “is a highly
strategic power invested in the state.’ 1 In fact, the state becomes the institutional
embodiment of societal values that are essential to managing cultural diversity
.
31
Though
the institutions that compose the state are not the only societal entities making
distinctions with cultural cogency, such distinctions are of significant importance because
they carry with them socioeconomic benefits. The actions of institutions (defined
broadly to include intellectual traditions by scholars in the new historical institutionalism,
or NHI, movement) are important to explaining the disadvantaged positions of minority
groups. Institutions are regarded as highly influential because they shape the values,
identities, and behavior of both the people who work within the system and those who
seek to change it. Individuals and the structures in which they operate are inextricably
intertwined; in fact, “agents and structural principles are a duality.”32
As sociolegal scholars have demonstrated, state activity is both influenced by
culture and shapes it. Smith has argued that stories of peoplehood that are promulgated
by the state both serve state interests (in the sense of engendering allegiance) and help to
Ibid., 202.
29
Jon Stratton and Ien Ang, “Multicultural Imagined Communities: Cultural difference and
national identity in the USA and Australia,” Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and
Identity, edited by David Bennett (London: Routledge, 1998) 135.
30
Connolly, Identity / Difference, 207.
31
Stratton and Ang, “Multicultural States,
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constitute those interests “for aspiring leaders and potential constituents alike.”33 The
state responds to individuals/groups and “help[s] to construct the players before, during,
and after the game, particularly when it fears that “ignoring them could arouse
disruptive activity and a loss of credibility.”35 In order to prevent disruptive social forces,
the state engages in what Davina Cooper calls a “hegemonic project” which involves a
normative agenda constructed both to win popular consent and to deploy such consent
for the achievement of particular goals.” The state does this primarily through the
employment of “discursive strategies” that promulgate ideological and cultural values
that reinforce the legitimacy of the system. 36 Though the state is a hegemon, its power is
not absolute. Instead, it exists within a context of social unrest with various forces
competing (sometimes successfully) to obtain control over state institutions or, at the
very least, to decenter the forces monopolizing state power.
Major domestic and international events in the 1960s through the 1980s led to an
influx of non-Anglo immigrants and refugees to the United States, Australia and Canada.
Persons who demonstrated respect for the political system by applying for residency via
the state’s proper channels and who possessed cultural traditions and/or political views
akin to Anglo-Saxon values were most likely to be regarded as legitimate. Conversely,
the state sought to ensure that newcomers and long-time residents alike would recognize
the state as the legitimate sovereign. Since allegiance to the state could never be fully
assumed, especially among long-time citizens who considered noncitizens a threat to
their cultural and, in some cases, socioeconomic status, and liberal-democratic states
33
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could not exert extreme physical force over their polities without consequence, the
American, Canadian and Australian states created mechanisms to compel support. The
state compelled noncitizens to believe in the system’s legitimacy in order to diffuse the
negative impacts that (illegitimate or near-illegitimate) noncitizens allegedly exerted
upon the economic welfare and social cohesiveness of the state (in order to render their
presence legitimate).
Even when the state is able to present itself as vulnerable to social forces and
lacking in the authority necessary to rectify societal inequality, it maintains its privileged
position. State authority is bolstered because citizens are conditioned to expect less
from it. The belief that groups of others ’ (non-Anglo-Saxons) are the preeminent threat
to society (as opposed to the state’s resistance to restructure the society fundamentally) is
reinforced. At the same time, the common perception of the system as one preserving
freedom is maintained, in part because of the utilization of discourse of freedom to
legitimize societal inequality. “’Freedom’ has shown itself to be easily appropriated in
liberal regimes for the most cynical and unemancipatory political ends.”38
Rights claims, which are central to discourses of freedom,30 are one discursive
method used to mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. Despite the widespread
belief in rights claims as effective political vehicles for maximizing freedom, the impact
they exert is multifaceted. For example, “[t]he orientation toward rights, with its litany of
institutional channels and deference to professional discourses, contributes to political
stability in the United States.”40 Rights claims allow citizens to ‘“feel empowered’
37
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stability in the United States.”40 Rights claims allow citizens to ‘“feel empowered'
without being so,” which is an “important element of legitimacy for the antidemocratic
dimensions of liberalism.”41 In other words, images of freedom fail to reconstruct the
institutional structures through which inequality is produced and to dissolve the social
categories ol oppressed groups. 4" As I demonstrate in subsequent chapters, multicultural
and assimilation models are examples of the use of rights discourse to maintain the
disadvantaged socio-economic positions ot minority groups. Both models promise full
membership to disadvantaged groups that, for the most part, is not realized. Multicultural
policies, in particular, may strengthen the societal significance of categories of
“otherness” by according them (limited) benefits. In other words, “legal 'protection' for
a certain injury- lorming identity discursively entrenches the injury-identity connection it
denounces.”4 ’ One of the ways that this occurs is through the reduction of a minority
group s identity to tit into the criteria the state has established to warrant benefits. The
state effectively extends a modicum of power to such groups (i.e., through financial
support) in exchange for enhancing its own power to regulate identities and the cultures
from which they acquire significance.
Policies advancing rights claims help the state to relinquish itself from
responsibility for the inequalities that exist in society. Such policies are often referred to
repeatedly as examples of the state’s responsiveness to minority communities, which
suggests that any remaining social problems are the consequences of poor choices made
by the members of those groups.
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they turn back upon the individual all responsibility for her failures, her condition,
her poverty, her madness - they privatize her situation and mystify the powers
that construct, position, and buffet her
.
44
At once, the individual is “liberated” in the sense that her membership in a minority
group is accorded formal rights and confined to a situation in which her disadvantage is
perceived to be evidence of her own irresponsibility. The state acknowledges the
existence of social conflicts but portrays them as the result of illegitimate beliefs and
actions, which effectively prevent the reasons for those conflicts from “appearing] to
acquire legitimacy or to engage majority opinion .”45
Moreover, policies recognizing cultural differences and framing them in terms of
rights (whether multicultural or assimilationist) often serve to unify citizens and reinforce
the legitimacy of the system, primarily by exerting an assimilating force. Martha Minow
argues that rights claims that seek to promulgate respect for difference or “otherness”
engender unity “because they channel dissent and opposition into a communal language
and secure participation and respect for the dominant structures of law .”46 The use of
rights rhetoric allows the state to appear neutral while being comprised of the institutions
that maintain and reinforce societal inequality .
47
Rights are assumed to encapsulate
fairness; consequently, use of rights rhetoric sends the message to society that the state is
engendering justice. However, definitions of what is “just” or “fair” are shaped heavily
by the dominant community’s understanding of itself and its perceptions of national
44
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goals. This understanding includes images of “responsible” citizenship that are
frequently contrasted with images of “irresponsible” minority groups possessing traits
that “threaten” the dominant cultural tradition
.
49
As will be demonstrated in this
dissertation, such discourse is used in discussion of immigration and refugee policies in
order to reinforce state support among legitimate members of the polity and to justify
denial of membership rights to illegitimate visitors (those who have failed to pledge
allegiance by adopting Anglo-Saxon values.)
The data examined in this dissertation supports the work of sociolegal scholars
that reveal the ways in which law has maintained the salience of race in our social
reality. According to Minow and others, distinctions are often used to justify
mistreatment or to allow certain groups to avail themselves of benefits while denying
those same benefits to others. “Anglo-American law has historically used categories to
assign people to different statuses” and to reinforce privilege
.
51
Comparisons do not
necessarily include explicit discussions of the norm against which the “other” is
compared. In fact, the invisibility of the norm demonstrates its pervasiveness and
elevates it to the realm of what is considered to be natural or true
,
despite the fact that it
is “not inevitable” and “promotes the interests of some but not others .”52 Anglo-
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Saxonism (or whiteness)53 is one of these norms. 54 For example, the race of an individual
or group is only mentioned when it is something other than white. As will be shown, the
unstated norm that the state seeks to preserve by the metaphoric models it constructs to
deal with cultural diversity is Anglo-Saxonism. In other words, the Anglo-Saxon state
accentuates the differences or otherness of groups as justification for differential
treatment, consequently reinforcing its authority to govern. 55
Emphasis on certain cultures (and the people who practice them) as “other”
reinforces the naturalness of the state as governor. The “other” is created by the state “in
order to secure itself as intrinsically good, coherent, complete or rational and in order to
protect itself from the other that would unravel its self-certainty and capacity for
collective mobilization if it established its legitimacy.”56 The state engenders loyalty
when it acts in the interest of preserving the collective identity from external threats.
Rhetoric and other resources are used in order to appear reasonable. A majority of people
is convinced because of the conviction that domestic safety is consistently in jeopardy
and “that security from external threat is essential to internal democracy.”57 The state
renders itself vulnerable to attempts by forces in society to use state power to benefit
53
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specific or “special” interests
,
58
without acknowledging the fact that it serves the interests
of the collective identity (which are particularized interests). The politics surrounding
collective identity become most virulent when the state is confronted by (what are
believed to be) threats to its self-sufficiency
.
59
Such threats exacerbate the challenge of
bilateral legitimacy and compel the state to more actively engender support for its
authority.
Though the liberal-democratic state attempts to appear nondiscriminatory as it
mitigates the challenge of bilateral legitimacy, it encapsulates the manifestations of the
inegalitarian forces that shape society. In other words, the state is gendered, raced, and
sexualized. My theory illuminates what other sociolegal scholars have argued, and that
is that race is central to a nation s understanding of itself as a people. 9 * Law, which
codifies racial categories, “is one of the most powerful mechanisms by which any society
creates, defines, and regulates itself.”62 In particular, race functions within the
“meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are commonly recognized as
legal,” referred to as “legality.” Legality, according to Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey,
“operates ... as both an interpretive framework and a set of resources with which and
through which the social world ... is constituted.” The lens through which we understand
reality is shaped by cultural mores (which include “binary oppositions” and other cultural
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codes ).
63
Therefore, symbols such as skin color
,
64
gender, and sexuality infuse the state’s
understanding of itself and of its alleged enemies. These assessments legitimize and
reinforce the importance of such cultural codes in everyday life. Social contract theory,
and the emphasis on rights that emanates from it, has been used to justify excluding those
who “do not manifest the capabilities for rationality,”65 which are assessments made
through a racialized and gendered lens. Those incapable of being fully rational cannot
adopt democratic values nor be productive in a capitalist system. The presence of large
numbers of unproductive people is then perceived to threaten democracy and the security
of the state. Keeping illegitimate people out and facilitating the assimilation of those
already within the country become critical goals in order to minimize threats to state
authority.
Since the crux of sovereignty is the ability to decide who is, and is not, allowed to
join the polity
,
66
decisions regarding which potential members are best equipped to adopt
national values and become productive citizens (in other words, assimilate) take on
special significance. The state is portrayed as vulnerable to the uncontrollable forces
caused by non-citizens seeking to gain entry (legally as well as illegally.) Refugees are
considered to pose a particular threat because they are not subjected to the gate-keeping
mechanisms used to assess immigrant applications (i.e., possessing skills in economic
demand and familial safety nets.) The time period in which they enter the country is
63
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often condensed because admittance is allowed in response to emergency situations. In
many cases, refugees leave their homelands with little or no resources. Howard Adelman
explains the “metaphorical framework” within which refugee policies (and, I contend,
immigration policies) are handled.
[Policymakers and scholars] are concerned with controlling the destabilizing
forces of an influx of refugees, of guiding and managing the process to ensure that
the situation does not spin out of control—The central issues [are] [t]o what
degree should the entry points be open and closed, and what are the appropriate
legal and administrative mechanisms to ensure the gates remain sufficiently open
to admit refugees without destabilizing the domestic body politic?67
Again, the equilibrium (or stability) of the state, which is assumed to be within the
government s grasp without the influx of refugees, is paramount. The goal is “to absorb
the chaos produced outside one’s sphere ofjustice with as little interference as possible in
the equilibrium.”68
Noncitizens are necessarily unwelcome unless they are expected to assimilate
easily. This conviction is revealed in the analogies that are drawn between measures
managing the arrival of noncitizens to “gates,” “doors,” and other objects that protect
homes from invasion. Images of fluidity, such as “flow” and “wave”, are used to signify
groups of noncitizens attempting to enter. Concern often involves economic factors - not
only regarding the marketplace’s capacity to provide noncitizens with jobs, but also the
wealth (or lack thereof) that they bring with them. Successful assimilation in the Anglo-
Saxon country requires economic self-sufficiency. Since the state is composed of
individuals and institutions that encapsulate the biases inherent in the dominant culture,
assessments regarding which noncitizens are best equipped to enter the marketplace and
67
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climb the capitalist ladder are racialized. In other words, noncitizens who are considered
“white” or “Anglo-Saxon” are assumed to be more equipped, while noncitizens who are
deemed non-white are expected to rely on social welfare services. Noncitizens who fit
into certain legally-defined categories and who share Anglo-Saxon values are assumed to
be more legitimate than those who do not. 69 Non-Anglo-Saxon noncitizens (especially
those who arrive with little or no financial resources) constitute the ultimate challenge to
the state: the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. The state is faced with the difficult task of
compelling noncitizens to believe in the system’s legitimacy in order to diffuse the
negative impacts their (illegitimate or near-illegitimate) presence is assumed to exert
upon the economic welfare and social cohesiveness of the state. At the same time,
noncitizens must attain legitimacy by pledging allegiance and adopting Anglo-Saxon
values.
Research Questions
The variable studied in my dissertation is how public law has treated non-Anglo
noncitizens in order to diffuse conflicts allegedly produced by cultural diversity during
the mid-1960s through the early 1990s70 in Canada, Australia, and the United States.
These nations stand as intriguing examples of the challenge of bilateral legitimacy
because they are, and have cultivated national identities as, three Anglo-Saxon
69
1 realize that immigration and refugee policies are more complicated than described here. The
situation has been slightly simplified for explanatory purposes, though the variations will be
fleshed out in the following chapters.
70
This time period was chosen because significant changes in policies regarding immigration and
refugees, as well diversity management, occurred in all three countries. Beginning in 1965 with
the creation of multiculturalism in Canada, the changes continued in a Cold War climate through
the 1980s and the early 1990s. Though the impact of the fall of communism on the world stage
on bilateral legitimacy in all three countries in the 1990s and beyond is worthy of study, it is
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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democracies characterized by ethnic and racial diversity. These states managed
immigration and refugee policies and created government documents in an attempt to
preserve the dominance of Anglo-Saxon values in their societies. They historically
restricted the influx of noncitizens from non-Anglo-Saxon nations (referred to as the
Eastern hemisphere), often justifying their decisions using overtly racist and
ethnocentric language. Due to domestic and international events in the 1960s and early
1970s, immigration quota systems (based on explicitly racist principles) were replaced
with more liberal provisions. However, racist principles continued to shape policy
decision-making in this area. For example, there was widespread concern that
noncitizens from non-Anglo-Saxon nations would fail to integrate into the marketplace,
causing them to drain social welfare services. Though certain generalizations could have
been drawn regarding the types and levels of skills noncitizens would bring based on the
financial and technological statuses of their nations of origin, assumptions were not
predicated upon well-documented evidence. Instead, they were formed primarily through
the racist and ethnocentric lens that characterized policymaking. This lens made the
greatest impact on three specific areas. First, the paradigm regarding which areas of the
world were least likely to share Anglo-Saxon values (in the “Eastern” hemisphere) was
treated differently from the Anglo or near-Anglo sections (in the “Western” hemisphere.)
Second, claims that people from the Eastern hemisphere were ill-equipped to assimilate
to Anglo social and political values were replaced by an emphasis on their inability to
successfully integrate into the marketplace (it was assumed that they would depend on -
and drain - social welfare services.) Though economic concerns have historically been
part of discourses surrounding the influx of noncitizens, they rhetorically took center-
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stage following the liberalization of the immigration system in the post- 1965 period,
especially in the United States. Third, propaganda compelling noncitizens to pledge
allegiance to the state were created and/or altered in response to the increasing numbers
of non-Anglo immigrants and refugees, particularly in Canada.
My theory builds upon Smith’s recent work by demonstrating the ways in which
immigration and refugee policies in the 1965-1990 period, and the discourses
surrounding them, are important chapters in the stories of peoplehood. Such stories are
used by the state to clarify and justify to themselves who is to be conquered, who is to
be turned away or expelled, who is to be segregated or killed, and who is instead to be
fully included as an equal. As previously discussed, one of the predominant ways in
which Australia, Canada and the United States have preserved their Anglo-Saxon
identities is through the emphasis on cultures that are characterized as “other,” (in other
words, non-Anglo-Saxon). Though the methods used varied among the three nations and
across time-periods, their overall goal has remained the same. In order to maintain the
stability of the system, achieved primarily through state governance, virtually all citizens
must believe in the state’s legitimacy to govern. Since non-Anglo noncitizens are
assumed to be cultured in ways that prevent them from supporting liberal-democratic
systems, methods are used to compel their allegiance. Such methods reveal politically
popular (and racialized and ethnocentric) ideas about who deserves to be a citizen - in
other words, whose claims to membership are legitimate. Herein lies the challenge of
bilateral legitimacy in liberal-democratic, immigrant-accepting nations. The state seeks
to foster support for its legitimacy in order to diffuse the negative impacts that
71
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illegitimate or near-illegitimate noncitizens allegedly exert upon the economic welfare
and social cohesiveness of the polity (in order to render their presence legitimate.)
Changes on the world stage combined with domestic societal and economic
conditions forced Australia, Canada and the United States to reevaluate their immigration
and refugee policies in the 1960s and 1970s. International events such as the Vietnam
War and nations casting off their colonial chains resulted in millions of non-Anglo people
searching for new homelands. At the same time, the improvement of means of
transportation made immigration a more attractive option to people around the world.
Social movements for equality and efforts by humanitarian groups to make their nations
more hospitable to non-Anglos helped to shape policy decisions regarding the legitimacy
of claims to full membership in the national polity. Also, alternating economic booms
and recessions in the 1970s and 1980s impacted state conceptions of the effects of
noncitizens on labor needs. Policies were developed that sought to advance foreign
policy concerns (i.e., the desire to appear humanitarian and generous while fighting
Communist nations by admitting many of their citizens) and convince members of its
polity that it had shed its discriminatory past. However, these policies reflected historic
conceptions of how to manage diversity in ways that preserve the Anglo traditions that
were allegedly responsible for the greatness of each nation.
Political rhetoric in the United States has historically encouraged ethnic and racial
groups to relinquish their cultural traditions in order to enjoy some of the privileges of
citizenship (as captured by the “melting pot” slogan). In fact, from the 1950s forward,
the emphasis in American political culture on assimilation and “Americanization”
27
increased in intensity in the hope that the melting pot would be realized.72 Changes in
immigration law in the 1960s (in part in response to the egalitarianism being advocated
for by the Civil Rights Movement) led to increases in the number of immigrants from
non-Anglo-Saxon cultures at the same time that the nation felt under siege from the
spread of Communism. Between 1968 and 1993, approximately 80 percent of
immigrants came from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. 73 Full assimilation of
these immigrants was impossible, however, because racism and language barriers deemed
their appearances to be markers of inequality. The social conflict was intensified further
because “[d]ominant society views immigrants of color, especially those of a non-
Westem cultural heritage who speak a language other than English, as more foreign and
more un-American than other immigrants.” In fact, nativism in American history has
been most extreme at the same time that large numbers of people of color were
immigrating. 74 Due to increases in the number of immigrants from Asia and Latin
America, and population growth among African-Americans and other people of color, the
United States has been gradually becoming a multiracial society since the 1960s. 75
Policies encouraging assimilation have been one way that the state has attempted to
alleviate the “threat” posed to national values by non-Anglo immigrants.
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Since the 1960s, Canada has embarked on a national program of multiculturalism,
which destabilized (at least temporarily) the English/French dualism that dominated
Canadian cultural life and encouraged other ethnic and racial groups to maintain their
cultural practices (albeit within certain boundaries). A multicultural model was created
in response to a growing separatist movement in Quebec and social movements for
equality among non-French minority groups. The model acquired political support
among Anglophile Canadians because it was considered to be an extension of British
multinationalism and it “implicitly drew a flattering contrast between Canadian diversity
and tolerance — the Canadian mosaic — and the shrill nationalism, shallow conformism,
and cultural homogeneity of Americans - ‘the American melting pot.’”76 At the same
time, it allowed Canada to assert a distinct identity from Britain in an attempt to shed its
colonial image. Like in the United States, changes in immigration policy opened the
doors to greater numbers of immigrants from non-Anglo-Saxon nations, increasing the
racial and ethnic diversity of the national landscape.
Australia, after abandoning a historic policy of assimilation, adopted a Canadian
model of multiculturalism in the early 1970s. Due to the deconstruction of its “White
Australia” policy beginning in the mid-1960s, there was an influx of non-Anglo-Saxon
immigrants. “The change in the Australian population since the 1940s is comparable to
what occurred in six generations in the United States and three in Canada.”77 Supporters
of multiculturalism perceived it to be a rejection of assimilation policies in favor of an
emphasis on cultural pluralism and state assistance to disadvantaged groups.
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Multicultural rhetoric was molded so that it encouraged ethnic organizations to provide
the welfare services that the state now refused to provide,78 effectively absolving itself of
the responsibility of aiding disadvantaged groups economically and socially. Moreover,
multiculturalism was framed as a vehicle through which national unity could be
preserved in the face of diversity. In fact, multiculturalism in Australia in the late 1970s
has been described as “a major government strategy” aimed at “developing the
ideological legitimation for an ethnically diverse society, cutting government expenditure
and enhancing social control over minorities.”79
There are some obvious differences between a multicultural and an assimilation
model, the most obvious being that multiculturalism commemorates cultures (in addition
to the dominant one) in order to recognize the various ways minority groups have
contributed to national progress. In contrast, assimilation celebrates the watering down
or diffusion of ethnicity into one “national” culture (which, in fact, reaffirms many
dominant values). At the same time, though, their theoretical foundations reflect similar
premises and goals. For example, both perceive non-Anglo-Saxon cultures to be a threat
to national unity and stability. Also, the state is able to relinquish itself from
responsibility when cultural groups do not prosper socially or economically.
Assimilationist policies are predicated on individualism, or the idea that each person
(including members of historically disadvantaged groups) possesses the responsibility to
move up the societal ladder. When a person fails to “succeed” in the system, the state is
able to divert the blame away from itself and the various institutional mechanisms
through which inequality is maintained and onto the individual. In this way, the state
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reinforces its legitimacy among those who already believe in it. A government
embracing multiculturalism is able to claim that it has assisted non-Anglo cultural groups
by both acknowledging that such groups have contributed to national progress and by
offering resources for the groups to maintain their cultural heritage. However, in both
models, noncitizens who adopt Anglo-Saxon values, pledge allegiance to the political
system, and integrate successfully into the marketplace are considered to be the most
legitimate, partially because they have demonstrated a belief in the legitimacy of the
system. Such people are used to celebrate the success of the liberal-democratic system.
In both models, the state exerts a disciplinary force over minority groups while
simultaneously promising them full membership privileges. The assimilationist state
makes the benefits of full membership contingent upon the adoption of the norms and
values of the dominant culture. The multicultural state guarantees privileges on the
condition that each group tailors its identity and practices to guidelines created by
(Anglo-Saxon) state agencies. In both cases, the state is able to influence (significantly)
the identity politics and cultural cogency of each group an
d
justify exclusion of groups
from full membership that fail to meet the state’s criteria. In other words, the state
buttresses its legitimacy via mechanisms that both include and exclude, and does so in the
name of fairness.
To varying degrees in all three countries, the destruction of historically
institutionalized racism (especially within immigration policy) was followed by an
emphasis on diffusing the conflicts created by cultural diversity instead of attempting to
rectify socio-economic inequality. This suggests that multicultural and assimilation
models may have been used (and continue to be used) as safety valves or short-term
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solutions to profound societal problems. Moreover, both of these models endow the state
with the ability to exert control over minority groups by establishing legal boundaries
within which they must act to obtain benefits. At the same time, the state believes that
increased control furthers one of its crucially important goals: to maintain national
stability. Such control enables the state to make legitimacy assessments and justify
denial of full membership benefits to those who refuse (or are unable) to assimilate while
maintaining a nondiscriminatory image. Consequently, its legitimacy is enhanced.
Importance of Research to Disciplinary Concerns
In light of the projections of a future in Anglo-Saxon democracies that is mixed
racially and ethnically (placing Anglo-Saxons in the numerical minority), it is important
to understand the ways such systems have dealt with increases in racial and ethnic
diversity. Contemporary investigation into the ways in which certain groups have been
denied the privileges of citizenship80 fails to capture accurately the role of the state in
simultaneously deconstructing historically oppressive policies and replacing them with
policies that attempt to mitigate the conflicts caused by an assertion of various cultural
identities. Moreover, such work has not fully explored the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy in Australia, Canada and the United States. In Stories ofPeoplehood, Rogers
Smith points out that one of the important mechanisms of people-making is that leaders
have two goals: they “seek both to prompt constituents to embrace membership in the
community or people they depict and to persuade them to accept as leaders the very sorts
80
This movement explores the ways in which certain groups have been “raced,” or denied the
privileges of citizenship, particularly by the United States. In other words, racial categories have
been used to brand some groups as “other” and to justify restricting them from “participating in
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of persons who are advancing
.
.
.
people-building accounts .”81 My theory of bilateral
legitimacy takes this argument one step further by contending that the process of
compelling allegiance involves state assessments regarding which noncitizens possess
legitimate claims to membership.
The theory of bilateral legitimacy extends the conception of institutions advanced
by the new historical institutionalism” (NHI) movement in Public Law to include
discursive practices regarding the state’s management of cultural diversity. NHI scholars
recognize that the actions of institutions (defined broadly to include intellectual
traditions) are important to explaining the disadvantaged positions of minority groups . 82
Individual actors within legal institutions are not necessarily the focus of study. Instead,
“political phenomena” is explained “in terms of concepts and ideas that transcend the
perspectives of individual actors.”8- This movement perceives institutions to be highly
influential because they shape the values, identities, and behavior of both the people who
work within the system and those who seek to change it. Similar to the literature
concerning the ways in which certain groups have been “raced” historically, some of the
work within the NHI movement recognizes the various ways that law has maintained the
salience of race in our social reality; in particular, by legitimizing socio-economic
inequality. For example, one of the first acts of the Commonwealth legislature in
Australia at the turn of the century denied suffrage to any “aboriginal native of Australia
81
Smith, Stories ofPeoplehood, pg. 52.
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Asia Africa or the Islands of the Pacific except New Zealand.”85 This law helped to
structure racial classifications hierarchically because whites (whose “race” was placed at
the top) were allowed to vote while nonwhites were restricted from participating in the
key mechanism of democracy. Similarly, suffrage was denied to Chinese immigrants in
Canada and the United States in the late 1800s. New Historical Institutionalism
encourages the Public Law scholar to remain attuned to the manifestations of intellectual
traditions (in this case, racism) in institutional rhetoric. “By tracking how common
knowledge gets produced, is subject to change, or is implicated in political relationships
of leverage and domination, we can produce robust explanations ofwhy people
coordinate their actions when they do.”86 Utilizing an interpretivist approach, one must
investigate the ways in which “institutionally embedded practices,
... [i.e., rules,
procedures, and ideologies], constitute social relations.”87 Such research can include
exploration of the various ideological connections among agencies of government that
manifest themselves into policies and/or rhetoric that maintain societal inequality.
Moreover, there have been calls within NHI for research that compares American
institutions with similar institutions in other nations. 88 This dissertation responds to those
calls.
The constitutive approach (one of the intellectual traditions within sociolegal
studies from which I am operating) argues that law, understood to be both
“pronouncements from the sovereign” and “what we think about the subjects covered by
85 Andrew Markus, Australian Race Realtions: 1788-1993 (New South Wales: Allen & Unwin,
1994), 118.
86 Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture,” 713.
87
Christine B. Harrington, “An Institutional Approach to Litigation,” Law and Courts: Newsletter
ofthe Law and Courts Section', 1
1
.
88
See Ronald Kahn’s and Michael McCann’s articles, respectively, in Law and Courts:
Newsletter ofthe Law and Courts Section, 12; 15.
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those pronouncements,” shapes “the foundational level of an activity.”89 In other words,
institutional activity is an important part of the phenomena of political culture because it
helps members determine if the state is a legitimate sovereign. As Public Law scholars
point out, “[r]ich opportunities await comparative researchers in the politics of courts and
law because laws and courts are firmly embedded in social structures and practices that
often lie beneath the surface of everyday life.” The authors contend that comparative
legal studies will tap into exciting, and as yet largely unexplored, scholarly terrain
.
90
Though my research is “traditional” political science in the sense that it focuses
on federal institutions, my theory incorporates a fundamentally interpretive approach that
builds upon the ideas of postpositivist scholars. For example, constitutive theory
perceives law to be created in the dynamic tension between official pronouncements and
their reception at least as much as it is formed in legislature and courts .”91 Law’s
influence supersedes the actions of legal institutions. However, such actions are still
considered to be important and, in fact, must be examined in order to reveal the ways in
which they shape social reality. In fact, “authority in politics lies in determinations about
the way the world is, not simply how people feel about it .”92 The theory of bilateral
legitimacy sheds light on the lens through which members of the polity assess the state’s
legitimacy and visa versa. Unlike legal pluralism, which de-emphasizes too extensively
the power that state institutions have
,
92
my theory captures many of the ways in which the
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the power that state institutions have
,
9 '1
my theory captures many of the ways in which the
state exerts its authority over social life. In other words, I demonstrate some of the ways
that the state tells stories ot peoplehood that seek to maintain Anglo-Saxon dominance
while appearing nondiscriminatory.
The theory ot bilateral legitimacy utilizes a constitutive approach because it
recognizes that institutions exist within “the parameters of the possible that operate to
construct politics at its inception by influencing how people bind themselves in
movements.” Legal customs are examined in the dissertation with the following in
mind:
On the one hand, law s power is tacilitative and enabling; legal conventions
supply much of the common repertoire of meaning construction that citizens
deploy in negotiating relations and waging struggles with others. On the other
hand, legal conventions are the biased products of past practices and struggles that
bound the practical understandings of and limit the strategic options available to
citizens in ways that tend to sustain privilege and hierarchy throughout society. 9
'’
My dissertation illuminates some of the ways that the state creates boundaries and
opportunities within which interpretive communities (particularly non-Anglo groups)
conceptualize their relationships to the state and act or engage in “resistance .”96
Individuals/groups who do not (or cannot) assimilate to the dominant cultural values are
deemed most likely to defy state legitimacy and, therefore, are most in need of state
control. As will be demonstrated in the proceeding chapters, the American, Canadian and
94
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mid-1960s through the early 1990s. Such measures brought non-Anglo individuals and
groups under greater state control and successfully engendered support for the state’s
legitimacy.
Examination of the ways in which three liberal-democratic states mitigated the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy contributes to the growing body of comparative law.
Though comparative law research has existed for at least a decade, it appears to have
been reserved largely to (European) law professionals and was available primarily in the
form of textbooks for law schools. Many considered it to be “dead” as an “intellectual
project.” However, part of its recent “renaissance” derives from the role that academics
are playing in assisting former Communist countries in their transition to market-based,
democratic systems. One feature of comparative law is not only the active political form
that it sometimes takes, but also the fact that many scholars attempt to avoid the
ethnocentrism that characterized “classical” works by exploring the nature of each
nations’ culture in explaining law.
97
In particular, research on multiculturalism done by
Comparativists encourages scholars to pay “careful attention ... to the ‘national’
historical, political, social, and institutional contexts in which [multiculturalism] appears,
circulates, and accrues meaning” while “interpret[ing] this term as part of an international
network of cultural relations.”98 My analysis of government documents and the
discourses surrounding them was done with close consideration of domestic and
international events. Consequently, the proceeding chapters illuminate three liberal-
97
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democratic states’ responses to increases in cultural diversity in the context of a changing
world.
My research also complements the studies of political culture within comparative
politics, particularly the studies that utilize an interpretivist approach. For example,
some scholars contend that actions are inextricable from culture and that, in order to
understand culture, one must attempt to recreate the logic behind its worldview
.
100
Political culture is not necessarily the definitive factor but it is central to the framework
within which politics takes place. In particular, scholars studying postcommunist nations
provide useful insight into the study of political culture. Russia’s democratic prospects
seem to rely, at least in part, on its political culture. Consequently, scholars have studied
various historical periods in order to assess Russia’s prospects for democratization. For
example, Nicolai Petro contends that Russian culture includes myths that encapsulate
values from contradictory intellectual traditions (i.e., democratic and communist).
101
Intellectual traditions survive through symbols that (although they are typically contested
among people within a given society) create a framework within which values are to be
" Since the 1990s, research on political culture have reached a new level of quantitative
sophistication by enhancing research techniques in order to collect data over long periods of time
from large, representative samples. For example, Neil Nevitte and Roger Gibbins uncovered
successfully the ideological attitudes of undergraduates in Australia, Britain, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States in New Elites in Old States: Ideologies in the Anglo-Saxon-
American Democracies (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990.) See Robert Putnam, Making
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debated. 10" In the following chapters, I uncover the intellectual traditions regarding
cultural diversity in Australia, Canada, and the United States. All three liberal-
democratic nations acted under the assumption that non-Anglo noncitizens destabilized
the polity, consequently threatening the legitimacy of the state and potentially preventing
national progress. In other words, non-Anglos were deemed to be illegitimate members
of the polity.
In these nations, national success was attributed to the prevalence of Anglo-Saxon
values, including (and especially) a strong work ethic. Though the specific degree to
which newcomers were expected to relinquish non-Anglo cultural traditions varied
among the three nations, all members of the polity were expected to assimilate in order to
prevent the depletion of Anglo-Saxon values and ensure state vitality. Since liberal-
democratic nations are limited in the tools available to force compliance, and explicitly
discriminatory policies were no longer politically palatable by the mid-1960s, the
American, Canadian, and Australian states utilized a variety of discursive methods
ranging from the modification of immigration and refugee policies to appear egalitarian
to the promotion of material celebrating the benefits of citizenship. These strategies
engendered support for the legitimacy of the state as they compelled noncitizens to
assimilate (at least by pledging allegiance.) At the same time, by demonstrating support
for the legitimacy of the state, those noncitizens attained a level of legitimacy within the
polity. These states successfully mitigated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
102
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Data Studied and Dissertation Layout
In order to understand the dynamic ways in which state institutions have dealt
with the challenge of bilateral legitimacy, three types of government documents seeking
to manage diversity (and the debates surrounding them) in the 1965-1990 period were
analyzed. First, focus was placed on immigration and refugee policies because they are
the most explicit vehicles through which nations determine who does and does not belong
within the polity. They reveal the states’ assumption that non-Anglo noncitizens have
been cultured to disrespect liberal-democratic systems as well as the stories of
peoplehood that help to define (and preserve) national culture. Second, programs
designed to diffuse the negative effects of increases in non-Anglo residents were
reviewed. This involved examination of the metaphoric models, federal declarations and
bureaucratic changes that were created to manage cultural diversity. Third, analysis of
citizenship materials produced by state agencies in the 1970s through the 1980s
demonstrated the degree to which the themes evident in other state discourse infused the
material designed to instruct noncitizens on how to become legitimate members of the
polity.
The dissertation was organized according to the motivations that shaped the
states’ attempts to mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. Chapter Two explores
the metaphoric models used historically by the nations to diffuse potential conflicts
created by increases in cultural diversity. Chapter Three provides a brief overview of the
immigration policies created to preserve Anglo-Saxon heritage until 1965 in the three
nations. Prior to World War II, states sought to preserve whiteness using explicitly racist
principles. The events of the Second World War, and the domestic and international
40
movements for equality that followed, compelled modification of immigration policies
and the establishment of the contemporary refugee framework. Though the changes
made in 1965 and beyond were significant, I will explain how Anglo-Saxon dominance
was protected. Chapter Four investigates the state’s attempt to present a fair and
humanitarian image on both the domestic and the global stages. Included in the analysis
are policies designed to reunite the immigrant family and make a home for refugees.
Chapter Five examines the state’s endeavor to protect (or promote) the vibrancy of the
national economy. Immigration policies were designed to utilize allegedly objective
selection criteria, which facilitated the admittance and nurturance of noncitizens with the
skills to meet the needs of the marketplace. In doing so, the state sought to prevent the
depletion and/or misuse of social welfare services. Chapter Six summarizes the ways in
which the Australian, Canadian and American states met the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy while cultivating unity and maintaining Anglo-Saxon national identities. Also
discussed are suggestions as to how liberal-democratic societies can mitigate the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy without reinforcing Anglo dominance.
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CHAPTER II
THE STATE AS MANAGER OF CULTURAL CONFLICT
Chapter Two explains how metaphoric models were used in the United States,
Canada, and Australia to mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. Such models
?
reflected political changes occurring domestically and internationally yet upheld many of
the political themes that characterized each nation’s history: most importantly, the
attempt to preserve Anglo-Saxon dominance in order to safeguard state sovereignty. At
the same time, these states reserved the right to determine which non-Anglo cultural
practices, and the noncitizens who possessed them, were legitimate. The American state
has utilized consistently the image of a “melting pot,” while the Canadian and Australian
states have constructed multicultural models that, to varying degrees, encourage ethnic
minorities to retain their non-Anglo-Saxon values and practices.
Introduction
The United States, Canada, and Australia managed cultural diversity in ways that
enhanced state control and mitigated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. The
metaphoric models used to describe their societies, though modified over the years, have
consistently sent messages regarding which people (as identified by ethnic, racial, and
cultural characteristics) were legitimately suited to membership. As explained in Chapter
One, liberal-democratic states act from the perception that noncitizens must be compelled
to believe in the system’s legitimacy in order to diffuse the negative impacts that
(illegitimate or near-illegitimate) residents allegedly exert upon the economic welfare and
social cohesiveness of the polity. Once such residents are assessed as productive
members of society, their presence is rendered legitimate. The multifaceted human and
extra-human components that constitute the state coalesce in ways that seek for its
maintenance, including policy decisions that preserve the status quo. Unexpected events
and phenomena outside of the state’s control are perceived to be threats. The more
difficult to control is the threat, the greater is the potential hazard. Whether or not
perceived threats, such as the influx of newcomers with cultural and language traditions
42
that differ from the nation’s dominant culture, actually jeopardize the state’s ability to
govern is controversial
.
1
Regardless, the state’s vitality is doubly challenged: both by the
perceived threat and by the degree to which citizens can be assured of the state’s ability
to mitigate that threat.
Rights discourse has been one of the liberal rhetorical devices that has been used
historically to deny non-Anglo-Saxon groups many of the benefits associated with
citizenship. Rights analysis reserves the power to define which variations among people
are most significant to the state, establishing categories that are used as justifications for
treating people differently. At the same time, explaining differential treatment in terms
of rights shifts attention away from the inequality that is created or reinforced through
such categorization and enhances state power by convincing people that societal
problems have been rectified (or at least addressed)/ Moreover, even rights claims used
to promulgate respect for ethnic, racial, or cultural differences (couched in individual or
group terms) do not jeopardize unity because they channel dissent and opposition into a
communal language and secure participation and respect for the dominant structures of
law.” At the same time, the state presents itself as neutral despite the fact that it responds
to cultural diversity by “competing] with the norms of other communities .”3
The American state has utilized consistently a metaphoric model encouraging
assimilation, while the Canadian and Australian states have constructed multicultural
models that, to varying degrees, formally encourage ethnic minorities to retain their non-
1
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Anglo-Saxon values and practices. I analyzed the most enduring metaphoric model in the
United States - the great “melting pot” - as well as the multicultural “mosaic” in Canada,
and the multicultural “family of the nation” in Australia. All three models fostered a
sense of national pride while compelling varying degrees of assimilation. The states were
presented as accepting (and even embracing) cultural diversity in ways that justified
discriminatory policies and engendered support for the political system. These models
were used to enhance the state’s legitimacy and establish boundaries regarding legitimate
non-Anglo traditions and the residents who possess them. In this way, the metaphoric
models helped to alleviate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy and maintain Anglo-
Saxon dominance.
The American Melting Pot
The American “melting pot” metaphoric model has consistently encouraged
assimilation into an allegedly “natural” process that safeguards the dominance of Anglo-
Saxon traditions and values. On the one hand, the state appears to accept cultural
diversity while on the other, it relinquishes responsibility for the Anglo supremacy that
results. The state’s role is cast as a neutral supervisor of the metaphoric cauldron’s
process of creating a new and improved America. Consequently, the state’s legitimacy is
preserved and noncitizens who fail to assimilate successfully are rendered illegitimate,
and thereby denied the benefits of full membership.
Recent scholarship has examined the extent to which the United States as an
immigrant nation has been historically exclusionary. Rogers Smith, an influential scholar
in the new historical institutionalism (NHI) movement, has demonstrated the fact that the
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United States legislature has “pervasively and unapologetically structured U.S.
citizenship in terms of illiberal and undemocratic racial, ethnic, and gender hierarchies.”
In fact, policies were established in accordance with dominant Americans’ “passionate
beliefs that America was by rights a white nation, a Protestant nation, a nation in which
true Americans were native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors.”
4
Similarly, other
scholars have demonstrated the extent to which liberal arguments were used to justify the
exclusion of certain groups in the 19 th century. ' Several American intellectual traditions
have been used to create or maintain societal inequality under a guise of fairness,
consequently buttressing the state s authority to govern. Responses to increases in
cultural diversity reveal the ideas inherent in American political culture. Though the
melting pot has been the preeminent metaphoric model, it has been shaped by the
approaches to cultural diversity that proceeded and followed it.
The Assimilation Model
The assimilation model emerged in the early to mid- 1800s at the same time that
the number of ethnic and racial groups and the heterogeneity among the geographical
distribution of these groups increased. However, aspects of the model’s intellectual
foundation have been traced back to the colonial period. For example, emphasis on a
“homogeneous social order” has been identified in the Great Awakenings in New
4
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England. The American Dream, which infused the assimilation model, has been
explained in the following terms.
The American Dream
. .
.
grew from a confluence of ideologies. Paradoxically itbecame equally identified by an image of conformity and by symbols of freedom
of expression and diversity. The skeleton of the dream was given flesh by
Enlightenment individualism. Yet, individualism had also found expression in the
model of an informed citizenry who served the needs of a virtuous republic. 7
The importance placed on promulgating the interests of the collective identity superseded
the tension that existed between support for individualism and an emphasis on
conformity. The state was the manifestation and protector of the collective identity so the
success of the American people depended, at least in part, on the maintenance of state
authonty. Moreover, the American dream was infused with the Protestant work ethic and
Anglo-Saxonism.
Central to this model was the belief that minority ethnic groups must
comprehensively adopt the traditions of the dominant culture. Noncitizens’ claims to
membership in the polity were accorded greater levels of legitimacy if the applicants
adopted dominant cultural and political values. Though this idea was promulgated by
nativist movements prior to the Civil War, it blossomed in the late- 1800s and early 1900s
with more virulent and numerous anti-foreigner groups reacting to “unprecedented waves
of immigration.” Following the Civil War, most immigrants came from nations in
southern Europe and “Eurasia” (such as Italy, Hungary, and Poland) for cheap labor to
6
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facilitate the Industrial Revolution, and from China to build the railroad. Previous
immigrants were from northern and western European countries
.
8
Perceptions of which cultures were “naturally” dominant were infused by popular,
social-Darwinist conceptions of race. In fact, the creation of racial categories (and
accompanying ideas about superiority/inferiority) has been regarded as the “most
important ideological development in the growth of the assimilationist doctrines of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries .”9 Such doctrines are considered by many
scholars to be of “Anglo-conformity.” Many nativist groups advocated for Anglo-
conformity while at the same time declaring the “black” and “yellow” races to be
unassimilatable. These ideas justified laws limiting (and in some cases restricting
altogether) immigration from nations with cultures allegedly antithetical to Anglo-
Saxonism. Though the most extreme ideas about race and cultural diversity were
believed to have faded gradually from the assimilation model, the emphasis on preserving
Anglo values and traditions (via maintenance of the dominant culture) has endured. The
state effectively mitigated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy by preserving a
predominantly Anglo nation and enacting policies to prevent full membership benefits for
noncitizens who failed to assimilate.
The Melting Pot Model
The melting pot model was offered as an alternative to the assimilation model
following the influx of immigrants at the dawn of the twentieth century. It has been
William M. Newman, American Pluralism: A Study ofMinority Groups and Social Theory
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973), 54; 60.
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regarded as “a minority response to the meaning of the ‘Atlantic migration.”’"
Capitalizing on the increasingly popular belief that America was a land in which people
from different backgrounds would melt into a new “race,” Israel Zangwill “catapulted [it]
into the forefront of the nation’s attention” with his play The Melting Pot'2 in 1908. The
play depicted the life of a Jewish family who had immigrated to the United States from
Russia. As family members’ interactions were primarily with non-Russian Christians,
they struggled with maintaining their religious and cultural heritage. 13 The play
portrayed a belief that cultural diversity would force people of different backgrounds to
overcome conflicts in order to live harmoniously. Moreover, the dominant culture would
become a synthesis or a hybrid of all cultures present. 14 Zangwill described the process
in the following terms:
Yes, East and West, and North and South, the palm and the pine, the pole and the
equator, the crescent and the cross — how the great Alchemist melts and fuses
them with his purging flame! Here they shall all unite to build the Republic of
Man and the Kingdom of God. 15
Zangwill’s conception of the process of amalgamation was infused with fire-and-
brimstone religious imagery. Despite the violent nature of the process, it was considered
to be a utopian understanding of how cultural diversity functions in society. 16
Inherent in this model was the reaffirmation of the superiority of whiteness. For
example, David, the play’s central character, was written to be of “Nordic appearance.” 17
11
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Also, Zangwill displayed a belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon culture when he
argued that “[I]t is unreasonable to suppose that American, thoughfortunately protected
by English literature
,
will not bear traces of the fifty languages now being spoken side by
side with it, and of which this play alone presents scraps in German, French, Russian,
Yiddish, Irish, Hebrew, and Italian.” 18 Bearing traces
,
however, suggests a process
somewhat different from the hybrid culture that is portrayed in other parts of his play.
This discrepancy could be viewed as a mistake or as an indication of the belief that
God s Crucible would ensure that non-Anglo-Saxon cultures would melt down into
mere traces to allow for the creation of a new culture that looked strikingly similar to the
old one. In fact, the image of the purgingflame suggests that the process would create a
race cleansed of all impurities (or non-Anglo elements).
Scholars of cultural diversity have regarded as ironic the fact that the melting pot
model acquired popularity around the same time that the United States government
passed extensive restrictions on immigration from nations outside of northern and
western Europe.
20
Since the model was developed by minorities, its utilization of the
social Darwinist idea that the superior qualities of certain races would naturally survive
was also perceived to be ironic or an oversight. 21 Newman and others have noted that the
melting pot ideology “was one way in which immigrants were able to impart positive
meaning to an otherwise chaotic and unpredictable situation.” 22 Scholars have failed to
note the primary reason for the model’s cultural cogency: its central tenet that Anglo-
18
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Saxon cultural values would not only survive but thrive in the melting pot pacified the
state and legitimate residents who believed that non-Anglo-Saxon cultures posed a threat
to American success. This model reaffirmed state authority because failure to integrate
successfully was deemed to be the responsibility of the individual and/or evidence of
early stages of melting. In other words, the state was not required to provide the
mechanisms necessary for social harmony. Noncitizens acquired legitimacy through a
combination of assimilation and a willingness to allow the cauldron to rid American
society of impurities. The state was the legitimate (neutral) manager of a “natural”
melting process. The same process that enabled Anglo-Saxons to realize democracy in
America would diffuse cultural conflict.
Cultural Pluralism
Cultural pluralism grew out of controversy surrounding the melting pot model and
shifted the focus from an allegedly “natural” (neutral) process to a preservation of
cultural practices that facilitated national progress. Though academics were primarily
responsible for the theorizing of this model, discussion over the “wisdom of assimilation
as a national policy was both a scholarly debate and a significant public movement”
called “Americanization.” This debate led to the creation of paid positions teaching
immigrants English and “basic American values. ”‘ 3 Businesses were largely responsible
for such programs and for studies examining the ways in which immigrants became
Americanized. Though contemporary discourse regards American society as dominated
by the cultural pluralist model, the melting pot continues to be the most enduring
metaphor for the conceptualization of difference in the United States. Consequently, I
23
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argue that cultural pluralism modified (and did not replace) the melting pot metaphoric
model in the American state’s management of cultural diversity.
Cultural pluralism has been described as “a compromise between the host and the
various immigrant cultures, with later newcomers being able to preserve the latter while
participating in the political and economic life of the larger society.”24 However, as will
be demonstrated, the degree to which each ethnic group was expected to compromise
varied in ways that effectively reinforced the superiority of Anglo-Saxonism. Moreover,
emphasis on preserving the system was maintained, as it was the objective behind
encouraging groups to participate in the political and economic life of the larger society.
In other words, the significance placed on unity and state authority (with the state as the
embodiment of the Anglo-Saxon collective identity) was consistent with the assimilation
and melting pot models. Pivotal to the system was a widespread belief among
newcomers that the state governed legitimately.
Philosopher Horace Kallen was the first to utilize the term “cultural pluralism.”
Though other scholars also critiqued the assimilation and melting pot models for not
encouraging cultural diversity, Kallen’s arguments were some of the most widely read.
His early work appeared in the left publication The Nation beginning in 1915 and
presented a quasi-Marxist analysis of the melting pot and assimilation models. His
critique was aimed at industry for using these models in Americanization programs in
order to ensure an adequate supply of cheap labor. His theory was predicated on a belief
in the superiority/inferiority of different racial groups despite the fact that one of his
objectives was to call into question the ideas about race promulgated by the Ku Klux
24
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Klan. Cultural heritage (which placed individuals within racial categories) was viewed as
fundamentally unchangeable. For example, in Culture and Democracy in the United
States, originally published in 1924, Kallen distinguished between class, which “rests
upon no inevitable external condition" and “nationality” or “natio,” which “has usually a
considerable intrinsic base.”25 In fact, for “Jews or Poles or Anglo-Saxons
... to cease
being Jews or Poles or Anglo-Saxons, [they] would have to cease to be.”26 He criticized
the melting pot model’s tenet that a new race would result from the amalgamation of
various groups in America, not only due to the fact that there were few intermarriages at
that time, but because [I]n historic times so far as is known no new ethnic types have
originated, and from what is known of breeding there comes no assurance that the old
types will disappear in favor of the new.”27 Instead, (irreconcilably different) groups
would coexist harmoniously in separate spheres.
Kallen contended that Americans have two choices in dealing with cultural
diversity. The first is a celebration of only British ancestry, while the second is a
“harmony, in which [the British] theme shall be dominant, perhaps, among others, but
one among many, not the only one.” Such harmony would not, assured Kallen, threaten
the political ideals upon which our governmental system is founded. 28 Under the cultural
pluralism model, groups, by encouraging them to maintain only those cultural values that
coincide with or support the political system, will “maintain the cultural perfection that is
proper to its kind. ” The legitimacy of the state derives, in fact, from its consistent
25
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encouragement of cultural pluralism (within natural boundaries).-’9 In Kallen’s view,
cultural pluralism was a “process in which cultural identity is a creative tool capable of
shaping the advancement of civilization.”30
Other scholars modified Kallen’s cultural pluralism model. 31 The “New
Ethnicity school, which began in the 1960s,32 argued that assimilation and cultural
pluralism were “interrelated processes.”33 Milton Gordon synthesized the three dominant
models allegedly central to American cultural history: Anglo-conformity (assimilation),
melting pot, and cultural pluralism. He contended that cultural pluralism and assimilation
were simultaneous processes. His work was considered a “turning point” in the field due
to his claim that the three traditional forces of religion, race, and ethnicity are intersected
by the additional factors of social class, urban-rural residence, and regionalism,” which
determined the extent to which groups achieved cultural and structural assimilation. 34
The belief that Anglo-Saxon values would remain preeminent and that such dominance
was responsible for the success of the individuals who adhered to them was evident in
Gordon’s theory.
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My point ... is that, with some exceptions, as the immigrants and their
children have become Americans, their contributions, as laborers farmers
doctors, lawyers, scientists, artists, etc., have been made by way of cultural
patterns that have taken their impress from the mould of the overwhelmingly
English character of the dominant Anglo-Saxon subculture in America whose
domination dates from colonial times and whose cultural domination in the
United States has never been seriously threatened
.
35
Clearly, legitimate citizens contributed to national progress by adopting Anglo and/or
quasi-Anglo traditions.
Implicit or explicit adherence to the belief that Anglo-Saxon values are superior
has consistently infused the nation’s understanding of cultural diversity. Though cultural
pluralism modified some of the most offensive aspects of the earlier models of
assimilation and the melting pot, it was predicated on the belief that Anglo-Saxonism
would (rightly) continue to be the most influential culture in America. Inherent
differences among cultural groups were assumed and the relationships resulting from
emphasis on those differences have been reinforced. In other words, the state’s
management of cultural diversity has never focused on ways to rectify socio-economic
inequality. The racialized and ethnocentric lens through which newcomers have
historically been viewed has restricted the extent to which certain non-Anglo noncitizens’
claims to full membership have been regarded as legitimate. The metaphoric melting pot
model has consistently advocated for non-Anglo noncitizens to adopt Anglo-Saxon
values, consequently reaffirming Anglo dominance.
Cultural pluralism facilitated the state’s capacity to tolerate cultural diversity
without the need to make substantive societal changes. Put simply, the American melting
pot allowed for cultural diversity that would not impede national progress because only
35
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Anglo and quasi-Anglo traditions would thrive. By formally embracing such diversity
while rhetorically encouraging assimilation, the state mitigated the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy.
The Canadian Mosaic
Canada was the first of the three nations to diffuse the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy through the creation of bureaucratic and financial resources for the (limited)
maintenance of cultural difference. Though the Canadian experience with immigration
was similar to the Australian and American experiences, the active efforts of French
Canadians to preserve their traditions carved out a space for a unique cultural tug-of-war
within Canadian identity. Prior to the introduction of the multicultural model in
accordance with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s famous speech in 1971,36 Canada was
officially bilingual and bicultural. The bicultural model provided for the temperance of
Anglo dominance with forced recognition of the French language and, to a limited
degree, French traditions. The most obvious impact of this model was the publication of
official documents in both languages and various policies designed to allow for
instruction in one’s native language. Experiences with the model varied by region, with
“Frenchness” finding the most room for expression in eastern provinces, such as Quebec,
and Anglo dominance being fully maintained in the western provinces, such as Alberta.
Since the policy carved out quasi-separate spaces for the two cultures, the Federal stated
aimed to maintain control by appeasing both groups in ways that compelled allegiance.
Legitimate noncitizens were those who became situated in French or Anglo cultural life.
36
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Pressure from Francophones, increasingly unhappy with the Anglo-dominated system,
and non-French minority groups, feeling left out of the bicultural model, compelled the
federal legislature to alter its approach. After rejecting the American “melting pot”
model as inappropriate within the Canadian context (in part because it was deemed too
harsh), the government crafted a multicultural metaphoric model of a “mosaic,” which
celebrated cultural diversity within separate, bounded spaces. This was not entirely what
critics of the bicultural model were looking for, but it effectively maintained Federal
authority and Anglo dominance.
The 1960s and early 1970s were marked by societal changes at home and abroad.
Criticisms of the political system by gender, racial, sexual and ethnic minority groups
gained prominence at the same time that human rights movements demanded
modifications to international laws and traditions. Also, non-Anglo immigrants became
actively involved in politics and were in search of officials to bring their concerns into
the formal political arena. The Liberal Party, led by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau,
recognized the party-building opportunities inherent in reaching out to cultural groups
who were feeling left out by the system. At the same time, leaders of large ethnic groups
were eager to find avenues through which they could access policymakers. The Liberal
Party adopted the multicultural model in part to attract and retain the support of ethnic
leaders and the voters that followed them. 37 Trudeau also hoped that the model would
disempower the most virulent Francophones by rendering French culture as one ofmany
cultures instead of one oftwo founding culture. Though official bilingualism was
370ne of the ways Trudeau accomplished this was through the creation of the Canadian
Consultative Council on Multiculturahsm in 1973. This Council lacked formal authority over
federal policy but gave a political forum to 100 ethnic leaders (and, simultaneously, gave the
Federal government a direct line to politically-active ethnic groups.)
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retained, the significance of the change was not lost on Francophones. Multiculturalism
worsened fragile relations between the federal government and the Quebec province.
Scholars have questioned why the Liberal government embarked on a model that would
antagonize the Francophone community when the federal ties between the two levels of
the state were so weak
.
38
I contend that the federal government attempted to capitalize on
an opportunity to assert greater authority while the federal distinctions among the levels
of government were nebulous. Moreover, by constructing space for certain non-Anglo
and non-French cultural groups, the state sought to engender greater support for its
authority throughout the populace. Legitimate residents were now those who fit their
ethnic identities into the multicultural model and supported Federal supremacy.
In a speech delivered partially in French, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau changed
the course of Canadian history by formally introducing multiculturalism to the Canadian
nation. Extrapolating from the recommendations of the Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Trudeau contended that “although there are two official
languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over
any other.’ Though the term “assimilation” was glaringly absent from his speech, the
desire to facilitate, and arguably compel, immigrants to adopt dominant Anglo values was
evident. Trudeau set out four ways in which the government would advance
multiculturalism, which are worth quoting in their entirety:
First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian
cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop
a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada
,
and a clear need for assistance, the
small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized.
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Second the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome
cultural bamers to full participation in Canadian society.
Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange amonu
all Canadian cultural groups in the interest ofnational unity.
Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one
ot Canada s official languages in order to becomefull participants in Canadian
society. (Emphasis added)
The primary objective behind these measures was to help ethnic group members evolve
into productive citizens, which ultimately benefits the economy and the political system
by alleviating the need for costly social services and diffusing conflicts allegedly caused
by cultural difference. None of these four modes of government support include ensuring
that ethnic groups had the room and resources necessary to preserve their cultural
traditions. Instead, traditions were referred to as “cultural barriers” that needed to be
“overcome” in the interest of national unity. Similar to the American “melting pot,” the
“mosaic” provided the vehicle through which the allegedly problematic elements of non-
Anglo cultures would be sufficiently removed - and all in the name of cultural
accommodation. Put simply, the multicultural model cloaked a program promoting
assimilation in rhetoric expressing concern for the success of ethnic noncitizens in
making the “individual freedom of choice” to become valued members of the polity. 40
Though the multicultural model did not fulfill its promise of equality, it did
effectively change the political landscape. Multiculturalism equipped policymakers with
an allegedly inclusive national ideal.
41
The objective was to create a society in which
virtually all ethnic groups had bounded cultural spaces within a system of Anglo
dominance and Federal supremacy. In fact, only groups who achieved political and
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cultural cogency were regarded as legitimate members of the polity. The assimilatiomst
aspects of the model were downplayed in the hope that the rhetorical ideal would appease
Francophones (by limiting the extent to which non-Anglo, non-French Canadians were
allowed to maintain their traditions) and the members of other ethnic groups (by
officially recognizing their cultural heritages.) The allure of the ideal was considered to
be so powerful by its creators that little attention was given to the considerable resources
needed to realize it. Multicultural programs were “very inadequately thought out” and
were “barely explained ... to the Canadian public.”
It is clear from [the government’s]
... management of [multiculturalism], and the
limited funds which they devoted to it, that the Trudeau government never
intended multiculturalism to be a policy departure of great significance. It was
seen simply as a public gesture of goodwill, as well as proper recognition of the
continuing contribution ofmany cultures to Canadian society.42
Though Freda Hawkins (a leading scholar on Canadian politics) has acknowledged that
creators and supporters of the multicultural model recognized its political utility (i.e., by
expanding the Liberal Party’s political base), she failed to recognize the degree to which
it enhanced the Federal state’s control over ethnic groups by reserving the authority to
decide which groups, and which activities sponsored by those groups, were legitimate
within the Anglo-Canadian context. In so doing, the state reserved the authority to
respond to certain cultural groups and ignore others according to the extent to which such
groups embraced the political system and, especially, the Federal state as sovereign.
Each ethnic/cultural group inhabited a separate and distinct entity in the Canadian
mosaic. The more vocal and numerous the members of one’s group, the larger the share
of the mosaic accorded. Cultural dominance resulted from a prevalence of one group
42
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within society as a whole, though one group’s dominance could not be absolute because
other groups would inevitably surround it. However, Anglo-Saxonism was the force that
mitigated among the groups, primarily because it was deemed to lack the degree of
ethnicity possessed by the other groups. The goal in this model was for one’s group to be
vocal and/or numerous enough to be recognized as a legitimate member of the mosaic.
According to Hawkins, the multicultural model was a logical development of
long-standing efforts of the federal Citizenship Branch to encourage harmonious
community relations in Canadian cities, and to protect and assist ethnic groups .”43 Like
biculturalism, the creation of separate spheres for each culture44 was considered the best
way to demonstrate respect for, while exerting influence over, groups. Not only did the
multicultural model enable the state to bring ethnic Canadians into the mechanisms of the
system (with the expectation that they would be rewarded at the ballot box), it also
allowed for the shaping of the ways in which those cultures expressed themselves.
Grants were distributed to ethnic groups whose projects:
demonstrated] a desire and ability to develop their culture within the Canadian
context and to contribute to modem Canadian society;
... [were] designed to share
a cultural heritage with other Canadians... [displayed] participation and support
of the community to which they are directed.
. . and [that] assisted] immigrants to
become full participants in Canadian society . 45
Inherent in the state’s “assistance” were mechanisms to compel assimilation and gate-
keeping functions to ensure that only legitimate ethnic groups (those already integrated
43
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into the community) would receive state funding. Projects had to be “available in one of
the two official languages’’ “in order to be accessible to the general public.”46
Instrumental to the multicultural model was the belief that ethnic group activities should
be used to educate dominant Canadians in an attempt to foster social harmony. Projects
were restricted to ethnic groups’ experiences within Canada. In fact, grant guidelines
specifically prohibited the support of projects that were “concerned only with the country
of ancestry.”47 Such guidelines - along with an advanced level of detail regarding what
was and what was not worthy of funding - dominated the federal government’s
multicultural programs from the early 1970s through the 1980s.48 Clearly, ethnic groups
that assimilated enough to acquire cultural cogency were deemed legitimate and thereby
worthy of funding for culturally-based activities that advanced their space within the
Canadian mosaic. By providing financial incentives to focus cultural expression on
contributions to Canadian life, the state simultaneously compelled assimilation and
reinforced its authority to manage cultural diversity. Moreover, federal supremacy was
strengthened among non-Anglo, non-French noncitizens. Put simply, multicultural
programs enabled the Canadian state to accord ethnic groups a sense of legitimacy while
fostering its own legitimacy to govern.
The Australian Family of the Nation
Unlike Canadian multiculturalism, which has consistently been almost entirely
disengaged from immigration policy, the Australian multicultural model took shape
46
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within a discursive context concerning which noncitizens had legitimate claims to
membership. Like Canada, policymakers (particularly Labor Party members) were
anxious to create a metaphoric model to woo expanding (and increasingly prominent)
non-Anglo ethnic groups. Lacking the support of the dominant society, the plan was to
encourage members of ethnic migrants4 ’ to become citizens and support the legitimacy of
the political system without making fundamental bureaucratic changes. Legitimate
members of the polity supported state authority by taking their proper places in
Australian socioeconomic society. The Australian Family of the Nation model that
resulted encouraged a connection among citizens that reinforced their allegiance to the
state. As in traditional Anglo-Saxon nuclear family structures, each person had his/her
proper place within socio-economic society. Full membership, therefore, was acquired
through support for the Australian way of life — a largely Anglo-Saxon existence. The
goal in this model was to become as economically prominent (and least dependent) as
possible. What resulted was a model that officially accepted non-Anglo cultures within
an overall program that facilitated assimilation.
The influx of non-Anglo immigrants following the displacement of people from
World War II and the changes made to immigration restrictions in the 1950s and the
1960s brought new challenges to Australian life. Ethnicity took on increased importance,
with language serving as the chief signifier of cultural difference as well as the primary
obstacle to social progress. The belief was that language barriers prevented non-Anglo
migrants from utilizing the governmental and non-governmental resources designed to
assist them in becoming productive citizens. Consistent with Australian history,
noncitizens (Anglo and non-Anglo alike) were assessed according to their potential for
49
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advancing Australian socioeconomic life. Ethnic groups posed particular challenges to
the system, not only because of the non-Anglo traditions they possessed, but because they
were not becoming citizens at predicted rates. Investing ethnic groups in the political
system was considered essential to maintaining Anglo-Saxon dominance and,
consequently, state sovereignty, which were instrumental to national progress.
Gough Whitlam has been credited with giving voice to the modifications in
Australian political culture that characterized the 1970s. Prior to his ascendancy to the
position of Prime Minister, Whitlam, as Leader of the Opposition, issued a speech to the
National Citizenship Convention in 1970. He noted that a history of unanimity on
immigration policy derived from “a general acceptance” that “economic growth and
national security required a faster population growth than could be generated within
Australia alone.” Within this consensus has been an expectation that migrants would be
subdued by their gratitude to the dominant society for granting them entry. What
developed was a system of “second rate” services for migrants, demonstrating the fact
that the government ignored its responsibility over full implementation of the
immigration program. In fact, according to Whitlam, some migrants failed to become
productive members of Australian society because of the state’s ineptitude, particularly in
the areas of “health, housing, and education.” Whitlam’s speech gave rise to the ethnic
vote, in part because it recognized publicly that noncitizens had rights. Whitlam’s
concern, however, reflected a desire to maintain Anglo dominance because it extended
only to migrants “who [could] be integrated into the Australian community.”50
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A1 Grassby expanded upon many of Whitlam’s ideas about the proper role of
ethnic groups in Australian society. As Minister for Immigration in the Whitlam
government, Grassby authored a reference paper that sought to establish a population
policy through the year 2000. The themes of national stability and progress were situated
at the heart of the program - and shaping the “national fabric” was considered to be the
crux of the challenge. The nation’s success with “absorbing people from many different
backgrounds” laid the groundwork necessary to tackle the “problems experienced by
newcomers settling in our midst.” While the political system failed to accord sufficient
legitimacy to migrants, those migrants were thriving in the marketplace. Such migrants
obtained legitimate status via their economic utility and, consequently, were worthy of
representation in mainstream media. In Grassby’s words,
“Where do these people belong, in all honesty, if not in today’s composite
Australian image? Are they to be non-people — despite their indispensable
economic contribution to our well-being - because they do not happen to fit the
largely American-oriented stereotypes of our entertainment industry?” (Emphasis
added) 51
Put simply, ethnic migrants who sufficiently adopted Anglo-Saxon values in order to
become productive workers were legitimate members of the polity.
Grassby evaluated three models designed to deal with cultural diversity and
contended that Australia was best suited to the “Family of the Nation”. The first,
“Anglo-conformis[m],” was a full assimilation model, which commanded non-Anglo
migrants to replace their traditions and language with “the basic Anglo-Saxon ‘core
culture.’” The second, the “melting pot,” was the classic American conception. The last,
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permanent ethnic pluralism,” allowed for limited assimilation in which groups could
maintain their traditions as long as doing so did not get in the way of participating in “the
general life of the nation ” Grassby argued that full assimilation was no longer possible
because of the “increasing diversity of Australian society.” In contrast, a “family of the
nation” model involves an “overall attachment to the common good” without requiring “a
sameness on the outlook or activity of each member, nor.
. ,den[ial] [of] their individuality
and distinctiveness in order to seek a superficial and unnatural conformity.”52 Though
this model allegedly allowed for the uniqueness of its members, commonality of purpose
was the unifying factor. The Australian people, regardless of their ethnic heritage, must
be dedicated to the common good” or, in this case, the advancement of Australia. Such
dedication was demonstrated primarily by economic integration into the workforce
.
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The challenge facing the nation was to cultivate a “truly national spirit” that compelled
migrants to become citizens and all Australians to work for social justice and equality . 54
Members’ freedom was limited only by the determination of how best to “contribute] to
the family of the nation.' The unity, and the ultimate socioeconomic progress, of the
nation was paramount - and the cultivation of support for the state among ethnic groups
was the principal motivation. The state sought to mitigate the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy by compelling noncitizens to demonstrate belief in the political system by
applying for full membership and finding positions of utility in socioeconomic life.
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Conclusion
All three nations developed metaphoric models to diffuse conflicts assumed to be
created by cultural diversity that rhetorically created space within the national landscape
for the maintenance of non-Anglo traditions and compelled assimilation. Such models
reflected political changes occurring domestically and internationally yet upheld many of
the political themes that characterized each nation’s history: namely, the attempt to
preserve Anglo-Saxon dominance in order to safeguard the legitimacy of the state. Major
domestic and international events in the 1960s through the 1980s led to an influx of non-
Anglo immigrants and refugees to the United States, Australia and Canada. Persons who
possessed cultural traditions and/or political views akin to Anglo-Saxon values were most
likely to be regarded as legitimate. Conversely, the state sought to ensure that
newcomers and long-time residents alike would recognize the state as the legitimate
sovereign. Because state allegiance could never be fully assumed, especially among
long-time citizens who considered newcomers a threat to their cultural and, in some
cases, socioeconomic status, and liberal-democratic states could not exert extreme
physical force over their polities without consequence, the American, Canadian and
Australian states created mechanisms to compel support. Since overtly racist policies
were no longer feasible (due to social movements within their borders and throughout the
globe), the states designed metaphoric models to mitigate the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy.
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CHAPTER III
THE STATE AS DEFENDER OF ANGLO-SAXON DOMINANCE
Chapter three illuminates the ways in which the American, Australian and
Canadian states historically mitigated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy by preventing
the influx of non-Anglo (illegitimate) persons. 1 Until domestic and international
developments compelled those states to liberalize their admittance policies in the 1960s,
laws explicitly restricted the entry of non-Anglos in an often overt attempt to preserve the
Anglo-Saxonism of their societies. This chapter also sets the stage for the analysis of
specific policies, federal hearings, and government publications from the 1960s through
1990 that constitutes subsequent chapters.
A historic concern with maintaining a unified and cohesive polity manifested into
laws preventing increases in cultural diversity in the United States, Canada, and
Australia. Determinations regarding for which persons national boundaries would be
porous, and for which persons national boundaries would be concrete, has been one realm
of national sovereignty that has enjoyed quasi-immunity. Citizenship acts as a
mechanism that gives to some and denies to others the benefits and responsibilities of
membership. It carries with it identity significance, helping human beings to understand
their positions in relation to the state, particularly in Western nations. In this way,
citizenship - along with the legislative activity that accompanies it - is a political
institution.
The “New Historical Institutionalism"' (NHI) movement in Public Law explains
political phenomena” ... “in terms of concepts and ideas that transcend the perspectives
1
The terms “Anglo-Saxon” and “white” have never been entirely synonymous. However, they
were virtually synonymous before the large influxes of non-British immigrants in all three
countries. It is worthy of note that the definitions of both of these terms have varied and become
more flexible over time, though their significance has not abated.
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of individual actors .”2 NHI scholars perceive institutions to be highly influential because
they shape the values, identities, and behaviors of both the people who work within the
system and those who seek to change it. Liberal-democratic societies have come to
“accept the factual and normative distinction between citizens and outsiders, and the
preference that we attach to the former in virtue of their being our fellow citizens .”
3
Citizenship is intentionally reductionistic because arguably, if it were to recognize and
institionalize difference, it would lose its ability to unify. “Citizenship would yet be
another force for disunity, rather than a way of cultivating unity in the face of increasing
cultural diversity. The tangible as well as symbolic realms of citizenship amount to an
institution that seeks to unite legitimate members of the community and justify the
exclusion or disadvantage of those deemed illegitimate. Extending full membership
rights only to (legitimate) residents who are believed to share the Anglo-Saxon traditions
and values central to the socio-political system allegedly safeguards the state’s legitimacy
to govern.
Pre-WWII: Explicit Preservation of Whiteness
Central to the racialized nature of the state in Anglo-Saxon democracies is the
legacy of the belief that race is a biological reality. Ideas regarding race developed in
accordance with colonialism and slavery. In fact, assertions that skin pigmentation and
other physiological characteristics were demarcations of inferiority were used to justify
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exploitation and the extermination of non-European people. Though scholars have
exposed the use of scientific theories to justify the exploitation of resources for industrial
expansion, such as Darwin’s theory of evolution in the 19th century, 5 few have
demonstrated the ways in which a belief in an Anglo-Saxon race (and the whiteness that
signifies it) has been used to nurture liberal-democratic political systems. For example,
following the rendering of slavery as illegal in the United States, privileges (previously
reserved for property-owning whites) were extended to white Christians who did not own
property. Social status was defined increasingly by one’s race following the removal of
the legal demarcation between slave and non-slave. Such policies were designed to
prevent whites that were disadvantaged economically from joining freed blacks in an
attempt to overthrow capitalism. Establishing whiteness as the criteria necessary for
certain privileges (while denying those same privileges to non-whites) was a method of
social control
6
and a successful tool to protect state sovereignty.
Belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race was used to justify expansionist
and exclusionary policies in the United States, Canada, and Australia in the 1800s and
early 1900s. For example, as Chinese immigrants in Canada (initially welcomed to take
backbreaking jobs building the railroads) failed to return to their homeland as expected,
national rhetoric reflected the widespread fear that the “yellow peril” would supersede the
Anglo-Saxon race. Various local and provincial governments passed discriminatory
legislation and restrictionist immigration policies, culminating in federal laws that
5
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excluded Chinese Canadians from the franchise and restricted their ability to leave and
re-enter the country.
7
Immigration of Chinese immigrants was terminated in the 1920s.
By denying legitimacy to nonwhites, states effectively mitigated the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy. The state, as defender of Anglo-Saxon dominance, responded to the interests
of legitimate (Anglo) citizens in preventing non-whites from becoming full members of
society.
Race took on pivotal importance in the Australian legal system in the mid- 1800s
as it distinguished between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australian, culminating in the
creation of mechanisms (referred to as Interpersonal Conflict of Laws) devoted to
determining who was white” and who was “native.”8 Discriminatory legislation
excluded most non-Anglo people from immigrating to Australia. The infamous dictation
test, which involved asking immigrants to take exams of 500 words in any European
language, was an effective exclusionary measure. The rationale behind this program was
that inferior races (non-Anglo-Saxon people) must be excluded in large numbers so
that Australia could evolve from a colony of prisoners into a nation of “equals” whose
stock surpassed the British “race.” Such policies were referred to as “White Australia.”9
For a more detailed discussion of the treatment of Chinese Canadians, see George Woodcock,
The Century That Made Us: Canada 1814-1914 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989); John
Boyko, Last Steps to Freedom: The Evolution ofCanadian Racism (Winnipeg, MB: Watson &
Dyer Publishing, 1995); and Victor Lee, “The Laws of Gold Mountain: A Sampling of Early
Canadian Laws And Cases That Affected People of Chinese Ancestry,” Manitoba Law Journal
21,2: 301-324. For discussion of the similar treatment of Chinese immigrants in California, see
Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement In
California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
8
See Campbell McLachlan, “The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law: Pluralism Beyond
the Colonial Paradigm - A Review Article,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 37,2
368-386.
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Similarly, whiteness was the explicit criterion for acquiring citizenship in the
United States from the late 1700s until the early 1950s. Federal courts mediated debates
regarding which people were “white” for purposes of law. Various scientific studies as
well as judicial assessments of “popular understanding” were used to exclude people of
Japanese, Chinese, Native American, Filipino, and African descent, as well as individuals
who were mixed” racially. Though the federal courts recognized the ambiguity of racial
identity, often conceding the fact that skin pigmentation did not necessarily denote a
particular racial heritage, they adhered to the classifications of non-white races popular in
science and in society. Such cases have been referred to as the prerequisite cases. 10
Science consistently deemed Asian and African cultures to be non-white and the courts
acted accordingly. For example, in Takao Ozawa v. United States, the Supreme Court
argued that
Manifestly, the test afforded by the mere color of skin of each individual is
impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among
Anglo-Saxons
,
ranging from imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the
swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of
the brown or yellow races. 7
7
(Emphasis added)
In situations in which the common knowledge of race and scientific data conflicted,
judges often constructed popular understandings of race in ways that accentuated the
exclusivity of whiteness. The “prerequisite cases [were] figuratively about naturalizing
White identity,” in part by treating whiteness as a natural biological phenomenon. The
codification of racial categories into law legitimized them, effectively transforming their
10
See Ian F. Haney-Lopez, White By Law: The Legal Construction ofRace (New York: New
York University Press, 1996).
11 260 U.S. 178 (1922). Quoted in Haney-Lopez, 220.
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inherent abstractness into social reality. 1 ' In other words, political and legal actors made
race real by buttressing racial categorization with institutional resources (not the least of
which were rules regarding which groups were allowed access to socioeconomic
benefits). By denying benefits to non-Anglos, the state attempted to minimize the
impacts of cultural diversity and maintain its legitimacy to govern among desirable
(legitimate Anglo) citizens.
A belief in Anglo-Saxons as the superior race was also used to rationalize
American colonialism. As Reginald Horseman explains, “[b]y 1850 American
expansionism was viewed in the United States less as a victory for the principles of free
democratic republicanism than as evidence of the innate superiority of the American
Anglo-Saxon branch of the Caucasian race.” 13 As Horseman and others have
demonstrated, there was never actually an Anglo-Saxon people in England that were
homogenous and had conquered other European groups. The term Anglo-Saxon was
used by the English in the nineteenth century at times to refer generally to people living
in England and, at other times, to “a vague brotherhood of English-speaking peoples
throughout the British Isles and the world.” The term was used in early United States
history to distinguish white people from those of African, Asian, Mexican, Spanish, and
Native American descent. Though there were regional differences regarding which
ethnic groups were assumed to be Anglo-Saxon, the American Forefathers were
considered consistently to be the descendants of Anglo-Saxons. Belief in Anglo-
Saxonism was used to situate America’s “chosen” people within a heritage of a race that
12
Ibid., 24-25; 17.
13
Reginald Horseman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins ofAmerican Racial Anglo-
Saxonism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 1. This book is considered to be the
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allegedly spread westward and was talented in the art of government. Such conviction
added hope and a measure of certainty during times of great societal change. Moreover,
similar to the Australian belief that equality could only be obtained if inferior people
were excluded, the idea that the presence of inferior people inhibited the ability of
democratic institutions to function effectively permeated American thought. 14 In all three
countries, the belief in Anglo-Saxonism was used to justify exploitation and/or
destruction of non-Anglo-Saxon peoples who were assumed to be doomed to extinction.
Denial of legitimacy status to such peoples was considered to be instrumental to the
preservation of Anglo-Saxon traditions and values and the state that embodied them.
States allegedly acted in their own interests and the interests of the legitimate members of
the polity. Restricting the number — and influence - of illegitimate persons mitigated the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
WWII - Post-WWII: Expanding the Umbrella of Whiteness
International and domestic events, including the displacement of people by World
War II, compelled the three Federal governments to modify the most discriminatory
aspects of immigration and settlement policies. Social movements for equality convinced
politicians that, if Anglo-Saxon dominance would be maintained, it had to be achieved
through policies that at least appeared non-discriminatory. Explicit restrictions on
immigrants from non-white, non-Anglo countries were relaxed and replaced by more
“objective” entry criteria. The state sought to engender support for its legitimacy among
newcomers by formally rejecting its discriminatory past. Legitimate residents were now
14
Ibid., 4,5,6. See Horseman for a more detailed explanation of the various intellectual and
cultural forces that resulted in Anglo-Saxonism as central to colonial America’s understanding of
itself.
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newcomers granted visas by the Federal government, suggesting that the state had found
their petitions (and the petitioners) worthy of membership. However, the impact on the
actual number of immigrants from historically disadvantaged nations was, in some cases,
minimal. Moreover, a measure of control over non-Anglo ethnic groups was achieved by
incorporating the leaders of the largest ethnic groups into moderate-liberal political
parties, effectively creating new voting bases for those parties. Concern that newcomers
adopted Anglo-Saxon values continued to be at the center of debates over immigration
policy, and assessments regarding who was capable of assimilation were still made
through a racialized and ethnocentric lens.
Historic policies encouraging European settlement in less-populated areas were
used to present Canada as an immigrant-welcoming nation. Though restrictive
immigration policies were changed significantly following World War II in order to
allow for the entry of non-Anglo peoples, 15 applications from those deemed to be Anglo
enjoyed preferred status. For example, young, single, Western European men and their
immediate families acquired approval, allegedly because they could easily integrate into
an economy in recovery. Political leaders and others perceived the increase in the
number of non-white immigrants, which occurred as a result of the liberalization of
immigration policies following 1945, as threatening because such groups were believed
to be “un-Canadian.” 16 In 1952, the Minister of Immigration was given the power to
determine whether or not an immigrant would adopt dominant Canadian values and
assimilate quickly. Applications from the United States, Western Europe, and Britain
15
Official biculturalism allowed for special visa programs for immigrants from French nations,
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were received most generously, while applications from Asia were often denied. 17 In
other words, though many of the explicitly racist provisions of immigration policies were
eradicated, many non-Anglos were denied entry due to a perceived inability to assimilate.
In this way, the state appeared egalitarian while preserving Anglo-Saxon dominance;
consequently reinforcing its legitimacy to govern.
Similarly, the Australian government began dismantling the White Australia
policy in 1 947 by allowing the admission of persons displaced by World War II. The
dictation test was removed via the 1958 Migration Act but was replaced by a
determination of whether or not immigrants had enough whiteness in their blood. 18 At
the same time that policies excluding non-British immigrants were being deconstructed,
various schemes were created to provide economic assistance to migrants from certain
(white) nations. The assisted-passage system allowed for the state-subsidized
immigration of over two million non-British persons in accordance with assessments
regarding “relevant” criteria (i.e., “nationality, occupation, health, employability.)”
Those of European descent seeking entry “were virtually free to settle in Australia
without restriction provided they had no known criminal record” 19 suggesting that the
claims and (white) identities of these migrants lent themselves to becoming legitimate
members of the polity. This was one way that socially-constructed whiteness carried
tangible, financial benefits in the post-World War II period. Moreover, Asians were
17
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consistently excluded (including the wives of Australian soldiers.)20 Dominant
Australians, who were concerned that non-British immigration would threaten national
unity, were promised, “there would be ten British immigrants for every foreigner.” When
such a ratio proved to be impossible due to the demands of the economy, authorities
encouraged assimilation as the best way to diffuse cultural differences and to promote
national unity. Both objectives were pivotal to the preservation of state legitimacy.
Legitimate residents were the newcomers who successfully obtained visas despite their
non-Anglo backgrounds and who adopted Anglo-Saxon traditions and values.
In the early 1950s, the challenge of bilateral legitimacy in the United States was
infused with the fear of Communism. Concern for the economic vitality of the state at
home and abroad began to dominate policymaking decisions in an attempt to lay the
groundwork for “international liberalism.” Bureaucratic expansion was justified as a
necessary step in the war against Communism. 22 The racialized and ethnocentric lens
through which immigration and refugee policy decisions were made was shaped by the
Cold War belief that outsiders (especially those from non-democratic nations) posed
threats to national security. “Immigration policy was reconceived as a net to protect
against the nation’s enemies.” Keith Fitzgerald argued that the motivator for immigration
and refugee policy shifted “from a domestic, racial basis to international, security
concerns.” However, the state’s interest in preserving Anglo-Saxon dominance
remained. Assessments regarding which immigrants maintained loyalty to their nations
20
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of ongin and/or possessed cultural values least like American values were shaped by
racial stereotypes. Though the McCarran-Walter Act, which was passed in 1952,
eradicated many of the restrictions on immigration from Southern Europe and Asia due to
growing criticism of the quota system, applicants from nations that were believed to be
non-Anglo-Saxon continued to be disadvantaged. For example, though Asia was
included into the national origins scheme for the first time, policies allowed for only 100
visas annually to Asian nations and another 100 visas for those applying from the so-
called Asia-Pacific triangle."
4
Though the explicit restriction against the immigration of
Asians was removed, the limitation of 2,000 immigrants from the new “Asia-Pacific
triangle” zone, which “consisted of countries from India to Japan and all Pacific islands
north of Australia and New Zealand,”" 5 effectively maintained the status quo. The state
believed that the best way to maintain legitimacy was to deny full membership benefits to
anyone who might have communist sympathies. Legitimate residents supported the
American state, in particular, and democracy, in general.
Though post-World War Two policies included fewer explicit provisions banning
the entry of non-Anglos, and, in fact, allowed for unprecedented numbers of such
immigrants, they granted federal officials sufficient tools to maintain Anglo-Saxon
dominance in order to preserve state legitimacy. These policies privileged Anglo
applicants because they were allegedly best suited to assimilate. Adoption of Anglo
traditions and values was viewed as instrumental to full assimilation. Non-Anglo
applicants, particularly those with suspected communist ties, were deemed to be
illegitimate petitioners, hence justifying their restriction. Similar to the pre-World War II
24
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period, the state maintained its legitimacy by denying membership to those persons
rendered illegitimate.
Mid-1960s
-Mid-1970s:
Rendering The Preservation of Whiteness Implicit
The 1960s and 1970s were a time of great social upheaval throughout the world.
In the face of increasing cultural diversity, scientists and social scientists advocated for
the whitening of society. 26 Modem anthropological works, such as Carleton Coon’s The
Origin ofRaces, continued the practice of utilizing physical characteristics (i.e., shapes
and sizes of skulls, teeth, and limbs) to classify the human population into separate races.
Attempts to preserve the dominance of Anglo-Saxonism in the United States, Canada and
Australia persisted. Alterations of immigration restrictions and other policies responsible
for reinforcing whiteness failed to eradicate the legacy of Anglo-Saxon dominance, in
part because laws help racial categories to transcend the sociohistorical contexts in
which they develop”' 8 and, in another respect, because the primacy of Anglo-Saxon
values was deemed to be central to national progress. Productivity in the capitalist
marketplace was tied directly to workers’ possession of Anglo-Saxon values. By the
mid-1960s, legitimate residents supported both the legitimacy of the state and the
economic system.
The occupations and specific skills of those seeking to immigrate took on
heightened importance in determining who was “suitable” for citizenship, particularly in
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Canada. The state contended that unbiased assessments of visa applications could only
be made through the prioritization of economic affairs. However, since the fate of
applicants’ petitions were determined almost exclusively by occupational skills, and most
third-world applicants lacked modem job qualifications, the system retained (de facto)
Anglo preference. Emphasis on allowing the immigration of people with skills in
demand by the Canadian economy increased in 1966 with Prime Minister Pearson’s
Liberal government’s White Paper on Immigration. The Immigration Act of 1976
included a provision that prohibited denial of immigration requests based on “race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, or sex .”30 That policy, along with the Green
Paper (a report published in 1974 by a government-sponsored commission on
immigration), reinforced and extended the economic objectives set forth in the White
Paper. The points system that resulted was heralded as the realization of a thoroughly
objective immigration policy. However, the points system and the emphasis on the skills
of the applicants evolved into a mathematical assessment of worthiness
.
31
It was
sufficiently flexible to allow for the biases of immigration officials to decide which
requests to grant, particularly through assessments of who was capable of integrating into
the economic system. Applicants were measured according to ten factors, six of which
dealt directly with employability (for a maximum of 65 points .)32 The ninth measure
‘ 9 Note that “members of the family class and retirees were not selected according to the points
system.” However, “refugees [were] assessed against the first five factors, which have to do with
employability, but were not given point ratings.” Employment and Immigration Canada,
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allowed for racialized assessments of immigrants’ ability to assimilate, for a maximum of
ten points. It read:
Points awarded on the basis of an interview held to determine the suitability of the
person and his/her dependants to become successfully established in Canada,
based on the person’s adaptability
,
motivation, initiative, resourcefulness and
other similar qualities
.
33 (Emphasis added)
The personality characteristics awarded by this measure were Anglo-Saxon, and terms
such as suitability and “adaptability” were virtually synonymous with assimilation.
Moreover, up to ten points were awarded to applicants who “read[], wr[ote] and
sp[oke] both English and French fluently.” Applicants who were fluent in only English
or French were awarded five points
.
34
Unless an applicant was an entrepreneur or was
sponsored by a relative, he or she had to earn fifty out of a possible one hundred points.
Applicants from non-Anglo developing nations were severely disadvantaged by this
system because it rewarded Anglo-Saxon social and occupational skills. Also, the
availability of immigration posts varied among the regions of the world, with higher
numbers in European nations and the United States than in the Third World. In fact,
“[t]he uneven distribution of posts, and the time differences in the processing of
applications” contributed to a system that, as implemented, functioned “in a
discriminatory manner with respect to the geographical location and, hence, the
ethnic/racial background of potential immigrants.”35 By establishing a quantitative
system for the evaluation of visa applications, the Canadian state successfully portrayed
itself as egalitarian, thereby reinforcing its legitimacy among non-Anglo residents.
33
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Though this system was less discriminatory than its predecessors, it continued a
preference for Anglo applicants. Immigration visas conferred a measure of legitimacy on
their recipients. Legitimate immigrants were persons deemed worthy of entry due to their
occupational skills and/or family connections in Canada. The needs of the economic
system (or, at least the state’s perception of its needs) became pivotal players in the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
In Australia, immigration and refugee policies were tools in a “conscious social
engineering [effort designed] to create a particular kind of society,” which incorporated a
desire to maintain[]
. . .British hegemony and ‘white’ domination”36 in order to preserve
state legitimacy. The removal of many of the explicit discriminatory aspects of
immigration policies via passage of the 1958 Migration Act led to a discursive shift from
a focus on keeping out “inferiors” to promoting “social harmony.”37 Since ethnic and
racial diversity were believed to cause conflict, an interest in maintaining Anglo-Saxon
dominance was at the root of this objective. Though Australia increasingly opened its
doors to non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants from the mid-1960s onward, it consistently
preferred white immigrants. For example, until 1982, assisted-passage programs were
targeted to European nations. The largest groups of assisted passengers were English and
Italian, while the rest were primarily Greek, Dutch, Yugoslavs, Germans, and Poles. 38
Non-British European migrants were seen as white but certainly as less Anglo than
British migrants and were, therefore, disadvantaged in the jobs made available to them.
Since Australia has consistently been, and continues to be, one of the two most British
36 James Jupp, From White Australia, 5, 6.
37
Ibid., 9.
38
Geoffrey Bolton, The Oxford History ofAustralia: 1942-1988 The Middle Way, Volume 5,
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993), 106.
81
societies in the world outside of England, the influx of non-British whites was felt more
keenly than in the United States. 39 Moreover, white British migrants were allowed into
Australia with virtually no restrictions until 19 8 3.40 Therefore, though policies were
modified to allow for greater numbers of non-British immigrants, they did not mitigate
white dominance. The Anglo-Saxon state attempted to achieve its goal of social harmony
(consequently protecting its legitimacy) by extending legitimacy only to citizens and
noncitizens who assimilated sufficiently to prevent cultural conflict.
Adjustments in immigration policies led to larger numbers of non-Anglo-Saxon
people entering the United States than Australia. The 1965 Immigration Act replaced the
national-origins quota system with “annual ceilings for Eastern and (for the first time)
Western hemisphere immigrants of 170,000 and 120,000 respectively,”41 while
establishing a limit of overall immigration numbers to 20,000 people from any one nation
annually. Immigration from the Western hemisphere was limited in order to stem the
rising tide of applications from Latin America. The intended beneficiaries of these
reforms were southern and eastern Europeans, with the numbers of Asians expected to
increase moderately.
4
“ Visas were granted on a first-come, first-serve basis. At the same
time, the “system of preference” was reorganized in order to benefit applicants sponsored
by their spouses, parents, or children. Though many non-Anglo people living in the
United States sponsored their relatives abroad, the shift of the policy towards family
39
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reunification benefited applicants from Anglo nations simply because those applicants
had a greater chance of having relatives in the States (due to the restrictions in existence
prior to the 1965 Immigration Act.) Though the policy officially removed its blatantly
discriminatory aspects, it did so in ways that maximized state control and sought to
maintain the privileges enjoyed by Anglo applicants. The American state fell short of the
bureaucratic control achieved by its Canadian and Australian counterparts. The first-
come, first-serve nature of the program did not provide the state with the filters necessary
to choose the most legitimate applicants but only with the ability to reject those who were
clearly illegitimate. However, this program did provide for mitigation of the challenge of
bilateral legitimacy.
American policymakers made concerted efforts to ensure that immigration and
refugee policies advanced domestic and international goals. Like in Canada and
Australia, social movements for civil rights and fair treatment compelled lawmakers to
promote equality. The changes made to the 1965 Immigration Act were engineered, in
part, to accomplish that goal as well as to advance the position of the United States on the
global stage, particularly among European nations. A Cold War mentality permeated
decision-making regarding refugee policy so much so that “fleeing from Communism”
was essential to the refugee designation. Even though the Middle East was included in
areas of the world from which refugees derived, it maintained the reference to
“communism as the essential form of political persecution.”43 The admittance of
refugees was also facilitated, entrusting the Attorney General with the power to admit
43
Ellen Percy Kraly, “U.S. Refugee Policies and Refugee Migration Since World War II,”
Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy
,
75.
83
them in “emergencies or in the national interest.”44 The authority of the executive branch
to utilize refugee policy as a foreign-policy tool was enhanced.45 This allowed the state
to diffuse the greatest (perceived) threat to its legitimacy: communism. Though a
concern with the maintenance of Anglo-Saxon dominance remained, the focus shifted to
preserving the polity’s belief that democracy (particularly the American form) was the
ideal political system. Legitimate refugees were those who fled communist systems in
search of political freedoms, and then embraced the American way of life upon arrival.
Conclusion
Historically, the American, Australian and Canadian states endeavored to exclude
non-Anglos in order to minimize cultural conflict and, consequently, maximize their
legitimacy to govern. As policies were liberalized in accordance with domestic and
international events, less explicit measures were used to cultivate polities that fully
embraced Anglo-Saxon socio-economic values. Immigrants’ legitimacy was increasingly
tied to economic utility. Foreign policy interests also played a pivotal role in the review
of visa applications, especially petitions for refugee status in the United States.
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CHAPTER IV
THE STATE AS PROMOTER OF FAIRNESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
f .
Domestic and international forces that were perceived to threaten the sovereignty
ot the American, Canadian and Australian states compounded the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy in the 1970s and 1980s. Chapter four reveals how immigration and refugee
policies were utilized by these states to maintain and/or acquire prominence in a changing
world while engendering support for legitimacy to govern at home. Political will
supported the promotion of the United States’ preeminence in international politics,
which meant deflating the influence of Communist nations by admitting large numbers of
Communist citizens as political refugees. The humanitarian aspects of Canada’s
immigration policy were placed within the national objective of promoting economic
growth. Movements for Quebecois independence, compounded by civil rights activity,
forced the Canadian state’s fight for legitimacy onto the forefront and tempered its
promotion of fairness and humanitarianism via its immigration policy. Australian
decision-making was highly influenced by the “populate or perish” slogan, which was
created in the 1940s and captured the belief that Australia was vulnerable to conquest by
Asian nations unless it expanded its (Anglo) population. In addition, all three nations
were heavily involved with international movements to admit people who faced torture or
death in their homelands. The more insecure the states believed themselves to be, the
more crucial cultivating allegiance became. Selection of newcomers who were most
likely to assimilate into dominant society and consequently support the legitimacy of the
system took on special importance.
The 1960s ushered in a period of domestic and international change around the
globe. Nations once ruled by colonial powers embarked on journeys of independence
and advanced democracies sought for ways to exert greater influence over a changed
international landscape. The concept of pluralism was acquiring credence on the world
stage as the most desirable way to manage diversity. At the same time, historically-
disadvantaged ethnic, racial, and sexual groups advocated for the deconstruction of
exclusionary policies and for access to the halls of power. The challenge of bilateral
legitimacy in the United States, Canada and Australia was compounded by these changes.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Australian and Canadian states responded by creating
multicultural institutions that formally celebrated difference but skillfully encouraged
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adoption of Anglo-Saxon traditions and values. Rhetoric surrounding assimilation in the
United States appeared to promote a mixing of cultural traditions in a “melting pot” that
really provided for a whitening of society. Immigration and refugee policies were
utilized to maintain and/or acquire prominence on the world stage while engendering
support for state legitimacy at home. These policies offer compelling insights into the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy because they prescribed who did and who did not
deserve to be members of the polity and spoke to both domestic and international
political stages. In other words, the discourse surrounding and constituting these policies
revealed how the state compelled noncitizens to believe in the system’s legitimacy, which
diffused the negative impacts that their (illegitimate or near-illegitimate) presence
allegedly exerted upon the economic welfare and social cohesiveness of the state.
Political will supported the promotion of American preeminence in international
politics, which meant deflating the influence of Communist nations. This strategy
involved admitting large numbers of Communist citizens primarily as political refugees.
The policies that resulted trumped, to a limited extent, the concern with maintaining an
Anglo-Saxon society. For example, Vietnamese refugees were admitted at rates
comparable to those of Soviet Union refugees. However, the assessment of petitions for
refugee status accommodated the racist and ethnocentric assumptions that continued to
shape policymaking. In particular, political oppression (a.k.a., living under a Communist
regime) was deemed to be worthy of entry, while economic oppression was not. Many
Haitians who lived in extreme poverty under the brutal dictatorships of the Duvaliers
were deemed to be merely seeking economic refuge and, therefore, not legitimate
refugees. Moreover, the removal of explicitly racist provisions from immigration
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policies was intended to send a message to domestic and international progressive
movements that the United States was fair and humanitarian. The preference for
reuniting family members was the premier vehicle through which a change in the
American image was supposed to be achieved. The generosity of opening the nation’s
doors to the families of citizens and permanent residents was intended to foster allegiance
to the state, thereby mitigating the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. However, concerns
about the (in)ability of non-Anglo-Saxon refugees and immigrants to assimilate, and the
ways in which such difficulties would disrupt social cohesiveness and/or harmony,
dominated much of the rhetoric. Such discussions revealed a belief that certain
newcomers, especially in large numbers, posed threats to the legitimacy of the political
system.
Australian and Canadian experiences were quite similar, though both states
operated from less prominent positions on the world stage. Both nations sought to
increase visibility through statuses as immigrant- and refugee-accepting nations. The
Canadian state was especially keen on cultivating an image of a nation more
humanitarian than its Southern neighbor and maintaining federal legitimacy in the face of
Quebecois separatism. Quebecois leaders felt threatened by the post WWII expansion of
the national government, especially the introduction of multiculturalism, which they
believed (somewhat accurately) was intended to move away from the official bilingual
and bicultural tradition by empowering non-French ethnic groups. Movements for
Quebecois independence, compounded by national civil rights movements, forced the
Canadian state’s fight for legitimacy onto the forefront. Immigration and refugee policies
took on even greater importance in mitigating the challenge of bilateral legitimacy
87
because they controlled the number of non-Anglo noncitizens allowed into the polity and
sent messages to citizens regarding the strength of state sovereignty. Selection of
newcomers who would integrate successfully into socio-economic life became crucial to
cultivating state legitimacy and preventing illegitimate newcomers from further
weakening Federal supremacy.
Australian decision-making was highly influenced by the “populate or perish”
slogan, which was created in the 1940s and captured the belief that the nation was
vulnerable to conquest by Asian nations unless it expanded its (Anglo) population.
Though all three states felt vulnerable to forces like Communism, and Canada was
primarily concerned with maintaining an adequate labor supply, Australia’s emphasis on
increasing its population to enhance its security was unique. In order to mitigate the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy, the Australian state had to maintain an adequate
population by admitting legitimate newcomers (those who fulfilled the needs of the
economic system.) For all three nations, the more insecure the state believed itself to be,
the more crucial it was to engender support for the system among the polity. Therefore,
selecting immigrants who were most likely to assimilate into socioeconomic life and,
consequently, support the legitimacy of the system, took on special importance. Though
various motivating factors shaped the refugee and immigration policies that resulted, the
state’s intent to enhance its power and/or image on the world stage and to cultivate the
legitimacy of the system both domestically and abroad was evident in the rhetoric
surrounding policy changes and proposals.
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Reuniting the Immigrant Family
Changes made to immigration policies in all three states were part of a campaign
to make newcomer selection less overtly discriminatory and, at the same time, more
manageable. As the role of government expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, immigration
became one of the many areas in which the state revealed its priorities and sought to
advance its interests. In the systems that developed, applicants with family members who
were legal residents or citizens were privileged in the selection process. This move fit in
with domestic and international campaigns that the nations had changed their biased
systems, and simultaneously advanced their interest in gaining influence on the
international stage. It also successfully cultivated allegiance among ethnic noncitizens
and newly-ordained citizens by sending the message that the states supported their
nations’ ethnic families, in particular, and cultural diversity, in general. In this way,
family reunification mitigated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
The United States
“We are concerned with the feelings and fate of thousands of human beings
and their families. We are concerned with a very fundamental question which asks
whether we believe, as we say we believe, in the dignity and worth of each
individual.”
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Testifying Before the House of
Representatives Subcommittee No. 1 of The Committee on the Judiciary
Wednesday, July 22, 1964
The changes made to American immigration policy in the 1960s built upon the
McCarran Walter Act of 1952 - including the exclusionary American traditions and
anticommunist mentality that were embedded in it. Though the 1952 Act maintained the
national origins system from the 1920s, it allegedly moved away from the blatantly racist
assumptions that formed the foundation of the earlier policy. “[C]laims of racial
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superiority” were replaced with “sociological theones relating to cultural assimilation ”
As Bill Ong Hing points out, “[whatever the language, the basis for perpetuating the
national origins quota system in 1952 remained the majority’s sense ofwho could be a
true American. In other words, determining which newcomers were best equipped to
become legitimate members of the polity has been a consistent part of immigration
policy. Such assessments were made through a racialized and ethnocentric lens. For
example, applicants from northern and western Europe were privileged in the system,
while those from a newly-created “Asia-Pacific Triangle” faced greater restrictions, albeit
fewer than under the previous Asian exclusion laws. Exclusionary tools were extended to
include others deemed subversive,” including Communists and homosexuals. 2
Immigration policy was unique among political realms because it endowed the
state with the authority to control who joined the polity. Consequently, immigration
policy was insulated from the judicial scrutiny to which other political decision-making
was subjected - creating free reign for discriminatory conceptions of which ethnic and
racial backgrounds were most conducive to assimilating into dominant American society.
The “plenary power” doctrine, which was enacted during a period in which “Congress
aggressively acted to exclude Chinese immigrants from this nation’s shores, bestowed
great discretion on the U.S. government in the establishment of rules that regulated the
admission of noncitizens into the country.” Though the “scope” of this doctrine has been
“narrowed” by the Supreme Court, it remains the “law of the land.”3
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The Kennedy Administration pioneered the privilege accorded visa applications
from family members of American citizens and legal residents. John F. Kennedy, and
then Lyndon B. Johnson, perceived the national origin quota system to be discriminatory
and believed that the nation would best be served by a system that prioritized the needs of
the U.S. economy and the unity of families. Such a policy allowed the state to act “both
as a leader and as an example.”4 The widespread belief was that immigrants with family
members who were already members of the American polity were the most likely to
assimilate. A multi-tier system was established according to the proximity of familial
relation to citizens and lawful permanent residents. Greatest weight was accorded to
applications from parents and minor unmarried children, while least weight was accorded
to applications from siblings. Three additional categories were created that sought to
fulfill needs of the economy. 5
Supporters of the proposed changes in 1965 found themselves assuring opponents
and the American public that Anglo dominance would be maintained. The policy that
resulted preserved the disadvantage to applicants from the Eastern Hemisphere. Though
20,000 visas were allocated for nations that fell outside of the Western Hemisphere, the
majority of the total visas set aside for the Eastern Hemisphere were for relatives of
citizens and lawful permanent residents. 6 This revealed the state’s belief that newcomers
from the East were most likely to assimilate if they joined family members who already
demonstrated a certain amount of allegiance to the system by obtaining legal legitimacy.
The policy also preserved the legacy of the Asian exclusions in that sponsorship
necessitated the long-term presence of family members already in the country. Even
4
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though the numbers of people who acquired access to immigrant visas through family
preference was significant (and considerably higher than anticipated), the intent was to
maintain the preference for newcomers with traditions that would be easily assimilated
into American Anglo dominance. Moreover, there was concern that the changes would
alienate the United States’ European allies, particularly Germany and England.
The 120,000 ceiling that was established on the number of visas available to
applicants from the Western Hemisphere was intended to curb Latin American
immigration. An increase in the number of Spanish-speaking immigrants following
World War II ignited “much of the lingering nativism in the United States.
.
..”
7
The fact
that such immigrants outwardly posed a challenge to Anglo dominance - most obviously
by their reliance on Spanish - was undoubtedly a key motivator for the resistance. The
ceilings that were created by the Immigration Act of 1965 8 resulted in long lines of
applicants under family preference from developing nations, which meant waiting
penods of up to twenty years. Consequently, the legacy of the national origins quota
remained intact: “similarly situated persons (e.g., siblings and children of U.S. citizens)
faced radically different waiting times for a visa only because of their country of origin,
with accompanying racial impacts.”9
Family reunification was the dominant theme in immigration policy from 1965
until changes were made to rectify the alleged disadvantage that newcomers, especially
illegal immigrants, posed to the economy in the 1980s. In Keith Fitzgerald’s words,
United States “immigration policy, especially after 1965 and before IRCA [Immigration
Ibid., 25.
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Reform and Control Act of 1986 10
] lackfed] a strong labor market policy rationale” and
instead consisted of categories that prioritized reuniting family members." The U.S.
Department of Justice cited the origin of a system that admitted newcomers based on
“reunification of families or upon skills needed by the United States” as the
recommendation of a special commission organized by President Harry Truman in
1953. 12
Concern with promulgating a fair and humanitarian image of the United States
infused testimony before the House of Representatives. In 1964, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy argued that prioritizing family reunification took into account “simple
humanity” because “[o]ne of the primary purposes of civilization
. .
.
[was] to guarantee
that family life can flourish in unity, peace, and order.” 13 Secretary of State Dean Rusk
explained.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been placed in the role of
critical leadership in a troubled and constantly changing world. We are concerned
to see that our immigration laws reflect our real character and objectives. What
other peoples think about us plays an important role in the achievement of our
foreign policies.
Family preference was cited as one of the most explicit examples of the nation’s rejection
of its discriminatory past. However, Rusk cautioned against treating applicants from all
nations equally because doing so might damage the nation’s relationship with its allies in
10
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Northern and Western Europe. 14 Maintenance of some discriminatory measures was
considered paramount to protecting national security in a hostile bipolar world.
Reuniting the immigrant family in the United States helped to cultivate a fair and
humanitarian American image on a Cold-War world stage while mitigating the challenge
of bilateral legitimacy at home.
Australia
Emigration is an adventure which holds a challenge both for the migrant and the
Australian-born citizen. Just as the newcomer must understand that customs and
conditions in Australia are likely to be very different from those of his homeland, so
the Australian citizen faces the need to live in goodwill and co-operation with his
fellow men, of whatever creed and from whatever country.
Information Office,
Australian Department of Immigration
Getting to Know Australians
No. 3 January 1968
The post-World War II political environment in Australia was marked by feelings
of vulnerability, particularly in regard to the continent’s Asian neighbors. The Chinese
state’s adoption of Communism meant that a political threat was logistically closer than
Australia s Western allies. As a member of the British Commonwealth, Australia often
existed in the shadows of England. Known for the bravery and dedication of its soldiers,
its other advancements often went overlooked. Since many Europeans (including
Anglos) who immigrated to Australia following World War II were returning to their
nations of origin, and attracting British newcomers was becoming increasingly difficult,
Australia sought to compete for migrants in order to support its “populate or perish”
program. Therefore, domestic and international forces exacerbated the challenge of
bilateral legitimacy, which deemed primarily from increases in cultural diversity. Intent
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on being recognized in its own right, and convinced that population growth and economic
development were instrumental to achieving international recognition and cultivating
allegiance, the Australian state modified its immigration policy. Similar to the
experience of the United States in the 1960s, the state was expanding in both literal (i.e.,
the creation of bureaucratic departments and overall manpower) and philosophical
(conceptions of issues that the national government should handle) terms. Australian
society was changing as ethnic groups and other minorities demanded equal treatment.
Bureaucratic resources via the Immigration Department, which was established in 1945,
were expanded in order to adequately manage population growth. The state adopted a
highly programmatic approach to population management, which resulted in “some of the
most detailed and meticulous migration statistics in the world.” 15 The Immigration
Department’s jurisdiction extended beyond keeping illegitimate people out of Australia to
facilitating the assimilation of those who acquired legal entry. Through fluctuations in
budget allocations and migrant benefits from the 1960s through the 1980s, the
responsibilities of the Department remained the same, though more emphasis was
increasingly placed on its policing function. Therefore, the Australian solution to
domestic and international insecurity (and thereby mitigating the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy) was to enhance the state’s control over immigration.
In the aftermath of World War II, Australia accepted large numbers of displaced
people, partly in an attempt to take on a greater role on the world stage. Special care was
15
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accorded to selecting migrants who could easily adjust and adapt to Australian society. 16
Adjustment included fulfilling the needs of the economy. 17 A large and extensive
bureaucracy was established to teach migrants English and prepare them for employment,
particularly in jobs for which Australians were unavailable. As far back as the late
1940s, the Australian migrant system was increasingly liberalized to allow for family
sponsorship. In fact, many families immigrated to Australia following Canada’s rejection
of their family members. This penchant for family reunification accorded Australia
international attention. Moreover, the willingness to take in displaced persons and others
in need helped to cultivate a humanitarian image. However, the belief underlying this
policy was that the Aussie way of life was “superior” and that immigrants should return
the “favour” of being “rescued from poverty” by adopting dominant Australian values
and practices. 18 Legitimate newcomers assimilated out of gratitude, which prevented
social conflict and reinforced state sovereignty.
As the communities created by displaced people became more politically astute,
they demanded modifications to the official assimilationist policy. The Australian state’s
response was to convert to a goal of “integration,” which allegedly allowed for
maintenance of non-Anglo traditions and values. Full integration, evidenced by
becoming citizens and being successfully employed, was the ultimate objective and
encouragement of “integration” was believed to avoid the pitfalls (namely, the ire of
ethnic groups) caused by an explicitly assimilationist policy. The integrationist approach
did not forbid non-Anglo behavior and traditions (i.e., speaking languages other than
16
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English). Instead, the belief was that “[assimilation was a good thing.
.
.,
so, by
definition, one had to rely on the inherent persuasions of the proposition and the goodwill
of the immigrant.” 19 In other words, legitimate residents had the common sense to adopt
Anglo-Saxon values and traditions. In this way, as with the American assimilationist
policy, individuals who did not succeed in society and/or the marketplace were held
entirely responsible for their failure. For example, if an immigrant failed to leam English
and acquire a job that allowed him to escape poverty, the state relinquished its
responsibility - even if services assisting in those challenges were not made available to
him by the state. Moreover, such “failure” was used as “proof’ that immigrants from
certain backgrounds were illegitimate, thereby justifying denials to the benefits of full
membership.
The policy of integration was introduced at a Citizenship Convention in the
1960s. By this time, non-British European immigrants had worked their way onto the
boards of many state organizations and represented potentially influential voting blocks.
Consequently, Citizenship Conventions became sounding boards for migrant issues,
especially the hostility among ethnic Australians towards being compelled to relinquish
most of their non-Anglo traditions. The state faced criticism that migrant policy
decisions were “racially or politically motivated” and that those decisions were carried
out in ways that violated human rights. 20 Integration was believed to provide a greater
incentive for migrants to play a more active role in mainstream Australian society and to
give Australia the upper hand in a competitive world of attracting immigrant workers.
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Essential to integration into mainstream society, the state believed, was voting for the
political party that pioneered the movement to eradicate overtly discriminatory policies.
A belief in the legitimacy of the Australian state was central to this program. “[A]reas
outside of the central compact which created and sustained the Australian community and
commanded its citizens’ cooperation and loyalty, were capable of diverse endeavor.” It
did not provide for a “disjointed medley of varied groups pursuing their own interests
regardless ofcommon obligations and concerns.”21 In other words, the state met the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy by creating a program that embraced a limited degree of
diversity as long as migrants demonstrated their own legitimacy by embracing the
sovereignty of the state and its Anglo essence.
Migrant services in Australia were extensive and included educational and other
programs to facilitate assimilation. For example, the Good Neighbor Movement, which
was created in 1950, was designed to act as a referral agency to public and private
transition services. One of its brochures, entitled Getting to Know Australians, provided
British migrants with a brief description of services offered by Good Neighbor branches
and community organizations, whose goal it was to make migrants “feel welcome” and to
help ease tensions concerning how they would “be accepted by the people of Australia.”
The immigration of British citizens was portrayed as a challenge to both the migrant and
Australian society. Despite the fact that British migrants were, on the whole, English-
speaking and Anglo, there was a concern with “successful integration,” which meant
“becoming] part of the normal, useful life of the community.” In the interest of
promulgating a positive image on the world stage, the brochure indicated that Australia
may “stand as an example to the world of the way in which men may live and work
21 Murphy, The Other Australia, 164.
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together in harmony” because of the peaceful way in which “representatives of some 40
nations reside “here” without the presence of “tensions and racial disputes.”22 The Good
Neighbor Movement ended in the late 1970s, but it set the stage for the service agencies
that were created to assist non-Anglo migrants and refugees in the 1970s and beyond.
The Federal government provided state and municipal private and public agencies with
funding to help migrants help themselves. These actions revealed themes that shaped
immigration and refugee policy throughout the 1970s and 1980s: that successful
integration (a.k.a. assimilation) of newcomers was a paramount goal and was of utmost
importance to the perception of the Australian state and its people abroad.
The Australian state dedicated considerable resources to investigating the issues
involved in migration and to devising policy solutions. Parliamentary reports and
bureaucratic instructional materials shaped, and were shaped by, political decision-
making and the challenge of bilateral legitimacy that was the subtext of the debates. The
image of the nation as a “family,” articulated by the Minister of Immigration, A1 Grassby,
in the Whitlam Government, was complemented by the preference for family
reunification within the migrant selection system. Though the movement to create an
objective selection system began in the 1960s, a numerically-based test was introduced in
the early 1970s. The 1970s were considered to be the start of the “fifth stage” of
Australian history in which the nation would be able to capture its “national identity,”
which involved strength in “diversity” and awareness of its “rich cultural heritage”23 as a
nation distinct from the British Empire. Similarly, Canada was carving an identity
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separate from Bntain during this time, which resulted in much discussion regarding what
constituted national identity. In contrast, the explicit emphases placed on fostering
national unity and on constructing a concrete national identity were not seen in American
rhetoric.
In addition to making the system less overtly discriminatory, the goal was to
better assess which applicants were well-suited to Australian life in order to reduce the
societal fnction that was believed to result from migrants who failed to assimilate. In the
words of A.J. Grassby, chief among the “considerations” upon which the immigration
system was designed was an attempt to provide for the “welfare and integration of all of
her citizens’ and “the avoidance of the difficult social and economic problems which
may follow from an influx of peoples having different standards of living, traditions and
cultures.” These objectives were to be pursued while “avoiding]
. . . discrimination on
any grounds of race or colour of skin or nationality. 24 This was done under the guise of
helping to prevent discomfort among migrants who would be unable to integrate and
dominant Australians who would pay an overall societal price. The result, of course, was
greater state control over who was allowed to join the polity. The aim was to create a
filtering system that only allowed for the entry of legitimate newcomers in order to
mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
The Australian state maintained an extensive and expansive role in population
growth. In fact, [bjoth annual intake levels and the criteria to be applied in the selection
of appropriate candidates were predetermined in Canberra.”25 The Structured Selection
Assessment System, which was introduced in 1973, accorded Immigration Department
24
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officials the authority to award visas based on various personal and other factors of the
applicants. In 1979, the Numerically-Weighted Multi-Factor Assessment System,
commonly referred to as the “points system”, replaced it. This version received
opposition from ethnic groups who were unhappy with the way in which the family
reunification portion was designed. The system was revised once again into the Migrant
Selection System, which prioritized family reunification as well as the needs of the
economy and went into effect in April of 1982. According to the Commonwealth
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, such a system was necessary because
“the numbers wishing to emigrate far exceeded] Australia’s capacity to absorb them.”26
Concern with absorption demonstrated a belief that immigrants must assimilate and
that only a system that facilitates assimilation and limits the number of migrants protects
the state s ability to maintain control over its polity. Three categories of migrants were
created: family, labour shortage and business, and other. The first provided for the
migration of spouses, parents, children, brothers, sisters and fiances of Australian
residents “who [could] sponsor them and provide support after [their] arrival in
Australia.” Business migrants were allowed entry if their occupation was “in demand” or
they were sponsored by a company. The third category encompassed various types of
entrants, including retirees with considerable wealth, athletes or other high-achievers who
would contribute to Australian society, as well as “refugees, displaced persons and others
seeking entry ... on humanitarian grounds.”27 These categories revealed two pivotal
themes that were at the core of immigration policy in Australia: the desire to appear fair
and humanitarian and the concern for nurturing the economy. All migrants, regardless of
26 Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Information Kit (Created for
Members of Parliament), 1982, 2-1.
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which category they fell into, had to be of “sound health and good character,”28 the
subjectivity of which allowed for raced and ethnocentric judgments. Those with
acceptable characters were presumably easily assimiable, which allowed for the
maintenance of Anglo-Saxon dominance.
The family reunification component of the system hinged on a concern with
economic viability. Sponsorship carried with it financial responsibility, which was
contingent upon whether or not the sponsored relative was likely to enter the workforce.
Two types of sponsorship were established. “Standard” required a sponsor to “agree[] to
provide general advice and assistance to help his relatives settle in Australia and to ensure
that suitable accommodation was available on arrival.” “Full” mandated that sponsors,
in addition to the standard assistance outlined above, provide any accommodation and
financial assistance that the sponsored relative might need for a period of twelve months
after their arrival in Australia. ’ Siblings and non-dependent children who were subject to
the Economic/Employment Assessment portion of the system received an automatic 25
points on the Economic Viability component if they were fully sponsored. The
Department evaluated sponsors’ detailed financial situations in order to assess their
ability to assist their family members. 29 Sponsors were required to sign legal documents
known as “Assurances of Support” for family members “who may not be able to support
themselves or find work and who may become a charge on public funds” including
parents close to retirement age.
In an Assurance sponsors were required to promise to fully support their
sponsored relatives for a specified period and to agree to repay any Special
Benefits paid out by the Commonwealth (or similar financial benefits from states
28
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or charitable institutions) dunng that period.
... Assurances [were] closely tied tothe period in which the person to be covered might have difficulty supporting
himself (eg an Assurance would be required for a period of 10 years - the aee
pension eligibility period - for a person within ten years of retiring age or older)The existence of an Assurance [did] not affect eligibility for pensions or benefits-
benefits
^ °b lgatl°n °n the perSOn offerin§ the Assurance to repay particular
Clearly, this program created a considerable (and, in many cases, prohibitive) burden on
Australian legal residents/citizens who sought to sponsor their relatives.
The humanitarian nature of family sponsorship was tempered by the state’s
concern with the potential social and economic strain under which migrants might place
the nation. Also, limiting sponsorship to those with material and financial means
restricted the ability of former migrants who had not successfully integrated (a.k.a. found
gainful employment) from bringing in family members. For example, a migrant from a
third-world nation possessing few Western skills and little education who legally entered
Australia but was unable to create a financially prosperous existence would be unable to
sponsor relatives with similar backgrounds. Moreover, the legacy of the White Australia
policy meant that Anglo migrants were more likely to be comfortably settled in Australia,
and, therefore, better able to sponsor relatives. Also, the concern with eradicating
discrimination from its migration system was not completely altruistic; instead, it was
designed “to contribute towards closer relations with other nations in the Indo-Pacific
area.’’
31
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area. The state successfully cultivated support for its legitimacy among all citizens by
formally encouraging family reunification while effectively maintaining Anglo
dominance.
Canada
There is every reason for Canada’s policy to retain its long-standing emphasis on
family values in the rules it sets for choosing immigrants. But it should be feasible
to safeguard those values while at the same time exercising that high degree of
selectivity that the admission of immigrants destined for the labour force requires
today, in the interests both of Canada’s economic well-being and of immigrants
themselves.
A. E. Gotlieb
Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration
Immigration Policy Perspectives
. A Report on the Canadian Immigration and
Population Study
(Green Paper)
December 1, 1974
The humanitarian aspects of Canada's immigration policy were placed within the
national objectives of promoting economic growth and advancing the nation's position on
the world stage. Family reunification, though one of the explicit goals of the policy, was
believed to stand in conflict with labor needs. In fact, in the 1970s and beyond, the state
believed that maintenance of its legitimacy was contingent upon an immigration program
that fueled economic vitality. Whereas Australia combined its multiculturalism and
immigration functions into one bureaucratic department, and the United States
empowered an immigration department that’s primary responsibility was enforcement,
Canada created a Ministerial Department ofManpower and Immigration. Family
nomination did not preclude an applicant from being assessed according to the highly
31
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“sponsored,” were exempt from the points system. Assessment included both the
applicants’ potential to enter the labour force and their “adaptability to life in Canada ”33
The Canadian state struggled to retain its supremacy in the face of a federal
system characterized by strong provincial governments and extensive regional
differences, which was increasingly challenged by a nationalist movement in Quebec.
This movement sought to maintain the French-English dualism that had become central
to Canadian history and traditions. The Quebecois interpreted Prime Minister Trudeau’s
movement for unity as an attempt to take away Quebec’s primacy in the cultural and
political fabric of the nation
.
3
In this sense, a provincial movement against its
supremacy compounded the Canadian state’s challenge of bilateral legitimacy in the
federal system by enhancing the importance of admitting noncitizens who would support
the legitimacy of the Federal government. Any conflict resulting from increases in
cultural diversity and the presence of noncitizens who failed to integrate successfully into
socioeconomic life could prove disastrous for the state.
At the same time, Canada had “securfedj” its “attractiveness as a country of
immigration internationally. ' Therefore, though the Canadian state professed interest in
promoting family values via its immigration policy and promulgating an image of
fairness and humanitarianism on the world stage, the primary objective of its immigration
system was to keep its head above water on the domestic (political and economic) stage.
As part of this endeavor, the Ministerial Cabinet recommended to the Prime Minister, in a
33
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confidential document, that the government remove “anomalies and inequities” from
citizenship laws and enlist considerable resources to emphasize the value of being a
Canadian citizen. Citizenship qualifications were altered to three years of residency,
knowledge of one of the two official languages and the responsibilities of citizenship, and
evidence of “good character.” The third criteria obviously allowed for raced and
ethnocentric assessments of applicants’ ability to assimilate. Lastly, applicants were
required to demonstrate support for the legitimacy of the Federal government by taking
oaths of allegiance. In line with the government’s professed interest in reuniting family
members, the spouses and children of citizens were exempt from those requirements
.
36
The intent to foster solidarity and unity incorporated both new citizens, those seeking
citizenship, and those turned off to federal politics by Quebec’s nationalist movement.
Similar to Australian activities, the Canadian Cabinet sought to rid of the terms “British
subject and Commonwealth citizen.” Though such changes were geared toward
promoting unity by emphasizing the salience of membership in the Canadian polity, the
Cabinet recognized the potential for discomfort among Anglo Canadians with strong
British roots. Moreover, recognition was made of the “gravitational pull” that its
neighbor to the south posed to its national unity and economic vitality
.
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state’s challenge of bilateral legitimacy involved a domestic threat unknown to Australia
and the United States, which tempered its promotion of fairness and humanitarianism via
its immigration policy.
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Making a Home for Refugees
The United States, Australia and Canada were at the forefront of international
movements to take in people who faced torture or death in their homelands. In the
interest of maintaining and/or enhancing its position and reputation in the international
arena, each state adhered, to varying degrees, to the United Nations regulations regarding
the acceptance of refugees. This added a new dimension to the states’ challenges of
bilateral legitimacy. The difficulties presented to host countries were not lost on
American, Australian, and Canadian policymakers. Since refugees typically left their
homelands under emergency conditions, they brought few material goods and often
lacked any knowledge of the host nation’s language and culture. Selection criteria did
not hinge upon whether refugees’ skills fit into the needs of the economy, which meant
that refugees required job training as well as language instruction and financial assistance
upon arrival. States were presented with a delicate balancing act: to accept a sufficient
number of refugees to maintain international obligations and appear humanitarian on the
world stage without bringing in too many newcomers who would not easily integrate into
society. “Too many” refugees threatened the state’s legitimacy to govern because they
allegedly burdened the social welfare system and disadvantaged citizens in the
marketplace. At the same time, refugees’ lack of experience with democratic government
and processes indicated that they would be resistant to supporting the system. In this
way, the challenge of bilateral legitimacy was heightened in the case of refugees.
Compelling refugees to believe in the system’s legitimacy carried with it the need to
diffuse the negative impacts that their (illegitimate or near-illegitimate) presence was
assumed to exert upon the economic welfare and social cohesiveness of the state.
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United States
Similar to the nation’s approach to immigration policy, the United States lacked a
long-term strategy for managing global refugee crises until the passage of the Refugee
Act in 198 0. 38 Prior to this Act, refugee administration was part of the immigration
preference system and was largely governed by ad hoc admissions based on international
events. The Federal Register provided for the admittance of noncitizens “who believe[d]
him/herself to be eligible for admission to the United States as a refugee and who [was]
within one of the groups designated by the President to be of special humanitarian
concern. Admission would not be granted to refugees who were “firmly resettled in a
third country” or who did not have the resources to provide “an assurance of housing and
employment for one year and transportation to the U.S. destination .”39 These regulations
revealed the fact that the nation’s desire to appear humanitarian was tempered by its
concern that refugees would drain socio-economic resources, thereby threatening the
state s legitimacy to govern. Since “refugee flows [were] insensitive to changes in the
economy of the United States, the number of refugees that [came] into the United States
[was] unrelated to the level of unemployment, as might be expected if foreign events
drive acceptance rates.
40
This resulted in much concern among policymakers and the
public that the nation was becoming flooded by illegitimate newcomers; namely, refugees
who were in need of financial assistance and were not easily assimilated into dominant
society, and undocumented entrants who entered the country by subverting legal
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channels. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a mounting sense that the
nation was growing out of control, that its borders were too porous. The Refugee Act
was enacted in 1 980 in an attempt to exert greater control over who was allowed to join
tiie polity. This Act brought United States’ policy closer in line with the United Nations'
definition of refugee, which hinged on the legitimate fear of persecution due to race,
religion, nationality and/or membership in a certain social group, or political position. 41
Also, it created asylum status for refugees whose requests were granted once they were
on American soil. The U.N. definition of what constituted a legitimate refugee did not
match the American idea of legitimate noncitizen because it did not take into account
American foreign and domestic interests. Hence, the United States’ role in refugee issues
exacerbated its challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
Discourse surrounding the implementation of the Refugee Act revealed the
complex nuances of the state’s attempt to mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
The state was very concerned with presenting an image of fairness and humanitarianism
to its domestic and international audiences without threatening its ability to exert control
over its polity. In the words of Stephen E. Palmer, the Deputy Secretary for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, the nation’s “asylum commitment [was] fully
consistent with the strong humanitarian tradition of this nation.”42 The need to prevent
unexpected invasions by Haitians as occurred in the late 1970s was one motivator for
institutionalizing a coherent strategy for admitting refugees from abroad and processing
petitions for asylum for those already on American soil. Haitians entering the United
41
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States illegally were considered a special case because the Administration had not
deemed conditions in their homeland to merit automatic refugee status, unlike the
determinations made for Ethiopians, Ugandans, and Nicaraguans. 43 In this case,
recognizing the Haitian state as totalitarian (which would have accorded the Haitian
people virtually automatic refugee status) would have weakened the United States’
relations with the brutal and dictatorial regimes of the Duvaliers in Haiti. Instead, the
Haitian people were deemed “economic” refugees who were not necessarily considered
worthy of special status. According to David Crossland, Acting Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, “it has been the consistent position of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service that the vast majority of Haitians were coming to
the United States primarily to improve their economic status.” Despite this assessment,
the INS contended that it assisted Haitians who applied for asylum once they made their
way onto American soil because of the INS’ dedication to exercising its authority in a fair
and humanitarian manner. In Crossland’s words, “.
. .1 want - and certainly my
predecessor in the Carter administration wanted - a fair system so that all persons, no
matter from what country they come or what their race is, can make a claim for political
asylum if they have a valid fear of persecution.”44
Crossland maintained that race would not be used to determine the legitimacy of
refugee claims.
45
In an explicit sense, Crossland was probably accurate in his statement.
However, racism still played a role in refugee policy by shaping the state’s perception of
which types of relationships with which nations were most beneficial to the national
interest and through determinations regarding which refugees were illegitimate (meaning
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that they were assumed to burden the domestic economy by failing to integrate into
mainstream American society.) For example, Haitians (by and large people of color)
were deemed to pose greater socioeconomic challenges to American communities than
Cubans (who were white, though non-Anglo.) Cuban refugees were admitted under
special programs that deemed them “political” refugees following Fidel Castro’s takeover
of the Caribbean nation in 1959. Most Cubans who took advantage of this policy were
economically privileged and of European appearance. Though Cuban applicants without
family sponsors were subjected to security checks, they were not considered to pose
significant challenges to the social infrastructure, primarily because most brought wealth
and were able to find jobs in ethnic enclaves. Crossland admitted, “Prior to [the
enactment of the Refugee Act], the Cubans were treated as refugees. There is a history of
. . . cold war treatment of persons from Communist countries which
. .
.
gave them an
advantage over persons who did not come from a Communist country.” In order to refute
claims that the INS treated Cubans better than Haitians, Crossland argued that racism was
not a motivating factor in its decisionmaking because “many Cubans [allowed into the
United States were] black.”46 Moreover, other refugees of color, such as “Ethiopians,
Ugandans, [and] Nicaraguans” were allowed into the country. Crossland’s remarks
revealed a heightened concern with appearing nondiscriminatory in the Department’s
administration of refugee programs. However, Crossland did not compare the treatment
of refugees of color to refugees from “white” nations, such as the Soviet Union or
Poland. Instead, he dismissed charges that the INS had acted in a racist fashion by
pointing out that many Cubans were also people of color. The differential treatment of
refugees based on their nations of origin revealed the fact that refugee policies were
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shaped by the American state’s foreign policy interests and raced preconceptions
regarding which ethnic groups were most likely to attain legitimacy by successfully
integrating into the socioeconomic system. The testimony surrounding such policies
exposed the desire to appear fair and humanitarian on the domestic and international
stages while cultivating allegiance among its polity.
Policymakers believed that the United States was vulnerable to influxes of large
numbers of people entenng illegally who would harm the socioeconomic conditions of
the nation and impair the state’s ability to govern. Illegitimate newcomers challenged the
state’s legitimacy because they lacked understanding of, and/or support for, the American
democratic political system. Their presence might also send a message to citizens that
the state had lost control over the nation’s borders, further weakening state supremacy.
The deportation of Haitian “boat people” became a necessary step in discouraging illegal
immigration from Haiti and other Caribbean nations and, ultimately, to mitigating the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
[W]e are faced with a very large problem, given the technological reduction in
distance which has occurred over the last decade. The very wide understanding is
that the United States is a very great place to live in and to earn a living in, and
there is continued poor economic conditions and rapid population growth that
exists throughout the areas to our south.
47
Though the State Department was keenly aware of the abysmal series of human rights
abuses that Haiti has known practically throughout its 180-year history” as well as the
depths to which Haiti sank under Francois Duvalier,” including the failure of the nation
to meet internationally accepted human rights standards,” applications for refugee
John A. Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State For Inter-American Affairs on Haitian
Migration, Ibid.
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Though the State Department was “keenly aware of the abysmal series of human rights
abuses that Haiti has known practically throughout its 1 80-year history” as well as the
depths to which Haiti sank under Francois Duvalier including the failure of the nation
to meet ‘internationally accepted human rights standards,” applications for refugee
status/asylum were processed without assumptions of validity. 48 Moreover, the granting
of asylum or refugee claims was declared not to reflect the administration’s position on
the human rights practices of applicants’ homelands.
State Department research, which included interviews with Haitian state officials
(who insisted that most applications for asylum were submitted by economic and not
political refugees), revealed the state’s foreign policy objectives. Access to political
officials in Haiti demonstrated the friendly relations that that nation’s leaders had with
the Reagan Administration. Applicants’ lack of education was used to negate attempts to
classify them as “political refugees (who, by definition, were worthy of American
protection.) For example, the summary of the work done by the State Department's
Study Team on Haitian Returnees declared that, “In light of [Haitian applicants’] usually
low socio-economic status and lack of education, [they] would not be considered political
refugees. Similarly, ”[b]y virtue of lack of education, typically extending to functional
illiteracy, the average emigrant apparently is viewed as politically unaware and therefore
47
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Migration, Ibid.
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legitimacy by allegedly protecting the nation from soctoeconomic challenges caused by
uncontrollable numbers of poor and largely unedueated newcomers (as well as from
Amencan people who might lose faith in the government’s ability to secure its nation’s
borders.)
The Refugee Act came under congressional scrutiny when amendments were
proposed to extend the authorization for appropriation and to improve the program. The
goal of the system that was set up in accordance with the 1980 Act was to promote self-
sufficiency and facilitate assimilation. State Department officials described the Refugee
Act as creating a “cumbersome and increasingly bureaucratic, unresponsive structure that
[was] experiencing a kind of bureaucratic gridlock of welfare dependency.” In line with
the political temperament of the Reagan Administration, political discourse was focused
on the depletion of socioeconomic resources by illegitimate members of society.
Interestingly, refugees themselves were not blamed for falling into the web of welfare
dependency. Instead, officials testified to the work ethic that many groups, especially
Vietnamese refugees, brought to this country, only to find themselves caught in a cycle of
social dependency and economic irrelevancy. The medical and financial assistance that
refugees received upon their arrival “implanted in them the idea that these benefits [were]
not temporary grants in aid, but an entitlement.”50
Though the United States’ commitment to international obligations needed to be
maintained, those most in need of protection became “the ordinary taxpaying citizen who
50
Testimony of Eugene Douglas, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, U.S. Department of
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too often fe[lt] overwhelmed by the forees largely beyond his control ”51 As explained
by Eugene Douglas, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs,
icauer. it is certainly willing, as always, to set an example. But we do
nor can we, bear a disproportionate share of this common burden.
““ ;_
“ ady to be a
not intend,
to look
In order to fulfill the paramount responsibility of protecting legitimate residents, the state
had to stem the tide of Vietnamese refugees entenng the United States. Concerns that the
American polity might become out of the state 's control (expressed in testimony
surrounding the Refugee Act) appeared to have been exacerbated by this point. At the
same time, the acceptance of refugees onto American shores was taken as an indication
of the generosity and humanitarian spirit of the American people.” As explained in the
testimony submitted by Philip Hawkes, the Director of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement,
As a nation, we made a tremendous moral and humanitarian commitment in
adopting the Refugee Act of 1980. In these past two years, we have made
impressive progress in meeting that commitment. In the next few years, we must
continue to build on our accomplishments and further strengthen the refugee
program. This legislation represents a great tradition upon which this Nation is
based - the tradition that persecuted people can find refuge here and start their
lives anew. Let us continue that tradition in the Refugee Act and strive to meet
this most moral commitment as befits one of the richest nations in the world. 52
But such traditions were threatened by the influx of refugees and could only be
maintained by “preserving the economic and social strengths of the nation.”53
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Amendments sought to compel faster integration of refugees into the American
workplace. One proposal reduced the special benefit to learn English from 36 months to
18 months. To obtain language services beyond 18 months, refugees were required to
apply to state or local programs. Waivers for not seeking employment for the first 60
days after arrival were to be removed. Integration into the economy was accorded the top
priority, with little recognition of the difficulties refugees would face in acculturating and
adjusting to a marketplace governed by a foreign language and Western capitalist
business practices. Though the state’s concern with maintaining its prominence on the
world stage continued into the 1980s, the perception of how this was best to be
accomplished shifted from the desire to appear fair and humanitarian to protecting the
domestic economy and legitimate Americans from the socioeconomic burdens of
refugees. In this way, the state attempted to preserve its legitimacy to govern.
Australia
Like in the United States, the Australian state believed that accepting refugees
was an international obligation that exacerbated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy by
potentially endangering its ability to exert control over its polity. Similar to its approach
to other population issues, the government exerted considerable resources to ascertaining
how to appear generous and fair on the world stage while causing minimal disruption to
its domestic environment. Herein lied the limitation of humanitarianism: refugees would
be accepted to the extent to which they could be “absorbed’’ into dominant society with
little stress on the socioeconomic system. In this way, the state restricted membership to
legitimate refugees and reinforced support for its legitimacy among its populace,
especially among ethnic and religious groups who were concerned with refugee issues.
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The experience of Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s was used to improve the
selection process to maximize the admittance of refugees who would most easily
integrate into Australian society. This group was chosen for study because it was the first
Asian group accorded access to residency without having ties to citizens or having passed
skills-assessment tests. A study was commissioned by the Prime Minister that sought to
assess various aspects of refugees’ experiences, including the reasons they left their
homelands, the "Australian Government assistance in maintenance and welfare they
requested, or needed, or received,” "the problems of culture and language difference they
had to face, and what happened to their cultural identity in the process of resettlement;
and to what extent - if at all - they suffered from racism.” The Government adamantly
asserted that its refugee and immigration policies were nondiscriminatory and
“sympathetically administered.” The study was designed to illuminate how long it took
for refugees to become fully “integrated,” which meant, in part, becoming
indistinguishable from the rest of the Australian community in their requirements of the
Australian Government. In other words, the goal of newcomers should have been to
attain a level of invisibility in terms of the demand they placed on social welfare services.
Legitimate refugees in Australia, as in the United States, required little socioeconomic
assistance by quickly attaining self-sufficiency.
Since Australia facilitated the resettlement of many refugees, including those who
were hard core (which meant that they required extensive and long-term government
assistance,)' 5 the state made a noteworthy contribution to international affairs and
propelled itself to the forefront of the world stage. According to the Minister for
54
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Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, “[a]s a matter of humanity, and in accord with
international obligations freely entered into, Australia has accepted a responsibility to
contribute toward the solution of world refugee problems,” which included “developing
special humanitarian programs for the resettlement of the displaced and/or the
persecuted.”56 But such humanitarianism and generosity was restricted by the obligation
to protect the vitality of the nation. Therefore, refugee resettlement decisions were
impacted by the state of the economy, the level of unemployment, “the background of
refugees to be accepted, their capacity for early integration or otherwise; [and] the
availability of post arrivals services - language instruction, education, training,
accommodation, health and welfare.” Consequently, one of the government’s goals was
to accord special preference to refugees who had relational ties to Australian citizens
and/or had backgrounds that lent themselves to “mak[ing[ the necessary social
adjustments. The interest in family reunification that characterized immigration policy
was also central to the program that extended citizenship to Vietnamese refuges in 1975.
Decisions regarding which refugees would be granted temporary residence in Australia
were made “with regard to the principle of maintaining the unity of families.”58
Accepting refugees who possessed family members already in Australia meant that those
refugees would integrate more easily and be less likely to require economic assistance.
However, the state’s conception of family did not match that possessed by most of the
Vietnamese applicants. “[I]t [was] clear that the Vietnamese concept of ‘family’ [was]
56
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quite unlike ours in that it embrace[d] the Astan notion of an ‘extended family' as
opposed to the more restricted Anglo-Saxon idea of the ‘nuclear family.’”50 The Senate
Committee faulted the government for failing to provide clear directives to applicants -
and the backlog of people attempt,ng to obtain financial assistance to evacuate their
family members that resulted. This cultural misstep demonstrated the fact that Anglo-
Saxon perceptions shaped state action in the area of refugee programs despite the fact that
much of the discriminatory components of its policies had been removed.
Also, refugees were accepted according to their “viability,” which was assessed
by “selection officers], after taking into account the background of the individual, what
his employment has been in the past, [and] what his education level was.”60 Such
assessments, which were often made ad hoc, included evidence of “an ability to integrate
into the Australian community.”61 Despite state rhetoric emphasizing the fairness of the
selection process, this provision allowed for highly subjectivejudgments. Since
admittance carried with it significant financial responsibilities for the Australian
government, unrestrained generosity would prove to be very expensive and ultimately
take funds away from non-refugee social services (potentially angering the public and
threatening its legitimacy to govern.) Settlement assistance included providing passage
to Australia as well as part- and full-time language instruction, job training courses, and
quasi-unemployment benefits upon arrival. In contrast to the legislative discourse in the
United States in the early 1980s, the Australian Senate criticized the government for
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, “Consideration of the Australian
Government’s Response to Requests for Assistance with Resettlement and Rehabilitation,”
Australia and the Refugee Problem, section 2.36.
Testimony of Mr. Selwyn John Dempsey, Deputy Secretary, Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs, Submitted to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 21
119
trying to force refugees to enter the workplace at the expense of facilitating their social
integration. The Senate suggested that the requirement that refugees be available for
suitable employment virtually upon arrival in order to receive a “special” (quasi-
unemployment) benefit be changed so that refugees could attend full-time English-
language classes. Policymakers in the United States believed that the best way to
maintain state legitimacy was to reduce the burden that refugees would “inflict” on
society by preventing them from taking advantage of resources aimed at helping them
acculturate by forcing them into the marketplace. Australia, on the other hand,
recognized the significant social welfare costs incurred by refugee resettlement and
sought to create mechanisms to keep out virtually any refugee who would depend too
heavily on the system, thereby reinforcing state sovereignty.
Moreover, the Australian state contended that international resettlement programs
that placed “hard-core” refugees in other nations best served the refugees themselves.
[T]he Government resolved that the international agencies such as UNHCR and
the Red Cross were the appropriate authorities to assist in the provision of relief in
Indochina; and looked upon Australia’s involvement mainly in terms of a
financial commitment rather than as a practical one of providing direct and
unilateral offers of refuge to the displaced persons from South Vietnam and
Indochina generally
.
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In other words, rejecting refugees who were least attractive to Western nations because of
their lack of self-sufficiency was deemed a compassionate response to an international
dilemma. In this way, the Australian state sought to enhance its humanitarian reputation
while extending its ability to exert control over its polity by limiting the burden of
disadvantaged newcomers. In fact, admittance under the Global Special Humanitarian
62
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Program was limited to “persons whose acceptance
. .
.
[was] unlikely to affect adversely
Australia's bilateral relations with other governments.”63 Though the Australian state’s
commitment to resettle non-Anglo refugees was commendable, its humanitarianism was
bounded by concerns with opening doors only to legitimate refugees (i.e., ones who were
least likely to burden the social welfare system and most likely to assimilate into society)
and enhancing its position on the world stage, ultimately reinforcing the state's
legitimacy domestically and internationally.
Canada
The Canadian state believed that one of the primary vehicles to attaining
international respect while maintaining its legitimacy to govern was to enhance its
humanitarian reputation via adherence to international treaties. In the famous 1976
Green Paper, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration set out a procedure for
assessing the legitimacy of refugee claims, which relied heavily on United Nations
Protocols. Unlike in the United States, the Canadian state provided its own interpretation
of U.N. refugee criteria. In so doing, the state was able to limit (and justify the limitation
of) the number of persons admitted as refugees, thereby maximizing control over its
polity. In true Canadian fashion, the state attempted to provide extensive descriptions of
qualifications in order to minimize the flexibility within which discrimination could
influence the process. One of the beliefs that underscored Canadian decision-making in
the areas of immigration/refugee policy and diversity was the more extensive the details
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of the program, the more fair and impartial the system. At the same time, Canada’s
participation in global movements to help displaced persons was celebrated in domestic
and international rhetoric.
The United Nations’ definition of refugee was broken down into components and
analyzed in an attempt to minimize (or present the appearance of minimizing) the
discretion of officials. The “well-founded fear” component of the criteria was recognized
to be a “subjective feeling” - but “well-founded” was considered to grant an air of
objectivity because it required applicants to submit proof. Valid factors were listed at
length and were worth repeating below:
(a) membership in a minority group - social, political, ethnic, national or
religious;
(b) whether this group was persecuted and, if so, for what reasons;
(c) history of incidents indicating persecution of the applicant or his close
relatives;
(d) his mode of exit - legal, illegal, at the risk of injury or life or otherwise;
(e) previous opportunities to apply for refugee status (particularly in another
signatory state.) The decision of the authorities in that state with regard to
refugee status;
(f) the stringency of exit controls imposed by the country of the applicant’s
origin;
(g) the political beliefs and/or activities of the applicant while in his country,
whether or not he was ever punished for political as opposed to other crimes;
(h) did the applicant ever receive punishment for a non-political offense which
appeared inappropriate (i.e., unduly severe) to the offence committed;
(i) reasons for wishing to go to Canada or stay in Canada (do they appear to
indicate fear or simply a desire for improvement in his economic and/or social
status?);
(j) how was the applicant treated in his country of origin compared with other
nationals of that country with regard to obtaining education or training,
employment, housing, or other social benefits. 65
The descriptive nature of these criteria exceeded those explicated in Australian and
American state documents. However, the determination that desire to improve one’s
65
A. E. Gotlieb, Immigration Policy Perspectives, 227-228.
122
economic status did not amount to a legitimate claim for refugee protection was part of
all three nations' policies. Though the United Nations failed to define what constituted
persecution,” Canadian officials expressed confidence that being “followed, harassed,
importuned with questions, threatened, coerced, discriminated against, etc. usually
because of beliefs or actions considered heretical” by government officials fit the
description. In fact, persecution had to derive from an individual’s “race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” so that it would
be “relatively easy to determine." In an attempt to attain an even higher level of
accuracy, the Green Paper distinguished “refugee” from other terms often used as
synonyms, such as “stateless person,” “displaced person,” and “defector.” Unless an
individual possessed a well-founded fear of persecution, then he/she did not possess a
legitimate claim to Canadian refugee protections
.
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Despite the nearly Herculean attempts by the state to eradicate any measures of
subjectivity from the process, the Green Paper conceded that, in many cases, refugees
would be unable to produce documentation or other incontrovertible proof of persecution.
In the absence of conclusive evidence and where no facts are known which give the
examining officer reason to question the veracity of the applicant’s claims, he should be
given the benefit of the doubt. Determinations regarding applications for refugee status
were instructed to be arrived at “sympathetically and from a humanitarian viewpoint” in
order to “do justice to the spirit of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
This did not mean, however, that applications with “totally unsupported claims” would be
granted .
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The Canadian approach was to balance the nation’s commitment to
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international humanitarian treaties with limits on the number of entrants. The more
mechanical the process, the more objective the decision-making, and the fairer the nation
would appear to its citizens and to other nations (thereby reinforcing the state’s
legitimacy to govern.) What the Green Paper did not acknowledge was the fact that
assessments regarding refugee claims could not be made objectively - both because of
the nature of the subject matter and the fact that decisions would be made by human
beings who possessed cultured perceptions ofwhat constituted “persecution” and “well-
founded fear.” The Canadian attempt to control the process might have regularized it but
it did not eradicate the inherent bias in the system. The state attempted to create an
objective system for determining the legitimacy of refugee claims while enhancing its
image as fair and humanitarian. In so doing, it sought to mitigate the challenge of
bilateral legitimacy by enhancing its image among its citizens at home and its peers on
the world stage.
Controversial amendments to the refugee system were proposed in the late 1980s
after concern was raised that the nation was admitting too many illegitimate noncitizens
who burdened the social welfare system. Bill C-55 sought to reduce the number of
refugees making their homes in Canada by providing a mechanism to return refugees to
the country in which they resided after leaving their homeland but before arriving in
Canada. In order to preserve the fairness of the process, the Bill established the
Immigration and Refugee Board, which was designed to review determinations regarding
refugee claims. Senate testimony revealed the controversy that stemmed from a concern
that refugees would ultimately be sent back to their homelands (called “refoulement”),
which meant certain torture and death. Moreover, the belief was that the system might be
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too rigid, which would allow people who failed to fulfill the United Nations’ refugee
criteria to be sent home despite the fact that they “should be allowed to stay in Canada on
humanitarian or compassionate grounds.”68 Similarly, C-84 enhanced the authority of the
state to detain anyone who entered Canada without sufficient proof of his or her
legitimacy. A recent increase in the number of people arriving at Canadian shores
seeking asylum fed a growing perception that the nation’s borders were too porous. C-84
allegedly maintained the innocence of attempted refugees because it targeted organizers
of such voyages.
However, the enhanced power to detain people who entered the nation with
insufficient documentation revealed a tempering of policymakers’ concern with
appearing humanitarian and acting in accordance with international law. The recently
passed Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protected individuals from
mistreatment or unjust punishment. Much debate revolved around whether or not
refugees, and especially those seeking asylum who entered the nation without
documentation, fell under those protections. The theme that underscored this discourse
exposed different perceptions of which Canadian residents were legitimate. In other
words, legitimate residents merited state protections from domestic mistreatment, while
illegitimate noncitizens did not. Legitimacy revolved, in part, around the extent to which
applicants’ desperation was economic. The greater an applicant’s situation was assessed
to be economic, the less likely that he/she would be deemed a refugee.69 The government
was intent on persuading its audience that its actions constituted a “fair response” to a
situation that was becoming out of control and disadvantaging the “real needs of genuine
68 AHn Nash, International Refugee Pressures and the Canadian Public Policy Response
,
Discussion Paper (Ottawa, Ontario: Studies in Social Policy, January 1989), 57.
69
Ibid.
125
refugees because such refugees were “being swamped and overlooked in the face of a
rising tide of people abusing the system in order to win easy entry into Canada.”70 In
carrying out this program, however, the state walked a fine line between mitigating the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy and preserving domestic support and international
relationships. While so doing, policymakers maintained the position that “Canada’s
response to the plight of refugees has been both considerable in its own right and a world
leader when compared with the contributions of other nations .”71 The state sought to
increase control over its polity by reducing the number of refugees making a home on its
soil all in the name of furthering the humanitarian commitment to genuine (or legitimate)
refugees.
Conclusion
The United States, Canada, and Australia, as leading immigrant- and refugee-
accepting nations, sought to mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy by preventing
floods of newcomers from burdening their socioeconomic systems. Perceptions that
the three states were ill-equipped to control their nations’ borders were believed to erode
citizens’ support for the system. The presence of large numbers of noncitizens who
relied on social welfare services and failed to assimilate (a.k.a. illegitimate noncitizens)
threatened the states’ primacy. The states sought to promulgate fair and humanitarian
images while instituting mechanisms for rejecting immigrant and refugee applications.
Family reunification was designed to promote the belief that humanitarianism was at the
heart of the nations’ policies. The Canadian state, which was faced with challenges from
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one of its most populous provinces, increased bureaucratic oversight in an effort to
enhance its ability to select the applicants most suited to its society. The greater detailed
the policy, the belief went, the less vulnerable the state. Australia’s system, which
provided extensive settlement assistance, revolved around family sponsorship to keep out
the most economically dependent. American policymakers were primarily concerned
with utilizing immigration and refugee policies to enhance the nation’s relationships with
international actors, and facilitate the collapse of Communism. At the same time,
immigration and refugee policies in these nations were devoid of explicit racism and
ethnocentrism in order to appear nondiscriminatory. All three states successfully
reinforced their legitimacy to govern by constructing gate-keeping measures shrouded in
humanitarian rhetoric.
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CHAPTER V
THE STATE AS PROTECTOR OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY
Through the analysis of legislative and bureaucratic rhetoric, Chapter Five
demonstrates the states’ perception that their legitimacy to govern hinged upon their
abihty to protect legitimate citizens from being disadvantaged by the presence of illegal
labor Noncitizens were assessed according to their potential to become dependent upon
social semces and/or act fraudulently in the marketplace. Visa application processes
acted both as gatekeeping mechanisms (to prevent too many newcomers) and filters (to
prevent noncitizens who would threaten national stability by failing to assimilate.)
Though all three nations systems were devoid of the explicit racism that characterized
historical immigration programs (and were deemed to have achieved objectivity), they
continued to disadvantage non-Anglos, particularly those from developing nations.
Moreover, instead of acknowledging that the economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s
were caused by a combination of sociohistorical and fiscal factors, policymakers
exaggerated the impact allegedly caused by too many noncitizens who failed to
successfully assimilate. Legitimate states protected legitimate members of their polity
from negative socioeconomic impacts brought about by the presence of illegitimate
noncitizens.
The challenge of bilateral legitimacy has been historically impacted by economic
fluctuations. The extent to which refugees and immigrants were perceived to threaten
national stability was exacerbated during recessions. Restrictions preventing the influx of
illegitimate noncitizens (people who would fail to assimilate into socioeconomic life)
became vital to maintaining state legitimacy. The United States, Australia, and Canada in
the 1970s and 1980s provide intriguing examples of this phenomenon. As revealed in
legislative and bureaucratic rhetoric, the three states believed there was a direct
relationship between the their legitimacy to govern and their ability to protect legitimate
citizens from being disadvantaged by the presence of illegal labor in the marketplace.
Simultaneously, noncitizens were assessed according to their potential to become
dependent upon social services and/or act fraudulently in the marketplace. Noncitizens
walked a legitimacy tightrope between assessments of being least able to assimilate (i.e.,
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those from non-Anglo nations who lacked the wealth and skills sought by Western
businesses) and as being most likely to take jobs away from citizens. Moreover, leniency
toward illegal noncitizens and refugees was considered to cause undue hardship to those
who applied for residency through arduous, allegedly objective, and often expensive,
bureaucratic processes. Those waiting with petitions in queue, many who applied years
prior, were accorded a measure of legitimacy because they sought admittance through
bureaucratic mechanisms. Formal applications suggested that applicants respected the
state s management of its polity. Conversely, noncitizens who entered without proper
documentation were considered suspect, particularly because they presumably would not
have been granted entry through proper channels. Application processes for admittance
into the polity acted both as gatekeeping mechanisms (to prevent too many newcomers)
and filters (to prevent noncitizens who would threaten national stability by failing to
assimilate.) The challenge of bilateral legitimacy involved state attempts to compel
newcomers to support the system in order to diffuse negative impacts that (illegitimate or
near-illegitimate) noncitizens allegedly exerted upon the socioeconomic cohesiveness of
the nation (in order to render noncitizens legitimate.) Simply, legitimate states protected
legitimate members of their polity from negative socioeconomic impacts brought about
by illegitimate noncitizens.
Constructing Objective Selection Criteria
Canada was the first among the three nations to attempt to mitigate the challenge
of bilateral legitimacy through an allegedly objective immigrant selection system. The
state contended that unbiased assessments of visa applications could only be made if
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economic concerns were priontized. Consequently, immigration policy became infused
with economic analysis. The degree to which the nation could “absorb” noncitizens was
determined both by the viability of the domestic economy and the ability of noncitizens
to integrate into socioeconomic society. Though this system was devoid of the explicit
racism that characterized historical immigration programs, it continued to disadvantage
non-Anglos. Since applicants’ job skills virtually determined whether or not entry was
granted, and most applicants from developing nations lacked skills needed by Western
capitalist economies, third-world applicants were less likely to be allowed into Canada
than Anglos from developed nations. Legitimate noncitizens possessed the qualities
necessary to fueling (as opposed to inhibiting) economic expansion. What resulted was a
points system that ultimately facilitated the maintenance of Anglo dominance and
reinforced the legitimacy of the Federal state.
By the time the points system was introduced, the federal bureaucracies handling
immigration and economic matters had been merged into the Department of Manpower
and Immigration. In 1973, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Robert Andras,
announced a plan to examine Canada’s immigration policy. This study involved
soliciting suggestions for revision from non-profit organizations, provincial governments,
federal agencies, and members of the general public. The findings were organized by
Department officials into a collection of discussion papers referred to as the Green Paper.
The goal of the document revealed the themes that dominated immigration policymaking.
An attempt has been made for the first time in an official publication to present a
comprehensive picture of all aspects of Canada’s immigration policies and
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practices relating these to domestic, economic and social questions, and placingthem in the context of international developments. 1
Economic concerns were accorded the same level of importance as social concerns and,
as demonstrated in Chapter Four, the state evaluated these matters with an eye toward its
position on the international stage. Though the White Paper on Canadian Immigration
Policy, which was released in 1966, made it clear that “immigration [was] intimately
linked to economic realities,”2 “social” concerns, such as how an increase in the diversity
of residents might threaten Anglo dominance (and, ultimately, state sovereignty), became
subsumed by rhetoric focusing on “objective” economic concerns. Central to
assessments of the success of immigration policy was “how well it responded] to the
needs, present and future, of Canada’s market” and the degree to which it solved
“national manpower problems.” 3 Moreover, changes were made to the system in 1974
because “too many” immigrants without desirable job skills gained entry. Consequently,
all applicants, regardless of whether or not they had relatives in Canada, were assessed
according to their employment capabilities. Subsequent changes resulted in a filtering
mechanism that required the deduction of 10 points “unless the applicant show[ed]
evidence of bona fide arranged employment, or [was] going to a job where persistent
regional shortages [were] known to exist.”4
The points system claimed to render a subjective assessment objective. It was
created to measure two specific characteristics of applicants: their potential to integrate
into Canadian society and their ability to find gainful employment. Applicants were
1
Department of Manpower and Immigration, Immigration Policy Perspectives: “A Report of the
Canadian Immigrant and Population Study,” 1 December 1974, vol. I, p. x.
2
Ibid., x,19.
3
Ibid., x, 20,21.
4
Ibid., x, 31.
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awarded points “by weighing a combination of personal and labour market-oriented
qualities.”
5
The question
... of how many immigrants Canada can absorb from a cultural
standpoint is one that could be much disputed. The evaluation of absorptive
capacity in terms of immediate labour market demand, however, is fortunately
less dependent on subjective judgment.
One’s ability to be absorbed (or become a legitimate member of the polity) was
governed, at least in part, by one’s “job-worthiness,” which was measured, along with
applicants age, schooling, and skills,” by the points system. Applicants were also
rewarded for fluency in one of the two official languages. All of these factors were
deemed crucial to noncitizens’ abilities to “adapt to Canadian society and to the world of
work. The assumption was that assessments focused primarily on economic factors
were virtually impartial, which rendered them distinct from assessments focused on
culture or ethnicity (as if the realms were entirely disengaged.) The state failed to
concede that the concept of the polity’s “absorptive capacity” was infused with raced and
ethnocentric conceptions and concerns. Clearly, to become a legitimate member of the
polity, one had to integrate into the socioeconomic system. Doing so required that non-
Anglo noncitizens adopted Anglo occupational skills and social mores. By limiting
membership to persons unlikely to become dependent upon social services, the state
maintained control over its polity along with a powerful, nondiscriminatory image, which
facilitated allegiance.
The points system provided for the allegedly objective needs of the economy to eclipse
more explosive and controversial (and explicitly raced and ethnocentric) determinations
5
Ibid., x., 22.
6
Ibid.
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based on applicants’ national origin. Potential immigrants applied either independently
or were sponsored by family members. Points were awarded as follows: a maximum of
fifteen points for meeting the demand in a specific area of employment; five points for
the vitality of the overall labour market in the region to which the applicant would settle;
and ten points for pre-arranged employment or the ability to obtain an occupation for
which there were considerable shortages. The overall number of visas available was
altered in accordance with changes in the economy. Though sponsored applicants
received extra points because possessing relatives in Canada was deemed to ease
transition, they were still assessed according to “their prospective contribution to the
economy. Legitimacy was tied directly to applicants’ potential to become productive
members of society. Familial connection accorded applicants only marginal legitimacy.
The points system’s apparent impartiality was allegedly enhanced by its reliance
on quantitative measures compiled by bureaucratic agencies such as Canada Manpower
Centres (CMCs) and local branches of the Department of Manpower and Immigration.
The country was divided into 35 areas and each was measured according to its annual
levels of unemployment and employment growth. These measurements were reviewed
approximately four times per year. Also, a “monitoring system” was established “ to
keep a continuing check on the number of visas granted in each designated occupation”
in order to prevent overflows of immigrants with the same skill set. 8 As demonstrated in
earlier chapters of this dissertation, the more systematic the bureaucratic processes, the
greater the state’s power to maintain its legitimacy, and the fairer and more egalitarian
the state claimed were the processes.
7
Ibid., x., 30.
* Department of Manpower and Immigration, Immigration Policy Perspectives: “A Report of the
Canadian Immigrant and Population Study,” 1 December 1974, vol. II, p. 213.
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In line with the Australian legislative tradition to engage in extensive data
collection, comprehensive study was conducted on immigration policy and its
relationship to population and economic growth. Australian immigration policy has
consistently revolved around the concern that the resident population would be unable to
sustain the nation’s economy. Consequently, the state has maintained a pivotal role in the
marketplace. In other words, policymakers have not adhered to a free-market approach
but, instead, played an active role in managing fluctuations in the economy
.
9
Though
applications by noncitizens lacking sponsorship and by noncitizens sponsored by
immediate family members were placed into separate categories, both were assessed
according to applicants economic viability” as well as their perceived ability to
assimilate and support the legitimacy of the state. The success of unsponsored applicants
hinged on whether or not applicants’ possessed “the qualifications and experience
required to meet Australia’s national needs.” Such needs had to be long-term in order to
make sure that migrants would not find themselves unemployed and dependent upon
public assistance after a few years. In fact, the Immigration Ministry announced that the
Structured Selection Assessment System was intended to “exclud[e] prospective migrants
whose chances of succeeding in Australia [were] poor.” Moreover, the new system was
designed to prevent immigration influxes from serving as “short-term responses to
changes in Australia’s manpower needs .” 10 In order to avoid situations that weakened its
sovereignty, the state limited visas to migrants most likely to become productive,
permanent, assimilated members of Anglo society.
9
James Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera: The Story ofAustralian Immigration
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 141.
10
Canadian Department of Immigration, Australia ’s Decade ofDecision , Immigration Reference
Paper, 1 1 October 1973, 7, 8, 10.
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The Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS), which was introduced
in January of 1979, was based heavily on the Canadian points system and sought to admit
migrants with strong potential for integrating successfully into the workplace. It was
used only to evaluate applications from unsponsored migrants. In its earliest form,
NUMAS assessment criteria included highly subjective qualities such as “adaptability
and personal appearance.” 1
1
As time progressed, and the state believed it advantageous
to appear more objective, those factors were removed. Despite the fact that bureaucratic
officials allegedly expert on issues of ethnicity revised the system, the preference for
applicants who demonstrated the ability to assimilate into mainstream society, especially
into the workplace, remained. Following a comprehensive study of settlement issues by
the Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA), a new
Migrant Selection System was introduced in 1982. The “Economic/Employment
Assessment” component allegedly provided for “an objective assessment” that “test[ed]
an applicant’s prospects of obtaining employment and being able to support himself and
his family in Australia. Factors for which applicants obtained points included
professional and technical skills (up to 10), occupational demand (up to 28), arranged
employment (up to 10), age (up to 8), English-language proficiency (up to 6), education
(up to 8), other occupational attributes (up to 10), economic viability (up to 20), and
growth area (up to 6). Similar to the Canadian points system, applicants fully sponsored
by family members were subjected to the same assessment as unsponsored migrants,
though they received an extra 25 points. The Australian state shared the perspective of
the Canadian state: that sponsored migrants were less likely to seek public assistance -
particularly because “full sponsorship require[d] assurances of support by the sponsoring
" Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera
,
149.
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relative. In order to be granted entry, applicants had to obtain at least 60 out of 100
points.
12
Seventy-eight of the 100 points were reserved for explicitly economic
attributes, with education (up to another 8 points) also (arguably) related to applicants’
economic viability. Clearly, the Migrant Selection System was designed to mitigate the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy by satiating Australia’s labor needs.
Without being explicitly racist or ethnocentric, the Migrant Selection System
effectively excluded most non-Anglos with few economic means. Applicants with little
education, few Westernized skills, and without family sponsorship, fell far short of the
necessary 60 points. For example, an applicant with a rural background who sought a
position which currently had an oversupply of labor, who lacked pre-arranged
employment, was 46 or over, lacked knowledge of the English language and appeared to
lack the capacity to learn, and was deemed to lack other occupational attributes that
would result in “major long term problems” in terms of economic viability 13 would have
been accorded zero points, and therefore, ineligible for migration. Even full sponsorship
by a family member would have yielded a score of only 25 points. Moreover, many
measurements allowed for raced and ethnocentric assessments. Recognized educational
qualifications presumably involved equivalents of Western-style schooling. Other
occupational attributes - which were designated on a scale that ranged from low to
outstanding - were left almost entirely to the discretion of migration officers.
“Economic viability” evaluations also allowed for raced and ethnocentric
decisions. For example, people of color from developing countries who possessed few
Western skills were presumably considered likely to face minor short-term or major long-
12 Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Information Kit (for members
of Parliament), July 1982, 2-3, 2-4.
13
Ibid.
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term problems in Australia. Such assessments could have been made without intending
to disadvantage non-Anglo applicants. Assessments regarding applicants’ “capacity to
learn English’’ left significant room for racism and ethnocentnsm. How was a presence
or an absence of the capacity to learn English determined? Presumably, applicants who
spoke languages with alphabets immensely different from English (such as Japanese and
Swahili) were more likely to be considered to have limited ability to become proficient in
English (especially if they lacked Western-style education.) Also, points for professional
and technical skills were awarded to those with skills desired by the Australian labour
market, which benefited applicants from nations with similar capitalist systems.
By the late 1980s, the Migrant Selection System had been amended in an effort to
obtain even greater control over who was allowed to join the Australian polity and,
consequently, more leverage to mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
Modifications revealed the Australian legislative convention that the more nuanced and
detailed the provisions, the more effective and efficient the system. 14 Adoption of a
system more like Canada’s that used a sliding scale according to labor needs was
believed to be “a more sensitive instrument [to market demands] and therefore able to
filter and control more effectively.” 15 The Australian Standard Classification of
Occupations (ASCO), which assigned points to specific coded occupations under skills
assessment, was developed. In the Migrant Entry Handbook, first published in 1985 and
amended in 1989, purposes for immigration policy included: “supplementing the supply
of skills needed in the labour force; promoting the inflow of overseas technology and the
14
For example, see Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, Migrant
Entry Handbook (for Immigration Officials), 4 th Edition, 1989, 2.1.2.
15 Graeme Hugo, “Outputs and Effects of Immigration in Australia,” in Immigration: A
Commitment to Australia: The Report ofthe Committee to Advise on Australian Immigration
Policies (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988), 29.
137
expansion of the business sector; and assisting in Australia’s population growth.” 16 The
state, in part via immigration policy, had to maintain an active role in the marketplace in
order to sustain a sufficient labor force. There was support for extending the points test
to evaluate virtually all applicants, instead of only those who applied under the
Independent and Concessional Migration category. Also, 70 points (as opposed to 60)
were now required to pass the test. The intent was for the test to evaluate assimilation
potential by according points for qualities like English-language proficiency.
Concern with the impact of immigration on the economy remained and was, in
some cases, enhanced, but it was supplemented by a renewed interest in measuring the
more subjective qualities of applicants. This suggested that the allegedly objective
selection system was failing to sufficiently mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
A call for the use of interviews and other measures to determine applicants’ suitability
emerged. There were three categories within the Skilled Migration component of the
assessment system: Occupational Shares System (OSS), Employment Nomination
Scheme, and Business Migration Programs. Though all three categories facilitated the
connection between immigration and the economy, they were perhaps too objective
because they failed to assess the more subjective criteria that were pivotal to migrants’
overall success or failure in Australia. For example, the OSS, which assigned shares of
“designated [employment] vacancies” to migrants and was “designed to meet short and
medium term labour shortages,” was considered to allow for the entry of noncitizens
resistant to making permanent commitments to Australia. 17
16 DILGEA, Migrant Entry Handbook, 2.1 .2.
17
Hugo, “Outputs and Effects of Immigration in Australia,” 18-19.
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Though OSS did an adequate job of responding to the needs of the economy, it
failed to assess the “settlement potential” of migrants
.
18
This potential involved
measuring applicants’ overall employability, including their “personal presentation, local
market knowledge, cultural compatibility, motivation/drive, [and] work values and
attitudes. Despite the concession that allowing migration officials to make such
assessments “remained] a highly subjective exercise,”20 “success as an immigrant
involve[d] more than employability and economic potential and ... assessment of
settlement [held] an important place in selecting immigrants.
.
.”
21
In testing applicants’
“capacity to adjust to Australian society” officials were instructed to consider applicants’
“[evidence of adaptability, resourcefulness and independence,” “likely ability to learn
[English]” and “whether applicants [held] extreme views likely to put them in conflict
with sections of the Australian community.”22 In other words, the state attempted to
exclude illegitimate applicants (or those least likely to assimilate and support state
legitimacy.) Such perceptions [were] culturally based, which disadvantaged non-Anglo
applicants. Highly subjective settlement assessments were pivotal to the selection
system. According to the Migrant Entry Handbook, “[i]f it was considered [by an
immigration official] that the applicant would be unable to settle, the application must be
refused, regardless of the score obtained on the points assessment .”23 Despite
bureaucratic claims that the system was avowedly non-discriminatory, the significance
placed on subjective factors provided room for (and even prioritized) raced and
18
Ibid., 19.
19
Ibid., 42.
20
Ibid., 25.
21
Ibid., 28.
22 DILGEA, Migrant Entry Handbook, 14.4.6, 14.4.7.
23
Ibid.,, 14.4.11.
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ethnocentric assessments. This enabled the state to mitigate the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy by maintaining Anglo dominance.
The United States was unique among the three nations both because its shift to an
economically-focused immigration policy did not occur until the 1980s and because it has
not created a quantitative assessment system in the interest of screening out illegitimate
newcomers. Scholars have argued that the United States has historically lacked a
coherent, consistent immigration selection system.24 From 1965 until the 1980s, the
preference-based system involved six preference categories with quotas, but exempted
spouses, unmarried minor children and parents, and parents of U.S. citizens. The first
preference was for unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens (20%), the second for
spouses and unmarried adult children of permanent resident noncitizens (20% until the
1 980s, when it increased to 26%), the third for professionals, scientists and artists with
labor certification (10%); the fourth for married children of U.S. citizens (10%); the fifth
for brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens over 21 (24%); and the sixth for skilled and
unskilled workers with labor certification for occupations suffering from labor shortages
( 1 0%). This system did not attempt to use a mathematical formula to measure
applicants’ settlement suitability or their potential to assimilate like the Canadian and
Australian systems did. Though American political officials did not claim that
immigration policy achieved the level of objectivity exulted by Australian and Canadian
political officials, the increasing emphasis on occupational skills as opposed to national
origins was believed to eradicate the bias central to the pre-1965 system.
~ 4
See Keith Fitzgerald, The Face ofthe Nation: Immigration, the State, and the National Identity
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
25
Ibid., 29.
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The approach to establishing “fairness" fit in with the American meritocratic
tradition, which equated formalistic equal opportunity with unbtased results. As best
expressed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in a speech supporting the establishment of a
preference-based system,
That is why in my state of the Union message.
. . I said that I hoped that in
establishing preferences, a nation that was really built by immigrants -
immigrants from all lands
-could ask those who seek to immigrate now: What can
bom?°6
^°r °Ur C°Untry? But We 0Ught never ask: In what country were you
Both prior to and following changes to immigration policy that were made in the 1980s,
the United States’ preference-based system27 did not accomplish the level of bureaucratic
control achieved by the Canadian and Australian quantitative systems. Instead, resources
were increasingly dedicated to keeping illegitimate people out as opposed to carefully
filtering people allowed into the country. Though a rhetorical commitment to cultivating
a non-discnminatory immigration system remained, the focus on maintaining fairness
shifted to compelling employers to hire only legitimate employees. In other words,
American legislators turned, in part, to the private sector to police its polity and to
mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy.
President Lyndon Johnson as quoted by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Congress, House,
Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary, To Amend the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 2 July 1964, 387.
27
As of 1 965, the preference-based system exempted spouses, unmarried minor children and
parents, and parents of U.S. citizens and established six preference categories and quotas for each.
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Admitting and Nurturing “Good” Wor-Wc
Political rhetoric in all three states revealed concern that newcomers possessed
both the skills necessary to fill job vacancies as well as the work ethic and cultural
affiliation needed to attain self-sufficiency (in other words, the characteristics necessary
to achieving legitimacy.) Many immigrants who were granted entry based on
occupational skills failed to become citizens and/or remain gainfully employed - in other
words, to fully assimilate. Policymakers responded with attempts to alter their nations’
filtering mechanisms in order to grant entry only to those who would become long-term
and/or permanent (and productive) members of the polity. Clearly, despite revisions to
their immigration policies, the three states continued to view non-Anglo noncitizens as
threats to their legitimacy. Preserving state sovereignty required admitting noncitizens
most likely to support the political system and cultivating allegiance to the state among
newcomers as well as the entire polity.
Canadian policymakers were consistently concerned with the nation’s “absorptive
capacity:” the degree to which newcomers could join the polity without substantively
altering the socioeconomic status quo - unless it was for the better . 28 Since a sound
immigration policy was part of an overall strategy to maintain the population necessary to
fuel a vibrant economy, much emphasis was placed on attracting newcomers who met
labor-market needs. In fact, “manpower and immigration policies” were “welded”
together as parts of a single endeavor.”^ Consequently, admitting noncitizens with
strong work ethics and dedication to becoming permanent members of Canadian society
" 8
For example, see Minister of Supply and Services, Royal Commission on the Economic Union
and Development Prospectsfor Canada
,
1985.
A. E. Gotlieb, Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Immigration Policy
Perspectives: A Report on the Canadian Immigrant and Population Study, Volume II (Green
Paper), December 1, 1974, 22.
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was crucial. Limiting immigration to people who would “make[] a consistently positive
contribution to the prosperity, harmony, and cultural evolution of [Canadian society] as a
whole” would “continue to reinforce Canada’s sovereignty and unity.”30 Legitimate
claims to residency were those that advanced the state’s objective.
Political officials recognized a potential for “racial strife” that might result from
the influx of non-Anglo and non-French noncitizens, such as the Indian, Vietnamese, and
Chinese that “dominated” the population of immigrants in 1982. Social conflict was
assumed to exacerbate the state’s attempt to maintain its legitimacy. In best Canadian
communitarian style, all members of the polity were asked to work together to diffuse
conflict and, consequently, mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. “All
Canadians... must not only help ‘settle’ our new immigrants, but also to promote their
full integration and participation in all occupations and walks of life.” Similar to
Australia and distinct from the United States, the state turned to dominant members of
its polity to help facilitate allegiance among noncitizens.
The creation of a harmonious multi-cultural and multi-racial society will require a
high degree of tolerance and civility from all Canadians, reinforced by politics
aimed at preventing foreseeable conflicts. The political viability of a less
restrictive immigration policy will depend on our capacity to deal with the
domestic challenges which are likely to flow from it. 32
30
Ibid., 37.
31
See the discussion of the Australian Good Neighbor movement in Chapter Four.
32
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143
The overall objective was to prevent socioeconomic instability from reaching a level that
would challenge state control. 33 Enlisting dominant Canadians in efforts to make good
citizen workers out of noncitizens was considered vital to the solution.
Since at least the 1960s, legitimate immigrants to the United States were those
who did not rely on social services and/or displace American workers. Discourse
regarding illegitimate - or illegal - noncitizens was imbued with racism and
ethnocentrism. Concern with people entering the United States illegally from Canada
targeted immigrants from the third world, especially Latin America. Congressional
testimony through the 1970s and 1980s focused (sometimes indirectly) on Latino,
particularly Mexican, immigrants. Those who entered illegally and without proper
documentation were regarded as illegitimate visitors and blamed for poor economic
conditions. Large and uncontrollable numbers of illegal noncitizens were accused of
stealing jobs sought after by unemployed Americans. In fact, the socioeconomic plight
of minority Americans was explained as the consequence of illegal noncitizens
competing for many of the same unskilled, low-paying jobs. According to Joseph I.
Flores, Assistant Regional Manpower Administrator for the United States Department of
Labor in San Francisco,
[T]he illegals are blunting the Department of Labor’s efforts to upgrade the skills
of the labor force and to improve and protect the working conditions of the
American worker. Our studies of this problem.
. .lead us to conclude that illegal
aliens
. . .[djepress the wages and impair the working conditions of American
citizens. . .and constitute for employers an unskilled group rich for exploitation -
aggressive, enterprising workers with low-wage demands. 34
33
See Special Joint Committee of Senate and House of Commons on Immigration Policy, Report
to Parliament, 1975.
34
Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary, To Amend the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 92 nd Cong., 1 st sess., 5 May 1971, 101.
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Curiously, qualities such as “aggressive” and “enterprising” were deemed to be negative
qualities in illegitimate noncitizens though they have historically been celebrated as
central to the American Anglo-Saxon work ethic. Statements such as these were
common and revealed the illegitimacy of illegal noncitizens’ presence - their tenacity in
finding employment was taken as evidence of a tendency to prey on the American system
as opposed to an indication that they were well-suited to American culture. Despite the
fact that American immigration officials failed to provide much evidence to support their
claims, they confidently asserted, time and time again in congressional testimony, that
illegal noncitizens were responsible for high rates of unemployment and poor working
conditions in the United States. In this way, the American state attempted to avoid
responsibility for economic problems in order to maintain its legitimacy. Illegitimate
non-Anglo noncitizens were scapegoated in order to mitigate the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy. By increasing efforts to remove illegitimate residents, the state cultivated
allegiance among legitimate citizens, consequently reinforcing its sovereignty.
Many state actors expressed dismay that certain temporary employment visa
programs did not compel noncitizens to become permanent residents or citizens. In fact,
noncitizens who did not “share in both the fruits and the responsibilities of
residency.
. .such as paying taxes” by refusing to officially join the polity should “have
their green cards cancelled .”
35
Refusal to follow the proper legal channels to become
official members of the polity was regarded as a rejection of state sovereignty despite the
fact that no data establishing a direct correlation between not applying for permanent
residency and an absence of allegiance was acquired. Though it was easy to entertain
35
Ibid., 108.
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such a connection, it was not the only or the most plausible reason why temporary
workers would not seek permanent residency (i.e., language barriers and fear due to
unfamiliarity with democratic political processes.) Moreover, undocumented noncitizens
and those who overstayed their visas were believed to “present a serious threat to the
employment situation of this country.”36
Though the extent to which illegal noncitizens - as opposed to employers who
willingly hired them - were to blame for the nation’s socioeconomic problems was
disputed, there was widespread agreement that solutions must include forcing employers
to be more responsible in their hiring practices. Public officials sympathetic to the plight
of the illegal noncitizens exploited by American businesses argued that employers were
primarily to blame for the negative impacts caused by the hiring of illegitimate workers.
For example, Representative Rodino, a pivotal player in immigration reform, contended
that “imposition] of a criminal penalty, on this poor [illegal immigrant], who is really
victimized in many cases.
. .would seem to further violate his human dignity.”37 Others
insisted that the route of the problem lied primarily in the existence of an economic
incentive so strong that people risked arrest, deportation and even death to enter the
United States. There was support for shifting the focus from devoting resources to the
apprehension of illegal noncitizens toward the prevention and punishment of illegal
employment. Department of Labor officials claimed that illegal noncitizens were to
blame for high unemployment even though they “had no idea” how many illegals were
part of the labor market nor could they demonstrate with any certainty whether or not
36
Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary, First Session on
Illegal Noncitizens Part III
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unemployed Americans were turning down jobs due to low wages or poor working
conditions. 39 Illegal noncitizens continued to be scapegoated but there was a growing
emphasis on requiring employers to participate in the solution to the problem.
Administrative penalties that were issued by the Department of Labor in 1968 proved to
be unworkable and were consequently abandoned, which led officials to ask Congress to
enact legislative sanctions.
40
This culminated in the passage of the Immigration Law
Reform Act of 1986.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was the first extensive
revision of immigration policy since the national origins system was modified. The Act
reflected the popular conceptions of the role of immigration in America that were debated
by legislators in the 1970s and early 1980s. Specific changes were made based on
recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy41 in
1981. The Commission called for measures to close the “back door” and to better
accommodate those possessing legitimate claims to enter via the “front door” of
immigration. Images such as “front” and “back” doors in discussion of immigration
policy suggested that the nation was conceived of as a home or edifice with limited space.
It is worthy of note that place of entry has been used historically to signify one’s station
in social hierarchies — most notably, of course, during slavery and segregation in this
country. Noncitizens granted entry through the front door possessed legitimate claims to
join the polity, while those forced to seek entry through the back door were denied
membership. The Commission fell short of calling for opening the front door wide
39
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enough to allow for significantly larger numbers of immigrants, which revealed a concern
with restricting the flow in order to maintain the state’s authority over its polity.
Though the employment of illegal and undocumented noncitizens had been
against the law since the 1950s, IRCA introduced penalties on employers for hiring them.
Since illegal noncitizens were believed to enter the United States for jobs, and
apprehension of all illegal noncitizens was cost-prohibitive, penalization of employers
was considered the best solution. Versions of the bill in the years prior to IRCA’s
passage called for sanctions against employers who knowingly hired illegal noncitizens,
protections against discrimination of legitimate Hispanic workers, and special temporary
visa programs for agricultural workers. The final product instituted a level of
bureaucracy in order to prove that employees possessed the right to work in the United
States, including forms certifying their eligibility. It also established financial penalties
from $250 to $3,000 for each offense and prison sentences for up to six months for
employers who exhibited a pattern of violations. The impact of Hispanic and agricultural
lobbying groups was evident in the Act’s sunset provision, which provided for the
termination of sanctions after three years if widespread discrimination in employment
was demonstrated. The antidiscriminatory component of this policy was not intended to
supplement or amend United States civil rights law. In fact, employers were considered
by many political actors, especially President Reagan, to be victims preyed upon by
illegitimate workers. Even though employers were only required to demonstrate a “good
faith effort” in assessing the validity of employment authorization documents, the state
extended its enforcement arm to include the business community in its efforts to ensure
legitimacy in the workplace. Worthy of note was the fact that illegal workers were
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assumed to be non-Anglo. The threat of sanctions was
,mended to compel employers to
provide for the removal of illegitimate (non-Anglo) workers. Employers were required to
assist the state in preventing illegitimate noncitizens from “stealing” jobs from legitimate
Americans, which was potentially threatening the state’s legitimacy. In this way, the
state enlisted the private sector in its attempts to mitigate the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy.
The conception of legitimacy in regard to noncitizens increasingly took on an
economic focus. Only legitimate workers, or those who gained entry to the United States
via legal means and found gainful employment, were to be welcomed into the polity.
IRCA allowed for noncitizens who entered the United States illegally before January 1,
1982, remained without interruption, and exhibited “minimal understanding of English
and knowledge of U.S. history and government” or were taking classes on those subjects,
to apply for temporary residency status.
42
According to Kevin E. Moley, the Assistant
Secretary for Management and Budget in the Department of Health and Human Services,
[NJewly legalized noncitizens are contributors to our society and to our economy.
They pay taxes. They contribute to their communities through their productivity.
They have taken the opportunity Congress provided to them to leave the shadows
and enter the economic and social mainstream. All of us will benefit from their
contribution. 43
Though the program was quite limited in terms of eligibility, and was somewhat
prohibitive in terms of bureaucratic processes, it demonstrated a shift towards hinging
legitimacy primarily on economic utility. By limiting full membership benefits to
4
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legitimate newcomers, the American state allegedly minimized prospects for social
unrest, consequently maximizing its legitimacy to govern.
Among the three nations, the challenge of bilateral legitimacy was most explicitly
acknowledged in Australia. Immigration policies were designed to serve “national
interests” and to “seek a harmony of outcomes between economic and social interests.”
State actors perceived that the presence of an immigration program invoked dual
responsibilities. In exchange for the privileged opportunity to enjoy Australian
socioeconomic life, migrants were expected to wholeheartedly and without hesitation
succeed economically and culturally. The Migration and Ethnic Affairs Policy Division
of DILGEA captured this expectation in its Principles of Immigration Policy List.
Immigrants are expected to respect the institutions and principles which are basic
to Australian society, including parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and
equality before the law, freedom of the individual, freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, freedom of religion, equality ofwomen and universal education.
Reciprocally, Australia will be committed to the equal participation of immigrants
in society.
In other words, the state provided migrants with full membership benefits if they adopted
Australian (Western democratic) values. The hope was that migrants would ultimately
become citizens, which was equated with “due recognition as a symbol of commitment to
Australia and its future, and be associated with a declaration to respect Australia’s
institutions and principles. Policymakers were keen to develop a new and, in some
cases, renewed allegiance to the Australian state as an entity separate from the British
Migration and Ethnic Affairs Policy Division of the Australian Department of Immigration,
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, “Australian Immigration: Policy Development” in
Immigration History and Policy: Australia and Canada
,
1989, Appendix.
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Empire. The state unequivocally required migrants to support the legitimacy of the
political system in order to sustain their status as legitimate members of the polity.
Pivotal to this commitment was a duty to integrate into mainstream society and
find and maintain gainful employment. Immigration was deemed as one of the most
manageable components of population policy and perhaps the only vehicle through which
a sufficient labor supply could be sustained. Bureaucratic agencies predicted that a
decline in fertility rates in the 1970s and an increase in the number of retired persons
through the end of the 20th century would lead to a weak economy.45 The emphasis on
applicants obtaining employment before their arrival and/or obtaining assurances of
support from family members increased in the 1980s in an attempt to tailor population
growth to specific market needs. The Migrant Selection System required that applicants
be assessed according to predictors of their socioeconomic success, including
“resourcefulness and independence,”46 qualities valued by Western capitalistic systems.
The Australian state mitigated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy by admitting migrants
most likely to support the socioeconomic system.
Preventing the Depletion and Misuse of Social Services
Though national borders were believed to be too porous in all three nations in the
1970s and 1980s, this belief was particularly acute in the United States. Fluid borders
exacerbated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy by weakening the state’s perceived
ability to exert control over its polity, potentially abating allegiance among legitimate
residents. American borders were considered vulnerable primarily due to the length of
45
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the land border with Mexico and because “lakes and rivers compiled] our entire
international boundary.
.
.
[because] they provided] avenues for entry through which a
determined noncitizen [could] attempt to evade inspection .”47 Since undocumented
Mexican immigrants were deemed to constitute the majority of illegitimate noncitizens,
there was strong support for increasing the resources of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s Border Patrol along the Southern border of the United States. In
the legislative “push-pull” conception of the immigration phenomenon, extreme poverty
and the absence ofjob opportunities in Mexico were recognized as “push” factors, while
the prevalence of employers seeking low-skilled and cheap labor in the United States was
deemed to be the paramount “pull” factor. Unlike Canadian and Australian political
actors, who consistently emphasized the need to help developing countries around the
world in order to mitigate international “push” factors, American politicians focused on
diminishing domestic pull factors. There was widespread political acknowledgment
that most illegal immigrants were leaving their impoverished homelands for jobs in the
United States. Not all political actors cast harsh judgments on illegal immigrants’ efforts
to make better lives for themselves and their families
,
48
but consensus existed that jobs
had to be made less available to them. Canadian officials believed that increasing foreign
aid and development assistance would help to reduce the number of immigrants from
developing nations, thereby reducing the number of noncitizens dependent upon social
services. One proposal to help to achieve this objective was to loosen trade restrictions
47
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on third-world countries.
4
’ Similarly, Australia sought to help foster economic growth in
developing nations in order to make residents more self-sufficient in their homelands.
Though all three nations increased their enforcement branches, the United States
was unique in its concerted effort to increase the size and strength of its border patrol (in
part due to the fact that it shared a physical border with a non-Anglo developing nation.)
Efforts included proposals to construct 12-foot-high chain-link fences and position
greater numbers of officers along the American-Mexican border in order to make it
impenetrable. In fact, tangible measures were deemed necessary to authenticate the
border. In the words of Herman C. Moore, Chief Patrol Agent of the INS Border Control
Unit in El Paso, Texas: “There is no barrier, natural barrier, from here to Arizona, it is an
imaginary line. Curiously, the national border justified forcible prevention of the entry
of noncitizens but was rendered “imaginary” without physical enforcement markers. The
number of deportable noncitizens had “increased from approximately 60,000 in 1966 to
about 240,000 deportable Mexican noncitizens found in. . . 1970.” The number of border
patrol officers had not kept up with the upsurge, making the border penetrable and the
American people in danger of losing jobs to illegitimate noncitizens.
A downturn in the economies of all three nations fueled anxiety that immigrants
were abusing the benefits of residency. Not only were high unemployment rates blamed
on immigrants “stealing” jobs from legitimate members of the polity, but also the
financial strain of administering social welfare services was rationalized as overuse by
illegal and legal noncitizens. The Canadian state expanded considerable resources in an
effort to diffuse social conflict and maintain its legitimacy. Policymakers were interested
49
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in determining the size of the “flow" that could be “absorbed” in ways that enhanced the
nation’s ability to “adjust[] our economy to the competitive pressures of the late twentieth
century. In order to reduce the number of less absorptive people, immigration policy
was modified in 1982 to require that all people applying as independents (except for
entrepreneurs and self-employed applicants) possessed arranged employment approved
by a Canadian Employment Centre. 5’ However, admitting too many immigrants who
filled the needs of the marketplace also ran the risk of causing long-term economic harm.
While Canada gains by following an occupationally selective system of
immigration, this course runs the risk of making us more dependent on
immigration for certain types of skilled workers. Canadians may find that
particular occupations become difficult to enter, for training and apprenticeship
programs may become scarce if employers can rely on pre-trained immigrants. 53
Bureaucratic resources dedicated to immigration included an enforcement branch, which
was responsible for “preventing] the admission of people harmful to Canada’s health and
social and economic well-being and national security and to detect and remove
inadmissible persons from within the country.”54 A “reasonable” level of immigration
was one that was perceived to “consist of people who readily adapt[ed] and contributed]
to Canadian economic and social life. 55 In other words, newcomers who readily
assimilated were least likely to threaten state sovereignty.
Bureaucratic documents revealed a concern that many newcomers would
eventually rely on social welfare services (in other words, become illegitimate residents),
51
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even if they had initially attained legitimacy by passing the points system. Some political
actors believed that “economic migrants and temporarily displaced persons” were finding
their way into the country, only to end up dependent on state services. 56 Since the
government provided extensive Immigration Adjustment Assistance to help immigrants
adjust to the Canadian marketplace and society, the less Anglo-Saxon the newcomer, the
more expensive he/she was to the system. Services included language instruction,
employment training, and education in various subjects, including civics. Costs of the
Immigration Adjustment Program escalated from $2.7 million in 1978-1979 to $35.5
million in 1984-1985. Widespread support existed for securing the points system in order
to prevent the entry of independent applicants with fewer than ten years of schooling who
lacked language ability and clear signs of “adaptability.” There was also interest in
subjecting children and parents of working age who were sponsored by family members,
and, to a certain extent, refugees, to the points test used for independent applicants. 57
Refugees were deemed particularly expensive because they presumably would have
failed the points test, demonstrating the fact that they were not easily adaptable.
Language training was considered vital to immigrants’ successful integration, which is
why it was liberally funded. Also, the Secretary of State’s program to “promote
Canadian citizenship, provide services for the acquisition and proof of Canadian
citizenship” among other services, was well financed, which exhibited the state’s interest
in compelling allegiance among newcomers and making sure that no fraudulent
documents were being used to falsify citizenship. The state, in order to mitigate the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy, attempted to strike a balance between immigration that
56
Ibid., 137.
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enhanced the socioeconomic health of the nation and immigration that impeded the
nation’s progress.
Similarly, the Australian government expended considerable funds toward easing
the integration of immigrants into mainstream society in order to prevent social
disruption and protect its sovereignty. Doing so was considered paramount to the
implementation of immigration policies that successfully “maintained] and protected]
the health, safety and good order of Australian society.” Allowing immigrants to achieve
high levels of dependency did a disservice to the “community at large” because it created
“unacceptable burdens on post arrival and welfare services” as well as to “the migrants
themselves because it lead to hardship.' 8 The solution was to screen out applicants who
demonstrated a lack of positive settlement potential and whose presence challenged the
state’s ability to maintain control over its polity.
In the United States, the focus was on stemming the tide of illegal noncitizens and
forcing legal noncitizens to find employment soon after their arrival. Instead of
acknowledging that the economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s were caused by a
combination of sociohistorical and fiscal factors, policymakers exaggerated the impact
allegedly caused by too many newcomers who failed to assimilate successfully. No
longer were illegal workers confined to agricultural positions. Instead, they were
wealthier than before and were seeking jobs that were longer term and that paid higher
wages than seasonal agricultural positions. The increasing ease of obtaining falsified
social security and other legitimizing documents facilitated this enterprise. At the same
time, the Federal government was allegedly spending a billion dollars on job-training
programs. “Thus, the illegals [were] blunting the Department of Labor’s efforts to
58
For example, see DILGEA, Migrant Entry’ Handbook, 2.2, 8.2, 14.4.2.
156
upgrade the skills of the labor force and to improve and protect the working conditions of
the American worker.”59 Businesses were choosing to employ illegal noncitizens over
American workers because doing so allowed them to pay low wages and maintain poor
working conditions. Despite these claims, the Department of Labor was unable to
provide members of Congress with any proof that illegal noncitizens were taking jobs
from Amencans who wanted them
.
60
Instead, the contention that each job possessed by
an illegal noncitizen was a job that was denied to an American was a “logical”
conclusion
.
61
Another official relied on the “simple economic notion that” “wages can
and do go down” when supply exceeds demand
.
62
For illegal immigrants who utilized
public assistance and other govemmentally-subsidized programs, many political actors
assumed that, if they became legitimate residents via the legalization program offered by
IRCA, they would ultimately become public charges. The passage of IRCA was believed
to enhance the onus on the state to protect the American marketplace from unfair
competition. Illegal noncitizens were accused of stealing jobs from legitimate Americans
and misusing government resources by enrolling in job training programs and other forms
of public assistance. They were even blamed for the poor conditions of racial and ethnic
minorities because they created competition for low-income housing and low-wage, low-
skilled jobs. Illegal noncitizens presented a simple explanation for problems caused by
59
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complex histoncal factors. The state effectively sidestepped responsibility for the
disadvantaged position of minorities in the American capitalist system, consequently
maintaining the allegiance of legitimate residents and mitigating the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy.
Conclusion
The American, Australian and Canadian states sought to reinforce their legitimacy
to govern by restricting the influx of illegitimate noncitizens in order to maintain
economic vitality. Illegal noncitizens were blamed for economic recessions and over-
extended social welfare programs, thereby relinquishing the state from responsibility.
Allegedly objective selection criteria were created and, though they facilitated the
maintenance of Anglo dominance, allowed the states to appear fair and non-
discriminatory. To acquire entry, and ultimately legitimacy, noncitizens were required to
adopt Anglo-Saxon skills and social mores - and fill labour market needs without
displacing citizens. The more systematic the bureaucratic processes, the greater the
state s power to maintain its legitimacy, yet the fairer and more egalitarian it claimed
were the processes. All three states sought to extend their influence by enlisting the help
of non-state actors. In Australia and Canada, all members of the polity were obliged to
take part in the state’s endeavor to successfully integrate noncitizens. American
policymakers mandated that the private sector help to police its polity. The more
effectual these endeavors, the greater the mitigation of the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy.
158
CHAPTER VI
THE STATE, THE NONCITIZEN, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Chapter Six weaves together the conclusions reached in previous chapters with an
analysis of citizenship documents in order to demonstrate the ways in which the
American, Canadian, and Australian states mitigated the challenge of bilateral legitimacy
by cultivating Anglo national identities. In order to reinforce the unity of their polities,
and, consequently, the authority of the states that govern them, a shared sense of culture,
of social mores and traditions, was encouraged. The shared identity that was the crux of
national unity was Anglo-Saxonism. The United States functioned primarily from a
defensive stance because central to its policy decisions was the assumption that American
citizenship was so desirable that it was constantly at risk of being stolen by illegitimate
noncitizens at home and abroad. In contrast, in Australia, and especially in Canada,
though the states were entrusted with protecting their legitimate citizens from the harm
allegedly caused by illegitimate noncitizens, they adopted offensive stances toward
compelling legitimacy. In all three cases, Anglo-Saxon dominance was tied directly to the
vitality of the nation.
Since overtly racist policies were no longer feasible (due to social movements
within their borders and throughout the globe), all three nations utilized metaphoric
models to compel allegiance among legitimate noncitizens and citizens (which included
keeping illegitimates out) and sending messages regarding which people (identifiable by
their ethnic, racial, and cultural characteristics) were legitimately suited to membership.
The American Melting Pot model described a process in which allegedly natural forces
would combine so that non-Anglo differences would melt down into a quasi-Anglo
culture. The more easily one melted into the cauldron (so to speak), the more legitimate
his/her presence in the polity. The Australian Family of the Nation model encouraged a
connection among citizens that reinforced allegiance to the state. The goal was to
become as economically prominent (and least dependent) as possible. The Canadian
state granted groups legitimacy if they became active in the political system and/or were
Anglo enough to be recognized as having made valuable contributions to Canadian life.
The Chapter concludes with suggestions to aid in the construction of a model that
enables liberal-democratic states to mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy without
enhancing Anglo dominance.
Liberal-democratic states grapple with the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. They
act from the perception that noncitizens must be compelled to believe in the system’s
legitimacy in order to diffuse the negative impacts that (illegitimate or near-illegitimate)
residents allegedly exert upon the economic welfare and social cohesiveness of the polity.
Once such residents are assessed as productive members of society, their presence is
rendered legitimate. The multifaceted human and extra-human components that
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constitute the state coalesce in ways that seek for its maintenance, including policy
decisions that preserve the status quo. Unexpected events and phenomena outside of the
state’s control are perceived to be threats. The more difficult to control is the threat, the
greater is the potential hazard. Whether or not perceived threats, such as the influx of
newcomers with cultural and language traditions that differ from the nation’s dominant
culture, actually jeopardize the state’s ability to govern is controversial
.
1
Regardless, the
state s vitality is doubly challenged: both by the perceived threat and by the degree to
which citizens can be assured of the state’s ability to mitigate that threat. In that sense,
the discourse through which the state responds to these challenges carries nearly as much
significance as the responses themselves.
Determinations regarding for which persons national boundaries are porous, and
for which persons national boundaries are concrete, has been one realm of national
sovereignty that has enjoyed quasi-immunity. Citizenship acts as a mechanism that gives
to some and denies to others the benefits and responsibilities of membership. It carries
with it identity significance, helping human beings to understand their positions in
relation to the state, particularly in Western nations. In this way, citizenship is a political
institution. The contemporary “New Historical Institutionalism’’ (NHI) movement in
Public Law explains political phenomena”
. . . “in terms of concepts and ideas that
transcend the perspectives of individual actors .”2 NHI scholars perceive institutions to be
highly influential because they shape the values, identities, and behaviors of both the
people who work within the system and those who seek to change it. Liberal-democratic
1 Though this is a subject worthy of study, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
2
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societies have come to “accept the factual and normative distinction between citizens and
outsiders, and the preference that we attach to the former in virtue of their being our
fellow citizens. 3 Citizenship is intentionally reductionistic because arguably, if it were
to recognize and institutionalize difference, it would lose its ability to unify. “Citizenship
would yet be another force for disunity, rather than a way of cultivating unity in the face
of increasing cultural diversity.”
4
The tangible as well as symbolic realms of citizenship
amount to an institution that seeks to unite legitimate members of the community and
justify the exclusion or disadvantage of those deemed illegitimate.
National identities are cultivated in part via control over the boundaries that
separate communities. In order to reinforce the unity of the members of each community,
and, consequently, the authority of the state that governs them, a shared sense of culture,
of social mores and traditions, is encouraged. This “shared identity” runs “deeper than a
transient intersection of interests.’ In the American, Australian, and Canadian cases, the
shared identity that is the crux of national unity is Anglo-Saxonism. Diversity of
tradition, language, etc., “challenge^] strong senses of political identity and the
definition of the community as a we-group united by history, values and culture.”6 Thus,
diversity is perceived to threaten the very heart of the polity and the authority of the state
that both embodies it and governs over it. Anglo-Saxon values are at the core of the ties
that bind members of the community, the state’s identity, and consequently, national
1
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identity. It is in the state s interest and, arguably, the nation’s, to compel unification
through assimilation of non-Anglos.
The challenge of bilateral legitimacy involves the state’s attempt to engender
support for itself, as well as assessments regarding which noncitizens have legitimate
claims to join the polity. Controlling the perceived “floods” of newcomers who would
force change onto an allegedly static plane becomes pivotal to the state’s ability to
maintain its supremacy and the perception that it is in control of its borders. If the state is
deemed too weak to provide the factors essential to national growth, its supremacy will
erode. When Anglo-Saxon dominance is central to those factors (since it is deemed
responsible for the nations’ first-world status) noncitizens have to assimilate, at least
enough to become productive citizens. The United States, Canada, and Australia provide
intriguing examples of this phenomenon. The metaphoric models created by these
nations sought to force complicated sets ofhuman beings into coherent wholes, upon
which the state remained supreme. The multi-dimensionality of humanity was thus
diluted, providing for a polity with a unifying belief in the legitimacy of the state. Those
deemed unable (certain people of color, especially those lacking financial and educational
resources) or unwilling (those refusing to relinquish allegiance to their ancestral
homelands) to embrace this conviction were designated as illegitimate noncitizens.
Though the legal distinction between legal and illegal noncitizens was often blurry, the
social significance was less ambiguous. Legal noncitizens attained a certain measure of
legitimacy, though they were still denied the benefits of full membership, while illegal
noncitizens were wholly illegitimate and unwelcome guests in the polity.
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Immigration and refugee laws serve as “’magic mirro[s] into the domestic
prejudices and biases in the nation’s heart and soul” and “reflect, and at the same time
shape, national identity.”7 Determinations regarding which newcomers would pose little
or no threat earned with them legitimacy assessments. Major domestic and international
events in the 1960s through the 1980s led to an influx of non-Anglo immigrants and
refugees to the United States, Australia and Canada. Persons who demonstrated respect
for the political system by applying for residency via the state’s proper channels and who
possessed cultural traditions and/or political views akin to Anglo-Saxon values were most
likely to be regarded as legitimate. The state sought to ensure that newcomers and long-
time residents alike would recognize the state as the legitimate sovereign. Since
allegiance to the state could never be fully assumed, especially among long-time citizens
who considered newcomers a threat to their cultural and, in some cases, socioeconomic
status, and liberal-democratic states could not exert extreme physical force over their
polities without consequence, the American, Canadian and Australian states created
mechanisms to compel support. Since overtly racist policies were no longer feasible (due
to social movements within their borders and throughout the globe), the states utilized
models to mitigate threats allegedly posed by increases in cultural diversity. The raced
and ethnocentric lenses through which policymakers evaluated immigration and refugee
claims, though perhaps modified, were not eradicated. Instead, bias was “submerged in
the public discourse about immigration.”8 These models revealed, and sought to manage,
what I have deemed the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. In other words, the state
compelled noncitizens to believe in the system’s legitimacy in order to diffuse the
7 Kevin R. Johnson, The “Huddled Masses ” Myth: Immigration and Civil Rights, (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2004), 171.
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negative impacts that (illegitimate or near-illegitimate) noncitizens allegedly exerted
upon the economic welfare and social cohesiveness of the nation (in order to render their
presence legitimate).
Chapters one through five of this dissertation examined the American, Canadian,
and Australian states’ responses to the alleged challenge to their sovereignty presented by
the influx of non-Anglo newcomers. Since the socioeconomic success of all three nations
was considered to be the result of the Anglo-Saxon values infused in their liberal-
democratic systems, the presence of non-Anglo newcomers was considered a threat to the
vitality of the nations and their governing structures. Though the three nations erased
much of the overt discrimination in the texts of their national policies by the mid-
1 960s/early 1970s, implicit bias allowed for inegalitarian implementation. It is important
to note that the nations were not simply attempting to maintain Anglo-Saxon dominance
for the sake of maintaining Anglo-Saxonism. Instead, and potentially more troubling,
was the fact that states perceived themselves, and their national futures, to be at risk if
Anglo-Saxon values and traditions were diluted. Anglo-Saxon dominance was tied
directly to the vitality of the nation.
Immigration and refugee policies, as well as the discourse surrounding them, are
the most explicit vehicles through which the institution of citizenship is administered and
are the most illuminating in terms of how states manage the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy. As explained in Chapter Four, the American, Australian and Canadian states
sought to promulgate fair and humanitarian images while instituting mechanisms for
rejecting immigrant and refugee applications. Family reunification was designed to
promote the belief that humanitarianism was at the heart of the nations’ policies. The
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Canadian state faced challenges from one of its most populous provinces by increasing
bureaucratic oversight in an effort to enhance its ability to select the applicants most
suited to its society. The greater detailed the policy, the belief was, the less vulnerable
the state. Australia’s system, which provided extensive settlement assistance, revolved
around family sponsorship to keep out the most economically dependent. American
policymakers were primarily interested in utilizing immigration and refugee policies to
enhance the nation’s relationships with international actors, and with facilitating the swift
movement of refugees into the workplace. At the same time, immigration and refugee
policies in these nations were devoid of explicit racism and ethnocentrism in order to
appear fair. Moreover, the states sought to protect the economic health of the nation by
restricting the influx of illegitimate noncitizens. Illegal noncitizens were blamed for
economic recessions and over-extended social welfare programs. Allegedly objective
selection criteria were created and, though they facilitated the maintenance of Anglo
dominance, allowed the states to appear non-discriminatory. To acquire entry, and
ultimately legitimacy, noncitizens were required to adopt Anglo-Saxon skills and social
mores - and fill labour market needs without displacing citizens. The more systematic
the bureaucratic procedures, the greater the state’s power to maintain its legitimacy, yet
the more egalitarian it claimed were the processes. All three states successfully
maintained the exclusivity of their institutions of citizenship by constructing gate-keeping
measures shrouded in rhetoric that championed fairness and humanitarianism.
Among the three nations, the degree to which the states perceived a need for
mechanisms to engender support for their legitimacy - as well as the mechanisms used -
varied. The United States functioned primarily from a defensive stance because central
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to its policy decisions was the assumption that American citizenship was so desirable that
it was constantly at risk of being stolen by illegitimate noncitizens at home and abroad.
An arrogance regarding the benefits that American life had to offer, and a complementary
fear of its subversion, permeated discourse surrounding immigration and refugee policies.
[Suspicion of loyalty” for non-Anglos, particularly “those of Muslim, Middle Eastern,
and South Asian background” has been deemed part of the American cultural fabric and
has been most evident in “[t]he fact that hateful acts and words of private citizens are
followed up with official regimes of detention and profiling ”9 This persistent distrust
helps to explain the illegitimate assessments of people with racial, ethnic or cultural
traditions that do not fit easily into Anglo-Saxon society. Particularly during “times of
stress or crisis, policy makers ... expressed] a vision of America that excludes bodies of
people, based on skin color, ethnicity, or political belief.” Such exclusion included
deeming all those perceived to be foreigners as not “true Americans .” 10 Some people, no
matter how long they called America home and/or how fervently they demonstrated
allegiance to the political system by becoming citizens, could never be American enough
to be regarded as legitimate. The state’s role was principally to protect legitimate citizens
from the theft of American prosperity by illegal newcomers. The state’s failure to create
the level of bureaucratic control achieved in Canada and Australia perhaps exacerbated
the fear of subversion from illegitimate noncitizens at home and abroad. A focus on the
near-impossible task of making the nation’s borders impermeable in order to keep
illegitimate people out might have reinforced a belief in the state’s vulnerability.
9
Bill Ong Hing, Defining America Through Immigration Policy, (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 2004), 259.
10
Ibid., 272, 260.
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In contrast, in Australia, and especially in Canada, though the states were
entrusted with protecting their legitimate citizens from the harm allegedly caused by
illegitimate noncitizens, they also adopted offensive stances toward compelling
legitimacy. Federal bureaucracies were responsible for getting newcomers and long-time
residents excited about officially joining their polities. Citizens were asked to encourage
productive and mostly-assimilated noncitizens to demonstrate full allegiance by taking
oaths of citizenship. Though both states functioned under the assumption that floods of
illegitimate noncitizens had to be prevented to protect the nation’s health and provide for
national progress, there was a consistent doubt that legitimate newcomers could be
successfully attracted and sustained. Moreover, in the quasi-democratic socialist tradition
for which both nations are known, the states’ reaches were far more extensive than the
United States’. Bureaucracies were established and resources were dedicated to compel
assimilation and facilitate the integration of non-Anglo newcomers into Australian and
Canadian socioeconomic life. In contrast, the American focus was on the enforcement of
laws and policies to keep out illegitimate people seeking to steal jobs from legitimate
citizens. Therefore, all three states grappled with the challenge of bilateral legitimacy
slightly differently. Regardless, noncitizens least able to assimilate - whether due to skin
color, the lack of English-language skills, etc. - were instinctively regarded as
illegitimate by all three states because they allegedly posed significant threats to state
legitimacy. All three nations designed metaphoric models to compel allegiance among
legitimate noncitizens and citizens (which included keeping illegitimates out) and
sending messages regarding which people (as identifiable by their ethnic, racial, and
cultural characteristics) were legitimately suited to membership.
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Metaphoric Models Designed to Mitigate the Challenge of Bilateral T Ppitin^y
The American Melting Pot metaphoric model was infused with the arrogance that
permeated decision-making regarding immigration and refugee policy. The belief was
that natural forces would combine so that non-Anglo differences would melt down into a
quasi-Anglo culture. 11 Non-Anglo traditions, like impurities, would sink and only those
values akin to the dominant (Anglo-Saxon) values responsible for the success of the
United States, would survive. Most colors would be washed away so that only white (the
absence of color) remained. The goal for individuals in this model was to become as
invisible in a cultural sense as possible and to find one’s utility in the capitalist
marketplace. Though the model was modified somewhat by the embrace of cultural
pluralism that followed its introduction, it has remained the most well-known and widely-
accepted metaphor for diversity in America. Less acknowledged has been how its
acceptance has reinforced the state’s legitimacy to govern while simultaneously
indicating that, the more easily one melted into the cauldron (so to speak), the more
legitimate his/her presence in the polity.
A powerful indication of American arrogance regarding the desirability of
citizenship was the absence of federal material praising the benefits of being an
American. Though this might appear unremarkable, it becomes almost peculiar when
compared to the prevalence of such material published by Australian and Canadian
governments. Though publications for citizenship applicants discussed becoming
American in positive terms, they fell far short of the celebratory language in Australian
" For a detailed description of this model, please see Chapter Two.
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and Canadian publications. 1 ^ Moreover, American citizenship instructional booklets
emphasized the importance of obtaining social security cards in order to demonstrate
one s legitimate membership in the polity. For example, in Our American Way ofLife:
Federal Textbook on Citizenship
,
Chapter 1 1 instructs immigrants on how to obtain
social security cards, pointing out repeatedly that cards were provided at no cost to
immigrants and were essential for employment. 13 Though this textbook was published
prior to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, it demonstrated the extent to
which the American state was already concerned with illegitimate noncitizens taking jobs
from legitimate Americans. These cards carried with them the significance of belonging
to the polity.
Peter got his social security card. He showed the card to his wife and the
children. They were very happy. They felt that they were now a part of the
United States of America. 14
In order to be granted full membership, however, applicants had to demonstrate proof of
having assimilated. The textbook, which was obviously designed for non-English-
speaking immigrations since it was written in simple language, instructed that, in order to
apply for citizenship, one must “be able to speak, read, and write English,” “know about
the history of the United States,” and “know about the government and how it works.” In
addition, reviews of applications required assessments of applicants’ “moral character,”
which, as discussed in previous chapters, allowed for racist and ethnocentric perceptions
12
Extensive keyword searches for government documents produced few matches. It is worthy of
note that American citizenship materials were difficult to locate given the fact that they were
produced in primarily brochure format, which meant that many have not survived the test of time.
13 Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Our American Way ofLife:
Federal Textbook on Citizenship: Becoming a Citizen Series, Book 1 (Washington, D.C.: 1980).
14
Ibid., 43.
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of cultural behavior. In addition, in order to mitigate any threat that immigrants might
pose by maintaining allegiance to their homelands, citizenship required that applicants
“must be loyal to the United States.” When the applicant “t[ook] the oath of allegiance to
the United States he/she “must give up [his/her] allegiance to [his/her] old country.” 15
This provision revealed the consistent concern that American life was at risk of being
undermined.
Similar concerns infused the plans for the American Revolution Bicentennial
celebrations in the early to mid-1970s. If the American state could have been expected to
extol the virtues of possessing citizenship at any point between 1965 and 1990, it would
have been during this period. The American Revolutionary Bicentennial Commission
(ARBC) was established in 1966 but converted to the American Revolutionary
Bicentennial Administration (ARBA) in 1974 after the House Judiciary Committee
rendered the ARBC unworkable and ineffective. 16 By 1976, ARBA was receiving
approximately ten million dollars annually from the federal government with an
additional eleven million dollars available to disperse to states for celebrations. Though
various congressional hearings were held and policies created to allow for - and finance -
numerous state and local commissions, propaganda to compel non-citizens and non-fully
assimilated residents to sign up for full membership was noticeably lacking. There was
discussion of American unity in the context of attempting to “encourage a legitimate
sense of the destiny today’s Americans have a share in” because, though the American
Revolution had a “unifying effect,” such an effect could not “be counted on for long.”
Three types of celebrations were authorized: “Heritage USA,” “Festival USA,” and
15
Ibid., 81, 83, 82.
16 See Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary, The Operation ofthe American Revolution
Bicentennial Commission, 92
nd
Congress, 2
nd
sess., 21 December 1972.
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Horizons USA,” which, “[rjoughly put, ... correspond to an appreciation of what is past,
a celebration now of the occasion itself, and a dedicated planning for the future - the
third century.”
17
All three types included moving exhibits, films, printed materials,
museums, lectures, and other live performances, and were carried out via partnerships
between state governments and local businesses. Diversity was recognized as part of the
national fabric, but was not a central theme. However, instead of focusing on American
citizens as living testimonials to the glory of citizenship, the emphasis was placed on
ideas associated with the American Revolution which have been significant to the
development of the United States.” “The spirit of the American Revolution, which held
highest the goals of individual liberty and responsibility, [was] not dimmed by time .” 18
Commissions (and the policies that enabled them) were more focused on celebrating the
principles established by the event as opposed to the ways in which the American people
exhibited or embodied those qualities.
True to the American political psyche, rhetoric surrounding the Bicentennial also
included fear that the events, as well as the principles which they celebrated, were
assumed to be under siege. Congressional hearings were held to expose the alleged
campaign to use the Bicentennial to build support for a Communist revolution . 19
According to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the
Judiciary, the “revolutionary left” sought to “pervert the legitimate meaning of the
17 The New York State American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, 6th Annual Report, 1975-
1976 (March 1, 1975) 3.
18 Wisconsin, An Act to amend 20.855(5) (title); and to create 44.40 ofthe statutes, relating to the
Wisconsin state American revolution bicentennial commission, Chapter 27 of the Laws of 1973.
19 Much of the discourse resembles the concern with terrorist threats that dominates our post-9/1
1
world.
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American Revolution” through a “massive campaign to try to ‘capture’ the Bicentennial
celebration for themselves.’"0 The Peoples Bicentennial Commission (PBC) was
allegedly a “far-left organization” that was infiltrating communities by feigning to work
on behalf ofARBA in order to compel support for a Communist agenda. Their activities
were considered a threat to national unity because they encouraged criticism of American
capitalistic traditions and values. According to the Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act, PBC was composed of faux patriots because
they sought to “discredit each of the traditions and institutions of the political and
economic system. In other words, their activity (and perhaps their very presence) was
illegitimate because they actively refused to assimilate to American values and support
the legitimacy of the state.
Instead of acknowledging that the PBC’s discourse was an exercise of the
quintessentially American value of free speech, the group’s reportedly anti-democratic
agenda rendered them wholly un-American. But, notice the self-description of the PBC
from a flyer quoted in the Subcommittee’s Report:
The Peoples Bicentennial Commission is a nonprofit public foundation, founded
in the belief that it is time to reaffirm the democratic principles of the Declaration
of Independence of the American Revolution. Today we face economic and
political crises as great as those of 1776. Like our ancestors, we must meet the
challenge to our democratic birthrights. We must dedicate ourselves to a new
patriotism, one that calls for allegiance to the revolutionary democratic principles
that launched our first national rebellion against tyranny.
20
Congress. Senate. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, The Attempt to Steal the
Bicentennial: The People’s Bicentennial Commission
,
Senate, 94 th Congress, 2
nd
sess., 17&18
March 1976.
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Reportedly, many statements by the founding fathers were also used in the PBC’s
literature. Interestingly, the Subcommittee did not quote any material more damaging
than the statement included above. Though this organization could have been seeking to
overthrow the government by Communist revolution, it might also have been attempting
to raise public awareness in the hope of acquiring support for an egalitarian social
movement. Undoubtedly, policymakers assumed that people not fully supporting state
legitimacy were seeking to undermine it. There was even a perceived threat from the fact
that the PBC was encouraging critical discussion of issues instead of compelling citizens
to brainstorm new ways to serve their country. The PPC, in order to have been a
legitimate (as opposed to a subversive) group should have been extolling the virtues of
the freedoms that only Americans enjoy, including “the freedom to do the kind of work
you choose, to sell your products on the open market, and to bargain with others freely
for goods and services, [since they] are inherent to the maintenance of freedom of speech,
press, worship, and assembly[.]”21
The Australian Family of the Nation model encouraged a connection among
citizens that reinforced their allegiance to the state. As in traditional Anglo-Saxon
nuclear family structures, each person had his/her proper place within socio-economic
society. Though a measure of conceit existed in the belief that newcomers - especially
refugees and others with little or no economic means - should demonstrate gratitude for
being allowed to live in Australia by pledging loyalty to the state, it fell short of
American arrogance. Full membership, therefore, was acquired through support for the
21 Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, “The Attempt to Steal the Bicentennial: The
People’s Bicentennial Commission. Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee
on the Judiciary,” Senate, 94
th
Congress, Second Session, May 1976.
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Australian way of life - a largely Anglo-Saxon existence. The goal in this model was to
become as economically prominent (and least dependent) as possible.
A. J. Grassby, the Minister of State for Immigration in 1973, codified the model
in an Immigration Reference Paper titled: Australia ’s Decade ofDecision. The goal was,
when embarking on the nation’s “fifth stage of its history - the search for our national
identity, to become a united family that is “strong in its diversity and aware of its rich
cultural heritage.” In order to achieve a “new national unity” an understanding of
“ourselves, our history, our inheritance” was needed. 22 Similar to the rhetoric in the
United States and Canada, diversity was claimed to be part of the nation’s heritage, with
no mention of the Anglo exclusivity that was pivotal to immigration policy before WWII.
Use of the presence of Aboriginal peoples as diversifying would have been faulty given
the fact that they were (mis)treated in much the same ways as were the indigenous
peoples in Canada and the United States. In no way were they considered to be members
of the polity, nor was their presence considered legitimate. Though diversity was
allegedly a consistent aspect of Australian life, Grassby declared Australia to be “a new
nation and a new people” because “[tjwenty percent of our 13 million people were bom
overseas.” These new people, however, were not welcomed into Australia as temporary
residents. Legitimate residents were not “settlers and apprentice citizens” nor “guest
workers to meet some essentially transient need,” but people who intended to “join with
us fully in the life of the nation” by mak[ing] their homes here.” This required a
bureaucratic focus on settlement issues and services for migrants, such as training
22
A.J. Grassby, Minister for Immigration, Australia 's Decade ofDecision , Immigration
Reference Paper, 1 1 October 1973, 1-2, 3.
23
Ibid., 5.
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teachers in “the migrant family and conflicting values.”24 National success was entirely
contingent upon coming together in a unified whole. Unlike most United States
policymakers, Grassby recognized the need to “abolish discrimination” and bring about
“equal economic opportunity” and offer any “assistance
...necessary to place [migrants]
on equal footing with Australian-born.” Such an endeavor allowed for only one
distinction in Australian law: citizen and non-citizen, which would help to move the
nation further away from a history of allowing second- and third-class citizens. All
citizens would be treated equally as long as they “contributed] to the social and cultural
life of Australia.”25 Such contributions were assessed through racist and ethnocentric
lenses.
Many of the Australian citizenship materials published under Grassby’s direction
and into the 1980s expanded upon the Family of the Nation metaphoric model. Australia
was referred to as a “land of immigrants” who have contributed to making the nation
“strong and progressive, with a distinctive character of its own.” In order for various
cultural traditions to coexist peacefully and in ways that facilitated “mutual acceptance
and respect,” people had to be educated about backgrounds different from their own. 26
Diversity could not be boundless or uncontrolled. On the contrary - members of the
polity were brought together by “cultural and ethical values” that were “commonly
uph[e]ld.”~ The identity of citizen was also deemed to provide a unifying force because
it was “not just a status in law ... it also ...link[ed] together Australia Aboriginals, first
24
Ibid., 10, 13.
25
Ibid., 19, 20.
26
This theme became prevalent in material of this type, as it was in Canada, but not in the United
States.
27 Department of Immigration, Australian Citizenship Ceremony Handbook: A Guidefor Civic
Authorities, 1973.
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generation migrants and the descendants of earlier settlers into one community of
Australians.” In fact, “[citizenship [was] the counterpoint to diversity.”28 However, in
order to ensure national socioeconomic progress, the “privilege” of citizenship was only
granted to the “newcomer [who] has shown by his or her conduct that he or she is a
worthy recipient” during three years of residency. 29 One indicator was a working
knowledge of English and an understanding of the rights and responsibilities of
citizenship; in other words, proof that the applicant has assimilated. By 1988, officials
responsible for conducting citizenship ceremonies were instructed to deliver all speeches
in English without translation services while keeping them simple enough to avoid
confusion among candidates with limited English proficiency. 30 This suggested that
multiculturalism had a limited impact. Demonstrations of loyalty to the state and the
willingness to “uphold its Constitution and obey the laws made under it”31 remained
central to the granting of citizenship status.
At the same time, the influence of the (limited) multicultural model was evident.
Applicants were told that they were not required to “renounce” their “cultural identities],
customs or traditions.” Moreover, the “Fathers of Federation” were credited with
creating a system of “freedom and opportunity” that “rested not on a single race, or a
colourless uniformity in community or public life.” By voluntarily acquiring formal
28 Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, Australian Citizenship
Ceremonies: A Handbookfor Local Government Authorities, Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1988.
2q
Department of Immigration, Australian Citizenship Ceremony Handbook, 1973. It is worthy ot
note that, as of 1988, the residency requirement was reduced to a total of two years within the five
years prior to application. See Department of Immigration, Australian Citizenship Ceremonies ,
1988.
30 See Department of Immigration, Australian Citizenship Ceremonies, 1988, 9.
31
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membership, the new citizen had “pa[id] tribute to the new homeland.”32 Despite the fact
that non-Anglo traditions were recognized and, to some extent, celebrated in tune with
the multiculturalism model embraced by the national government, noncitizens were still
required to assimilate enough to demonstrate their support for the legitimacy of the
state.
33
By the late 1980s, national identity became an issue for bureaucratic study and
instruction. A concern with defining a national identity was deemed central to
Australians’ experience of their country. In fact, the state considered Australians to be
“obsessed with their concern for identity” in the face of the “highest per capita
immigration rate in the world.”34 The absence of a political revolution to signify a
dramatic break from British control was credited with a scarcity of character-constructing
material. Concern focused on the potential for social conflict resulting from the impacts
of historic and contemporary inequality. “The denial of a legitimate Australian identity
to so many in . . . society is a crucial matter that must be of concern to all.”35 In fact,
distinctions between Aboriginals and Australians resulted in a virtual rejection of the
state’s legitimacy to govern among Aboriginals, compelling many of them to seek their
own sovereign nation. Maintenance of the Australian state’s legitimacy at home and
abroad required including the Aboriginals in the definition of legitimate Australians,
particularly by granting indigenous land rights.
32 Department of Immigration, Australian Citizenship Ceremony Handbook
,
1973.
33 See also, Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Australian Citizenship Ceremony
Handbook: A Guidefor Civic Authorities, 1978.
34 Cabinet Document, “Policy Options For the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia,”
Australian Identity in a Multicultural Society, March 1988, 1, 10-11.
35
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36
Aboriginal claims of sovereignty are currently represented (in part) by an informal Aboriginal
embassy outside of the Australian Parliament building in Canberra. This embassy is a collection
of tents and other living-off-the-land structures. I witnessed them in September of 2004.
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In order to promulgate factors conducive to social justice and harmony, which
was the principal goal, the state took it upon itself to clarify which residents were
legitimate or “true” Australians. An increasing blurring of boundaries within social
hierarchies and of distinctions “between ‘them’ and ‘us’” created a “crisis of identity in
society. Clearly, the state recognized that lessening Anglo dominance was
disconcerting to Australians whose identity rested upon it, which included ethnics who
had been compelled to assimilate in the post-World War II period. A history of forced
conformism needed to give way to an embrace of cultural pluralism. However, there was
little interest in striving for the American melting pot model since it was intended to
“create ... a new and superior being, the American.” The Australian version pursued in
the 1970s was allegedly distinct from the American metaphoric model because it,
“caus[ed] differences to melt away, like ice dropped into hot water.” However, it failed
to uproot forced conformism. The state perceived that the challenge facing the nation in
the late 1980s and beyond was to create “a cohesive society that embrace[d] plurality and
at the same time [could] pursue a polity of equity for all.”38 Such an endeavor was
hindered by the “concept of nation” since it promoted “conformity.” Allegedly, “national
identity and ethnic identity [were] not mutually exclusive.”39 The state needed to
deconstruct old, outdated images of Australian-ness and replace them with images that
“reflected] the present reality.”40
37 Cabinet Document, “Policy Options.” This discussion paper was part of a series of policy
papers commissioned by the Office of Multicultural Affairs. Two of the documents six
objectives included compiling a “resume of the kinds of identity that are appropriate for
Australia” and “priorities and strategies for developing and sustaining appropriate identities.”
(Pg-0
38
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At the same time, unrestrained diversity had to be prevented. Instead, a society
must respond constructively
... to its own diversity” in order to prevent the “erosion of
national cohesion” that resulted from the “denial and suppression” of diversity
.
41 A
degree of assimilation was warranted in order to maintain national harmony. The pivotal
unifying element was “a commitment to Australia and its future,” which rendered one a
“true” or legitimate Australian
.
42
Tolerance instruction and cultural education aimed at
promoting an understanding of membership as predicated on support for the state were
“vital for the future of harmonious community relations .”43 Diversity itself was afforded
a measure of legitimacy as part of Australian life, but only in regard to maintaining
“relevant culturally determined behaviours and beliefs .”44 Put simply, belief in the
legitimacy of the Australian state made one eligible for legitimate membership in the
polity.
In the face of growing ethnic and racial diversity and a strong commitment to
egalitarianism (or, in Aussie terms, giving a “fair go”), the state revolved legitimacy
around an allegedly race- and ethnically-neutral factor. However, the state failed to
acknowledge the Anglo-ness at the heart of its political system, policies, and traditions,
despite the fact that its list of “Overarching Core Elements” of culture (i.e., English,
democratic government, economic system, legal system, and freedom) in a multicultural
society included Anglo-Saxon elements. Support for the state and participation in
political and social-welfare institutions, which were deemed necessary to productivity in
the public sphere, required assimilation. The Australian approach ultimately rested on a
41
Ibid., 11.
42 See R.J. Hawke’s quote from the Australia Day ceremony in Ibid., 12.
43
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“The essential ingredient of any future Australian identity is therefore the legitimacy of the
diversity that is so typically Australian.” Ibid., 24, 29.
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traditional liberal-democratic divide: maintenance of traditions that conflicted with the
dominant culture were allowed in the private sphere as long as they did not impede
individuals’ abilities to integrate productively into the public sphere. However, a unique
spin was placed on this traditional concept. Though culture was recognized as a dynamic
force, and some overlap was considered inevitable, “biculturalism,” or the “personal
orientation that one has to the ethnic group with which one might identify,” was relegated
primarily to the private sphere, while “multiculturalism,” which was viewed as “not an
aspect of one’s personal, but rather as one’s national identity as an Australian
. .
.
[was]
part of the public domain of our Australian culture.” State resources were committed to
publicizing models of Australian culture that encouraged citizens to embrace “the
legitimacy of diversity” and cultivate “a shared commitment to human diversity.”45
Complexity in the sphere under greater state and market control was kept to a minimum.
In this sense, the state was able to officially celebrate cultural space for non-Anglo
traditions and values, while limiting diversity in ways that reinforced its legitimacy to
govern. To be a “true” (or legitimate) Australian one had to demonstrate an outward
orientation to Anglo-ness, primarily by supporting the state’s legitimacy.
Each ethnic/cultural group inhabited a separate and distinct entity in the Canadian
mosaic. The more vocal and numerous the members of one’s group, the larger the share
of the mosaic accorded. Cultural dominance resulted from a prevalence of one group
within society as a whole, though one group’s dominance could not be absolute because
other groups would inevitably surround it. However, Anglo-Saxonism was the force that
mitigated among the groups, primarily because it was deemed to lack the degree of
45
Ibid., 32. See also, 33-37.
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ethnicity possessed by the other groups. The goal in this model was for one’s group to be
vocal and/or numerous enough to be recognized as a legitimate member of the mosaic.
The Canadian state enjoyed concerns and employed methods similar to
Australia’s in regards to shaping a national identity that embraced diversity in ways that
reinforced its legitimacy to govern and simultaneously required assimilation to the
nation’s core sociopolitical values. Even prior to the formal introduction of Canadian
multiculturalism by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1971,46 the themes pivotal to the
mosaic metaphoric model shaped bureaucratic material. In Canadian cultural lexicon,
people attained political cogency via their group affiliations. For example, The Canadian
Family Tree, which was produced periodically by the Department of the Secretary of
State to recognize ethnic groups that have contributed to the national fabric, listed the
groups that attained legitimate status. A review of these publications from the late 1960s
through the 1980s revealed an approach that simply added groups to the list of those
worthy of recognition. This allegedly did not conflict with the nation’s “basic
[English/French] duality” because “the growing reality of pluralism t[ook] its place
solidly [withjin [that] framework. 47 In other words, the response to increases in cultural
diversity was to enlarge the mosaic within the confines of official bilingualism.
The 1967 version of the Canadian Family Tree listed 47 groups, while the 1979
version listed 78 groups. Both editions acknowledged that the goal was to be as inclusive
as possible. While the 1967 version mentioned that the state’s attempts to include “as
many [ethnic groups which comprise the Canadian people] as possible” were hindered
46
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, House of Commons Debates, October 8, 1971, pp. 8545-8, in Howard
Palmer, Editor, Immigration and the Rise ofMulticulturalism, Issues in Canadian History
(Vancouver: Coop Clark Publishing, 1975.)
47 Canadian Parliament, The Task Force on Canadian Unity: A Future Together: Observations
and Recommendations, January, 1979, 55.
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[i]n some instances due largely to the lack of material, or to the fact that the groups have
not yet as developed an identifiable structure in Canada
... [in] other instances it is
impossible at present to identify a group, as statistics are not available on their numerical
strength or geographical distribution within Canada;”48 the 1979 version notes that “every
effort has been made to include all ethnocultural groups, large and small, which have a
distinct identity within Canadian identity.”49 Notice the state’s interest in demonstrating
its exertion in the interest of inclusivity and the designation of “ethnocultural” to signify
the types of legitimate groups. Both editions, however, acknowledged that legitimate
groups achieved a size and structure recognizable to the state, which suggests that groups
must take on a quasi-Anglo form in order to be regarded as legitimate. The discussion of
Canada as a nation of immigrants (with the exclusion of, to a certain extent, indigenous
peoples) and that virtually all Canadians were “members of one or another ethnocultural
group,”
50
while only certain immigrant groups were recognized as worthy of listing in
official publications, exemplifies the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. The state granted
groups legitimacy if they became active in the political system and/or were Anglo enough
to be recognized as a group that made valuable contributions to Canadian life. At the
same time, those accorded legitimacy were required to be “good” citizens, which
included supporting the state and its political system, and exercising individual freedoms
within “reasonable” limitations in order to avoid violating the rights of others.'
1
This
communitarian approach corresponded with the mosaic metaphoric model that restricted
48 Department of the Secretary of State, Canadian Citizenship Branch, The Canadian Family
Tree, 1967.
49 Department of the Secretary of State, Multiculturalism Directorate, The Canadian Family Tree:
Canada’s Peoples, 1979.
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each group to one unit of the fabric in order to prevent overruns into other units’
designated spaces.
Since ethnocultural identity was deemed pivotal to Canadian life, bureaucratic
publications sought to clarify the meaning of “identity.” Though ethnic identity was
accorded primacy, groups whose traditions/backgrounds did not fit comfortably into a
common understanding of ethnicity were still included; i.e., “Americans,” “Blacks,” and
Jews. The establishment of a definition of “identity” allegedly minimized the
imperfect workability of this approach. The 1979 version of The Canadian Family Tree
noted that,
For the purposes of this book, ‘identity’ was understood as ‘one’s sense of
belonging to a group, and the group’s collective will to exist,’ as defined in Book
IV of the Report ofthe Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.
Some other aspects of group identity which were taken into consideration include
language, geographic origin, historical continuity and religion. 53
The state declared by the late 1980s that, though there were “two official languages ...
there was no official culture” in Canada. 54 Unique among the three nations was the
designation of “English” as an ethnic/ethnocultural group. This reflected the
English/French dualism that provided the foundation for the Canadian state’s approach to
the issue of diversity. At the same time, however, the extent to which Anglo-ness imbued
the state and its institutions, and the requirement to assimilate enough to attain political
cogency, were unaddressed.
52
“American” would presumably be considered a national affiliation or homeland as opposed to
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The state perceived that it bore the ultimate responsibility for cultivating a
dynamic unifying force through the formal designation of citizenship. In 1987, David
Crombie, the Secretary of State during the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the first
Canadian Citizenship Act, declared that “[cjitizenship ties the nation together.”55 This
responsibility took on increasing importance according to the ebbs and flows of the
Quebecois separatist movement, which, by 1979, was considered to have culminated in a
“constitutional crises” by a Federal Task Force on Canadian Unity. 56 Both the Canadian
and Australian states were reacting to perceived crises in national unity in the 1970s and
1980s. A confidential cabinet document on citizenship composed in 1972 advocated for
a national campaign to educate Canadian residents about modifications to citizenship
laws. In a “highly factual, straightforward and unemotional manner,” and published in
languages in addition to English and French, “a multi-media advertising campaign”
would be used to “emphasiz[e] the ‘I chose to be Canadian’ theme, utilizing brief
histories of persons who have obtained Canadian citizenship.”57 Modernization and
promotion of Canadian citizenship certificates, which were small, easy to carry and
demonstrated one’s legitimate membership in the polity, were believed to assist in this
endeavor. The goal was twofold: to encourage non-citizen residents to apply for formal
membership in the polity and to remind Canadian citizens how desirable full membership
in Canadian life was.
In an effort to exert considerable control over popular understandings of the
nation’s history, political system, art and culture, a series of volumes were produced to
55 Department of the Secretary of State, Citizenship '87: Proud to Be Canadian: A Discussion
Paper
,
1987, 1.
56 Canadian Parliament, The Task Force on Canadian Unity: A Future Together: Observations
and Recommendations, January, 1979, 3.
57 Canadian Parliament, Cabinet Document on Citizenship, 1972, 12, 13.
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“provide a core of background material to enrich and deepen public understanding of
Canada s unique values, and how they help shape and determine our national identity.”
The less bureaucratic and the more accessible the information, the more likely that it
would instill convivial emotions among its audience. Little was left to chance. The
Canada Committee established units in every province with a mandate to “strengthen
national unity and identity.’ 8 As the state vied for considerable control over
determinations as to which newcomers would be granted access to the nation, it also
expended considerable resources in an attempt to foster a sense of national identity that
would encourage noncitizens to formally join the polity and unify all citizens. In line
with the motivation behind multiculturalism’s creation, the model and its principles were
advanced in an effort to quash separatist sentiment. However, what constituted “national
identity was much more difficult to define than the identities of legitimate ethnocultural
groups. Though definitions of what it meant to be Canadian varied among the populace,
according to the Secretary of State, “no one can say any longer that we don’t know who
we are, or that there is no Canadian identity for the Secretary of State to reinforce.” In an
attempt to clarify, one definition was offered: a “sum total of a people’s experience”
which “enable[d] citizens to be generous, to be understanding of others, to celebrate
rather than resent our differences” due to a sense of “tolerance ... [and] essential
fairness.” These values developed pursuant to the history of a vocal and at times
contentious English/French dualism. Central to being a true Canadian was the
knowledge that Canadian citizenship was “one of the greatest gifts that anyone [could]
58
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ever receive.”59 This sentiment rivaled the arrogance that underscored much American
immigration policymaking.
Citizenship applicants attained legitimacy if they demonstrated having
assimilated. Indicators included assessments of being of “good character,” an
understanding of Canada’s political system and history, a working knowledge of English
or French, and awareness of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, including
“be[ing] loyal to Canada itself and to lawful authority in Canada embodied in the
Monarchy. Though Australian documents encouraged education and understanding of
cultures other than one’s own, only the Canadian of the three states explicitly cultivated a
caring and communitarian approach to the polity. Specifically, applicants were
encouraged to “respect the rights and feelings of others, .... care for Canada’s heritage,
and support for its ideals.” “By respecting and appreciating each other and by sharing
responsibility for their country, Canadians choose to grow together.”60
At the same time, the state made a concerted effort to incorporate the themes
codified in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (enacted in 1982) into its citizenship
publications. Upon the 40 th anniversary of the passage of the first Canadian Citizenship
Act, citizens were encouraged to get involved in brainstorming for a revised citizenship
policy. By encouraging greater support, the state cultivated a pronounced sense of
involvement, and hence loyalty, in the government. Respect for the “heritage and values
of the many diverse cultural groups that enrich the Canadian personality” would be
reciprocated with widespread acceptance of citizens’ “personal obligation to contribute to
the well-being of their neighbors, and the development of the country as a whole,” which
59 Secretary of State of Canada, Being Canadian, 1988.
60 Secretary of State, The Canadian Citizen, 1983.
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would best be accomplished through unified support for the state. 61 The psychological
connection commemorated by taking the oaths of citizenship was analogized to making
the vows of marriage but “instead of uniting a bride and groom, the [citizenship]
ceremony unites a country and an individual.”62 Clearly, the level of loyalty demanded
of citizens was extensive and, arguably, excessive in a liberal-democratic system.
Citizens were allowed to maintain non-Anglo cultural values as long as those values did
not conflict with their ability to support the legitimacy of the state to govern.
Like in Australia, citizenship carried with it a sense of novelty due to the recent
removal of the designation of Canadian citizens as British subjects and the eradication of
the special status accorded to British subjects around World War II. Canadian identity
was allegedly strengthened and cultural space was made for non-Anglo groups. In fact,
the motivation behind the Citizenship Act was
to give equal citizenship status to Canadians by birth and Canadians by choice, to
extend Canadian citizenship to as many qualified people as possible, to impress
upon all Canadians the value of citizenship status, and to promote national unity. 63
In other words, it was intended to cultivate “a feeling of legitimate Canadianism.” In this
sense, the state tackled the challenge of bilateral legitimacy head-on. The state
recognized that, in order to be a legitimate entity among its polity, it must compel
psychological investment in the nation. Citizens must be “loyal to the country, with
allegiance to its institutions, the Canadian Constitution, and the law of the land.”
64
The
best vehicle for that objective was to utilize citizenship, since it was “a cornerstone of
61 Secretary of State, Citizenship '87, 19.
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national unity.”65 In that vein, and similar to the Australian state’s actions, access to
citizenship was enhanced by, among other things, lowering the residency requirement
from five to three years and guaranteeing a non-discriminatory approach to review of
applications. Simultaneously, the state would act in ways true to its “commitment to the
fundamental principles of equality, diversity, and community as the basis for Canada’s
free, bilingual, multicultural society.”
66
In a spirit of fairness and camaraderie, citizens
were encouraged to invite other residents to apply for formal membership into the polity.
A unique nation necessitated an active and distinctive role for the state that
governed it. Canada was allegedly unique because of the sense of optimism central to its
national character, its ability to recognize its socioeconomic problems, and the one-of-a-
kind “blend of citizenship values - freedom and order, unity and diversity, rights and
responsibilities - [that] represents an unparalleled opportunity for participating in, and
contributing to, the welfare of humankind.”67 The Department of the Secretary of State
was entrusted with an annual budget of more than $100 million dollars to “help[] to
reinforce our national identity, to safeguard the heritage of all Canadians, [and] to
strengthen citizens’ awareness of their rights and responsibilities.” Expanding on the
extreme analogy of citizenship and marriage used in a previous publication, the State
Department declared that it was “required to act as public custodian of the nation’s
soul.”
68
In that sense, the state adopted a role that exceeded the typical boundaries of
liberal-democratic states. Instead of only mandating that citizens demonstrated support
for the political system by taking part in the mechanisms of democracy, the state also
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required that citizens recognize and accept that they share an intense, eternal bond with
the Canadian people and the state that manages it. Multiculturalism was considered to be
“at the very heart of citizenship,” which meant that it “serve[d] as the great bonding agent
of Canadian unity.” By promoting citizenship, multiculturalism, and official languages,
the Department of State fortified national unity. 6) The state was no longer merely the
manager of diversity, it attempted to become the administrator of the public psyche as
well. The legitimate state protected legitimate Canadians from factious elements, such as
uncontrolled diversity and Quebecois separatism.
Toward the Construction of an Alternative Model
Though the attributes of liberal-democratic nations for which human beings
should strive may be controversial, in an effort to reach useful conclusions, I offer
suggestions as to how the liberal-democratic state can mitigate the challenge of bilateral
legitimacy without enhancing Anglo dominance. If the goal is to create an alternative
model that provides for a dynamic egalitarian society, then honest discourse regarding
where the nation has been and where it needs to go in terms of its treatment of perceived
ethnic/racial differences is essential. As I have demonstrated, much political discourse in
the United States, Canada and Australia credits the centrality of Anglo traditions and
values with national socioeconomic success. Critical analysis of what those alleged
values are, whether or not they were responsible for national progress, and what actually
constitutes “success,” needs to be central to a national dialogue. This would plant the
69
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seeds for “critically reflective attachments to the state.”70 In particular, a mainstream re-
examination of the negative and positive impacts of requiring assimilation for full
membership in the polity is warranted. The multidimensional effects of globalization on
Western political cultures and an increase in affiliations that exceed national boundaries
are likely to force changes in the tools available to modem liberal-democratic states to
maintain its legitimacy. In fact, the state might find that it must be more tolerant, and
perhaps even accepting, of allegiances that appear to conflict with national loyalty.
Moreover, we must remain cognizant of the interrelationships among the various groups
that help give individuals meaning to their roles in the polity. Such relationships shape
the role that the state adopts as well as the extent to which the state influences the
behavior of those groups and the individuals affiliated with them.
Such an endeavor, however, might serve to weaken the authority of the state.
Despite periodic threats to state supremacy from the Quebecois separatist movement,
Canada, along with the United States and Australia, has successfully utilized measures of
Anglo dominance to sustain state authority. If, like Rogers Smith, I am advocating for a
“world of moderate people in which multiple, overlapping memberships are common, ...
and in which transnational arrangements seek to secure human rights,”71 I must
acknowledge the fact that such a world might involve wholly unstable and entirely
transitory states and polities. One of the chief difficulties is the series of conflicts that
result from the differing worldviews that characterize human society. But at the heart of
democratic principles lies a belief in the utility of freedom to express ideas and
viewpoints. Allowing for, and even encouraging, “robust and explicit contests among all
70
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rival political views,”72 is perhaps the only way to avoid violating those principles. As
members of a liberal-democratic polity, respect for other worldviews, and the inequality
that may at times result, might be unavoidable. However, even in the face of prominent
inegalitarian views, we must work to maintain cultural space for other perspectives in the
hope that a fairer and more just society will evolve. Smith describes the conundrum:
We can, if we wish, certainly use democratic and liberal values to help define and
win support for our political objectives, for the institutions we wish to see
maintained and established, and for their proper conduct, as we engage in ongoing
political contests over rival visions, some liberal democratic, some not. But we
cannot hope to use those values at some imaginary, unalterable pre-political
moment to impose rules that succeed in getting all political groups to abandon
their public efforts to work for deeply held beliefs that we regard as
unreasonable. 73
Ultimately, “[pjolitics is in practice necessarily a matter of uncertain experimentation.”74
What about from a state’s perspective? What are the consequences of enabling
the “categories of self- and other-identification in public life ... [to] be as complex and
richly textured as social reality itself?” Seyla Benhabib insists that “[bjureaucratic
shorthand and administrative reductions of complexity for the sake of retaining group
• •
*7 C
privileges are not acceptable.” ' Though Benhabib adopts an approach similar to Smith’s
in which “political reflection and deliberation” about how we define ourselves, each
other, and the significance accorded to those definitions, are encouraged, neither scholar
adequately captures the supreme challenge to the state that these are likely to present.
Though state preservation is not necessarily an altruistic enterprise, there are benefits to
72
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human organization that are often safeguarded by moderate state supremacy, such as
domestic order and protection from outside military intervention. However, the
challenge of bilateral legitimacy, which is central to state authority in liberal-democratic
nations, will not be eradicated even (or perhaps particularly) within the type of system for
which the authors advocate. In fact, the challenge might be heightened. So, is it more
important to dispense with the threat (if that is possible) to the state or to minimize the
appearance of that threat (which, though difficult, might be more feasible)? In other
words, if state actors and institutions do not assume that dynamic national dialogue
threatens their existence, is it safe to speculate that the state would no longer rely on
cultural dominance to maintain its authority? Moreover, would faith in the state be
cultivated among people with various affiliations? Perhaps a paradoxical result would
occur from a state that was more relaxed, so-to-speak, about maintaining its legitimacy to
govern. Though this possibility resonates with me, I will not pretend to offer any
solutions here nor attempt to downplay the fact that the state, as an amalgam of various
human and historical forces, is an unwieldy and complicated entity. Instead, I hope that
this discussion illuminates the issues involved in seeking to create a model for the type of
society advocated for by sociolegal theorists like Smith and Benhabib.
The metaphoric models used by the three states examined in this dissertation
provided measures of success in mitigating the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. To
some extent, the multicultural model, particularly the Canadian mosaic, was the most
tolerant of ethnic differences. Though it has not been entirely effective in its efforts to
command loyalty among French Canadians, it has successfully compelled (non-French)
immigrants to take part in the political system because becoming full members of the
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polity required less-than-comprehensive cultural assimilation. From the standpoint of
supporting cultural diversity, this model is preferred to its American melting pot
counterpart, which relies on an allegedly natural process to make undesirable non-Anglo
qualities disappear in order to create a super (Anglo) American. However, the Canadian
mosaic and the Australian family of the nation multicultural models commit the same
error as the American melting pot, and that is that they force assimilation to Anglo-Saxon
traditions and values (albeit to varying degrees). They create the appearance of full
disclosure of historical inequality and Anglo dominance to make (limited) political room
for disadvantaged groups.
Multicultural models perceive society to be the sum total of groups with concrete,
quasi-innate identities. The models’ reliance on essentialistic conceptions of group
identity is reductionistic and inaccurate, though it fits nicely into the nature of
bureaucratic procedures, thereby facilitating state control. However, group boundaries
are unstable, fluid and blurred, as are individual and group identities . 76 In multicultural
models, individuals are tied to the state primarily through group affiliations. “In the
mosaic model, the individual is connected to the larger society and state indirectly, as in
the classic model of national citizenship, but only through prior membership in his or her
cultural group.” Consequently, when individuals do not fit comfortably into a group,
and/or a group is not recognized by the state due to its non-Anglo orientation, they risk
alienation. “Cultures that lack the requisite institutional completeness are not entitled to
special recognition by the state.”78 Individuals that fall within those groups or choose not
76
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to align with groups amplify the challenge of bilateral legitimacy. Compelling their
support for the state is compromised by the fact that those individuals are more likely to
have weak connections to the state and are least likely to attain legitimacy. The case of
the Quebecois — as well as the Canadian state s alleged failure to resolve it with the
mosaic metaphoric model - extends beyond a simple cultural analysis. Their motivation
was to maintain provincial supremacy in the face of an expanding national government.
It has been more an issue of federalism than one of purely culture.^ Preserving French
culture has been an important component (especially as a tool to rally support), but not
necessarily the crux of the movement. In that sense, the multicultural model was
improperly designed to quell the Quebecois separatist movement. Though Quebecois
separatists were not entirely demobilized by the multicultural model, nor fully entrenched
in the national system, their separatist movement has been unsuccessful.
Perhaps versions of multicultural models that allow for more fluidity in identity
formation and ethnocultural and even global affiliations, combined with the cultivation of
political cultures in which honest and contested dialogues regarding national objectives
are encouraged, would facilitate greater respect for citizens and residents as well as the
states that govern them. “The task of the state would be to preserve in general those
social practices and institutions that aid in the most equitable and integral development of
the human person.”80 Empowerment must also be part of this enterprise. Members of
ethnocultural groups must retain the ability to “appropriate, enrich, and even subvert the
terms of their own cultures,” which includes the “right to say no to the various cultural
offers made to one by one’s upbringing, one’s nation, one’s religious or familial
79
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community.”81 The experience of groups disadvantaged historically must be accorded
cultural credence. Individuals and groups must be allowed to tell their own stories of
peoplehood, without facing controlling assessments of legitimacy by the state, which
might enlighten citizens to the complexities of the social formation of racial and ethnic
identities in ways that reaffirmed the privilege of some at the expense of many. 82
However, the existence of the challenge of bilateral legitimacy can only be eased and not
eradicated in liberal-democratic societies. The political institution of citizenship (even a
less restrictive version than currently exists in the three states) is likely to fail to compel
the necessary allegiance unless there are accompanying stories of peoplehood that
resonate with large numbers of people. 83 The types of models for which I am advocating
would help to mitigate the challenge of bilateral legitimacy by making the ability to be a
legitimate member of the polity more flexible, and removing many of the reasons that
(non-Anglo) individuals might negate the legitimacy of the state to govern.
81
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1 believe this is the case because I agree with Rogers Smith’s arguments regarding the
importance of stories of peoplehood to human organization.
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